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COGS  cost of goods sold
COICOP Classiﬁ  cation of Individual Consumption According to Purpose
CPI  Consumer Price Index
CRk k-ﬁ  rm concentration ratio
DSGE  dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
ECB  European Central Bank
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EPL  employment protection legislation
ESCB  European System of Central Banks
EU European  Union
FDI  foreign direct investment
GDP  gross domestic product
HHI Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman Index
HICP  Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
ICT  information and communication technology
IPN Inﬂ  ation Persistence Network
NACE statistical  classiﬁ  cation of economic activities in the European Union
NCB  national central bank
NUTS  Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMR  product market regulation
PPLD  pseudo price level data
PPP  purchasing power parity
RPLI  relative price level index
SBS  structural business statistics
TFP  total factor productivity
VAT  value added tax
WDN  Wage Dynamics Network5
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Buying group: a group that uses the collective bargaining power of its members (ﬁ  rms and 
entrepreneurs) to negotiate more competitive product prices.
Discounter: a retail entity that typically uses a relatively small sales area to offer a limited range of 
products at a discounted price.
Hypermarket: a retail facility that combines a supermarket and a department store and usually has 
a sales area of above 2,500m².
Non-ﬁ  nancial business sector: comprises the total economy, excluding the agriculture and ﬁ  shing, 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation services and public services sectors.
Private label: the own company brand of a retailer (usually produced by an outside ﬁ  rm).
Quaranta table: a diagnostic tool for the checking and approval of purchasing power parity survey 
results.6
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The distributive trades sector, which is primarily 
accounted for by wholesale and retail trade, 
is not only economically important in its own 
right, but also relevant to monetary policy. 
Ultimately, it is retailers who set the actual 
prices of most consumer goods. They are the 
main interface between producers of consumer 
goods and consumers, with around half of 
private consumption accounted for by retail 
trade. The “value added” of this intermediation 
service can be substantial, as this accounts for, 
on average, about 25% of consumer prices. 
The purpose of this report is to analyse the 
structural features of the distributive trades 
sector and the developments within it, as well 
as how these may inﬂ   uence prices and price 
dynamics. 
Several aspects are relevant. From a monetary 
policy point of view, increasing the degree of 
competition in the distributive trades sector 
may have effects not only on price levels, 
but also on price dynamics, via a reduction in 
mark-ups, an increase in price ﬂ  exibility and a 
greater and more rapid pass-through of changes 
in costs to prices. Structural developments, 
such as the increasing market penetration of 
hard discounters, online trade and private label 
brands, the role of buying groups and the relative 
bargaining power between producers and 
retailers are of great importance to consumers 
and price determination. In addition, these 
may have implications for the measurement of 
consumer prices and inﬂ  ation. More generally, 
the distributive trades sector plays an important 
role in determining cross-country differentials 
in productivity growth, both within and outside 
Europe: the sector has accounted for over 
one-third of the widening gap in aggregate 
productivity between the euro area and the 
United States since the mid-1990s.
A speciﬁ  c contribution of this report is the use 
of a wide range of data sources,1 including a 
unique dataset on the location of over 100,000 
individual grocery stores across most of the euro 
area, to investigate how to better measure the 
degree of competition and concentration in this 
sector, and to compare sector developments 
from a national, regional and local perspective.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
TRADES SECTOR
The distributive trades sector covers three broad 
sub-sectors: motor, wholesale and retail trade. 
This report primarily focuses on wholesale and 
retail trade. In general, wholesalers intermediate 
between  ﬁ   rms, whereas retailers intermediate 
between  ﬁ   rms and consumers. Depending on 
which measure is considered, the distributive 
trades account for a varying proportion of the 
non-ﬁ  nancial business sector: around one-third 
in terms of total turnover, number of ﬁ  rms and 
self-employment and around 15% to 25% in 
terms of other measures, such as value added 
and overall employment. Although by some 
measures (most notably value added) the 
wholesale trade sub-sector is larger than the retail 
trade sub-sector, this report focuses on the latter 
owing to the fact that it is closer to consumers 
and consumer prices; retail trade is also more 
important with regard to direct employment.
The distributive trades in general, and retail trade 
in particular, have a number of distinguishing 
features in relation to the rest of the non-ﬁ  nancial 
business sector. They are generally more labour-
intensive and have more lower-skilled workers 
on average. Proﬁ   t margins in both retail and 
wholesale trade are below average, but this 
may simply reﬂ  ect a high degree of turnover 
(per unit of capital employed) rather than strong 
competitive pressures.
The retail trade sub-sector also displays 
signiﬁ   cant diversity across both euro area 
In particular, it utilises: (i) time series provided by national  1 
statistical institutes on regional consumer price indices broken 
down across a number of product groups, as well as information 
from private databases (such as store location data from Nielsen 
and retailing and consumer goods-related modules from 
Euromonitor Passport); (ii) detailed data and the “Quaranta 
tables” from Eurostat’s PPP database; (iii) individual price 
and survey data collected under both the Inﬂ  ation Persistence 
Network and Wage Dynamics Network of the Eurosystem; and 
(iv) country-speciﬁ  c information provided by ESCB staff, which 
is used to construct a new indicator of the degree of regulation on 
shop opening times.8
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countries and segments. Substantial price 
differences exist between branded and private 
label goods and also across store types. The 
rapid growth of discounters, of private label 
brands and of online trade, clearly visible to 
consumers, has had a noteworthy impact, but this 
has been of varying importance across countries. 
Buying groups affecting the bargaining power 
between producers and retailers, although less 
well-known to consumers, are also important in 
price-setting.
The acquisition cost of goods sold represents the 
single biggest cost incurred by the distributive 
trades sector, albeit with some notable variation 
in magnitude across sectors. In terms of 
importance, this is generally followed by labour 
costs. The cost structure, as a whole, plays a 
signiﬁ  cant role in explaining price-setting, and 
analysing this can help explain differences in 
the rate of pass-through of costs across sectors. 
More generally, differences in cost structures 
and the resulting proﬁ  t margins across countries 
for given segments may be indicative of 
differing degrees of competition.
As regards the labour market, the distributive 
trades sector accounts for a high percentage of 
self-employed and part-time workers, as well as 
young and female workers. On average, these 
account for a high proportion of low-skilled, 
low-productivity and, consequently, low-paid 
labour. They also account for a signiﬁ  cant 
proportion of the new jobs created over the 
last 15 years. Much of the growth in turnover 
and employment within the sector has come 
from larger ﬁ  rms, reﬂ  ecting the fact that this 
historically fragmented sector is gradually 
consolidating.
Although the report focuses on the distributive 
trades sector in euro area countries, it also 
considers developments in this sector in some of 
the EU’s newer Member States. Many large euro 
area retailers have invested substantially in the new 
Member States and have undoubtedly contributed 
strongly to the modernisation, expansion and 
productivity of the distributive trades here. 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the substantial 
changes and convergence that have already 
occurred, there remains some heterogeneity, both 
with regard to the euro area countries and within 
the new Member States themselves. 
MEASURING REGULATION AND COMPETITION 
IN THE DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES SECTOR
Regulation and competition in the distributive 
trades sector are key issues and are discussed 
in some detail within this report. As regards 
regulatory issues, there are a large number 
of areas of activity that are subject to speciﬁ  c 
regulations in the sector, covering issues as 
diverse as the setting-up of establishments, 
contractual relationships with suppliers, opening 
hours, price controls, promotions and sale 
conditions, and waste and recycling. These 
vary substantially across countries and regions, 
as well as in terms of products and store 
type/size. An appropriate degree of regulation 
is a necessary feature of a market economy; 
however, excessive or badly designed regulation 
can hinder competition and favour incumbents.
In addition, general planning regulations have 
often been cited by competition authorities as 
playing an important role in creating barriers 
to entry or expansion in the distributive 
trades. Fragmented national, regional and 
local commercial planning frameworks, in 
conjunction with different rules on property 
and land ownership, are factors likely to 
dissuade entrepreneurs and ﬁ  rms from entering 
certain markets. These regulations may also 
have unintended consequences. Indeed, some 
commentators partly attribute the growth 
of discounters to planning restrictions, 
as discounters frequently fall below speciﬁ  ed 
size thresholds subject to additional restrictions.
While they may facilitate cross-country 
comparisons, summary measures of product 
market regulation need to be interpreted with 
caution and should not be taken at face value. 
In this report, a new indicator of shop opening 
time restrictions is developed using detailed 
country-level information, which allows for 
a more nuanced and differentiated view on 9
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY this issue. More generally, while there is clear 
evidence of an easing in the degree of product 
market regulation in the distributive trades 
sector across almost all countries, there remains 
considerable scope for further progress. 
Regulatory differences across countries may 
also impede online commerce in general and 
cross-border e-commerce in particular. The 
strong growth, but relatively low market share, 
of domestic online commerce and the importance 
of physical cross-border retail shopping in many 
parts of the euro area illustrate the potential for 
cross-border e-commerce. This is all the more 
so in view of the evidence that online prices 
can differ signiﬁ   cantly across countries and 
that consumer choice is often restricted because 
domestic online suppliers only offer a limited 
range of products. 
Measuring effective competition in the 
distributive trades sector is particularly difﬁ  cult. 
This report tries to improve our understanding 
in this area. It considers a number of 
different indicators (concentration, proﬁ  tability, 
pass-through) at different levels of spatial (local, 
regional and national) and organisational (store, 
parent company and buying group) aggregation, 
as well as both upstream (producer-related) 
and downstream (consumer-related) aspects. 
These can provide differing messages. At the 
national level, a number of key results are 
found. A general ﬁ  nding is that concentration is 
relatively low at the national level in southern 
European countries owing to the persistence of 
a more traditional retail structure. The degree 
of concentration also varies substantially 
across the retail sub-sector, being highest for 
electronics and appliances and grocery retailing. 
Over time, a slight upward drift in concentration 
has been observed for most retail segments, 
reﬂ   ecting the ongoing consolidation in 
European retail trade. Lastly, there tends to be a 
positive correlation between concentration and 
proﬁ  tability measures, possibly partly related to 
efﬁ  ciency gains.
Regional and local measures of competition are 
also constructed by using a unique dataset on 
the location of over 100,000 individual grocery 
stores spread across the euro area. As regards 
which level is “best”, this may depend on the 
perspective involved. For example, for large 
producers, competition might be best considered 
at the national or supranational level. For food 
and grocery producers, competition might be 
primarily regional, whereas, for consumers, 
it might be local. Considering ﬁ  rst the results for 
the downstream (consumer) market, while there 
are some similarities with the results obtained 
when using national data, there are also some 
noteworthy differences: some markets that 
appeared to be relatively fragmented at the 
national level actually turned out to be quite 
concentrated at the local level and vice versa. 
As for the upstream market, concentration 
measures using buying group information 
generally provide a relatively similar picture 
to store-level measures, albeit with certain 
differences. Overall, the key message is that 
measuring the degree of competition in retail 
trade is not a straightforward matter; this is an 
issue that should be carefully considered along a 
number of different dimensions.
THE ROLE OF THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE 
DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES SECTOR IN EXPLAINING 
DIFFERENCES IN PRICE LEVELS AND DYNAMICS
Given that the intermediation services provided 
by the distributive trades sector account 
for a large part of consumer prices and that 
distributive services are not generally traded 
internationally, this report considers to what 
extent the structural aspects of the retail sub-
sector, combined with other indicators, help 
to explain differences in price levels, price 
dynamics and convergence. The main ﬁ  ndings 
are as follows. 
There remains a  1)  considerable degree of 
price dispersion across the euro area; this is 
lower on average for goods than for services, 
but it is still sizeable in most cases – tending 
to be lower for electronics and for clothing 
and footwear and higher for food products. 
The evidence points to a limited degree of 
price convergence that appears to come to a 
halt around the period 2004 to 2006. There is 10
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also compelling evidence of a strong “border 
effect” on price differentials across euro 
area countries, which suggests ample scope 
for further improving the Single Market. 
The structural and regulatory features of 
the distributive trades sector appear to help 
explain differences in price levels across 
countries. 
Using information drawn from the Inﬂ  ation  2) 
Persistence Network and the Wage Dynamics 
Network of the Eurosystem, the report 
considers price-setting behaviour. It ﬁ  nds that 
higher competition is associated with more 
frequent price changes in the retail sub-sector. 
Another ﬁ  nding is that price changes are more 
frequent in supermarkets and hypermarkets, 
though not larger in average magnitude. 
These results hold across countries and 
product types.
Using a combination of two unique datasets,  3) 
the report examines the relationship between 
price dynamics at the regional level and 
competition (measured at different levels of 
organisational and spatial aggregation and 
across a number of product groups). It ﬁ  nds 
that  higher market concentration has, in 
recent times, been associated with higher 
price growth for food and drink products. 
The interpretation of this correlation calls 
for further research, but it does appear to 
be robust and to hold across individual 
countries.
This report also considers the magnitude and  4) 
speed of cost pass-through. As a stylised 
fact, producer prices show a stronger and 
faster reaction to cost shocks than consumer 
prices. However, there is large dispersion in 
respect of the transmission of costs to prices 
across countries and sectors. The degree of 
competition appears to be positively related 
to the long-run pass-through of import 
prices to consumer prices. As regards food 
prices, a more pronounced presence of 
discounters seems to be associated with 
a higher pass-through. In the clothing 
segment, changes in import prices are not 
fully transmitted to consumer prices.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This report contributes to a better  1) 
understanding of the impact of the structural 
features of the distributive trades sector on 
prices and price-setting behaviour, thereby 
improving on previous research in this area. 
From a policy perspective, it highlights the 
importance of structural reforms that help 
enhance competition in this sector.
The  ﬁ   ndings regarding the impact of  2) 
structural features on price-setting behaviour 
and on price level differences across euro 
area countries suggest that further progress 
in improving effective competition in the 
distributive trades sector could help reduce 
border effects, narrow price differentials, 
strengthen the Single Market and enhance 
the effectiveness of monetary policy.
As concerns product market regulation,  3) 
although there is evidence of an easing in the 
degree of regulation impacting the distributive 
trades sector across almost all euro area 
countries, there remains considerable scope 
for further progress. However, the indicators 
available for this analysis may only capture 
some aspects of regulation. 
With regard to labour markets, the  4) 
distributive trades sector has the potential 
to be a major contributor to job growth, 
particularly for speciﬁ  c groups of the labour 
force, such as the low-skilled. Given the 
“Europe 2020” growth strategy of the EU, 
and in view of the high unemployment 
rates arising from the crisis, this would be 
an important point to consider. However, 
sector-speciﬁ   c product market and more 
general labour market structural rigidities 
may impede productivity growth and job 
creation in this sector.11
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY All in all, a crucial step towards further  5) 
progress would be the full implementation of 
the Services Directive. The beneﬁ  ts arising 
from further liberalisation and harmonisation 
of market conditions may be seen, in part, 
from the report’s ﬁ  nding that higher product 
market regulation is associated with higher 
price levels. Moreover, structural reforms 
in the distributive trades sector could 
reduce mark-ups and give rise to substantial 
increases in both output and real wages. 
In order to unleash the full potential and 
beneﬁ   ts of online and cross-border trade, 
remaining regulatory and legislative barriers 
(such as consumer law and VAT-related 
issues) need to be addressed. This could also 
contribute signiﬁ   cantly to improving the 
functioning of the Single Market.
The implications of ongoing developments  6) 
in the distributive trades sector for the 
measurement of price levels and price 
changes should also be considered by the 
relevant bodies to avoid the emergence 
of biases in measures of consumer price 
inﬂ  ation. Relevant issues here would be the 
analysis of alternative methods to consider 
new outlets and new product characteristics 
and prices, as well as how, and when, to 
introduce them into the HICP basket (e.g. via 
hedonic regressions or consumer surveys), 
and the need to ensure that samples are 
regularly updated and remain representative.
This report uses a wide range of data sources –  7) 
some of which are unique – to study an area 
that has been under-investigated, especially at 
the European level. There is, however, ample 
room for further research in this direction. 
In particular, it is important to gain further 
insight into how competition impacts retail 
price levels at a more disaggregated level 
(i.e. at the local or regional level rather than 
at just the national level). In this regard, the 
collection of more price level data at a highly 
disaggregated level (e.g. across store types, 
regions, etc.) would be particularly useful.12
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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION  2
The distributive trades, consisting of 
wholesaling and retailing, are a key sector of 
the economy. As the main interface between 
producers and consumers, the sector is 
particularly important from a monetary policy 
point of view: this is where most consumer 
goods prices are ultimately set. Despite almost 
20 years of the Single Market, mark-ups in the 
distributive trades sector can still be substantial 
and differ considerably across countries, 
while cross-border trade remains limited. This 
report examines the structural features of the 
distributive trades sector which are likely to 
play an important role in determining price level 
and inﬂ  ation differences across countries.
Given its key role in the economy, the 
distributive trades sector has been studied 
extensively by policy-makers, though generally 
from a different perspective. The European 
Commission recently published the results of its 
market monitoring exercise, which covers a 
wide range of issues affecting the retail trades, 
such as consumer accessibility, relationships 
with upstream producers, labour markets, 
logistics and information and communication 
technology (ICT), as well as energy use.3 
Many national competition authorities have also 
conducted comprehensive reviews of the 
distributive trades sector in their countries – 
for example, those of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom.4 These reports illustrate the 
challenging issues involved and the complex 
interaction between upstream agents (producers 
and wholesalers) and downstream agents 
(retailers), as well as the importance of the 
regulatory environment in supporting 
competition in this sector.5 However, there is 
relatively little research investigating the impact 
of the structural features of the distributive 
trades on prices and price-setting behaviour. 
The objective of this report is to shed light on 
these aspects by examining: (a) the main features 
of, and issues relating to, the euro area 
distributive trades sector from a monetary policy 
perspective; and (b) the impact of these features 
on price levels and inﬂ  ation behaviour.
The distributive trades sector has been 
undergoing substantial changes, in terms 
of, for example, growing consolidation and 
internationalisation and changing retail 
formats (e.g. the increasing market shares of 
supermarkets and hypermarkets, the growth of 
the discount sector and the expansion of private 
label brands). These developments inﬂ  uence 
competition and cost structure and play an 
important role in determining mark-ups and, 
thus, affect ﬁ  nal consumer prices in the euro 
area. As regards labour market issues, this sector 
has contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the improvement 
in employment growth experienced by the 
euro area during the past decade. However, 
productivity is comparatively low and the sector 
accounts for more than one-third of the widening 
Prepared by Aidan Meyler at the European Central Bank (ECB). 2 
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Health  3 
and Consumer Policy also regularly studies the retail markets 
in its Consumer Markets Scoreboard (CMS), focusing on the 
integration of the retail internal market, particularly from the 
consumer perspective. To date, ﬁ  ve editions of the CMS have 
been published (European Commission, (2011b), (2010c), 
(2010b), (2009) and (2008)). Each of these considers the general 
progress made in the integration of the retail internal market as 
well as speciﬁ  c topics. For example, the third and ﬁ  fth editions of 
the CMS consider cross-border and online consumer purchases. 
Both of these issues are discussed in Box 1 of this report.
In 2006, the UK Competition Commission (UKCC) initiated,  4 
at the request of the country’s Ofﬁ  ce of Fair Trading (OFT), 
a comprehensive two-year study into the supply of groceries by 
retailers in the United Kingdom. This is because the OFT believed 
there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting that a feature…of 
the market…prevents, restricts or distorts competition”. The ﬁ  nal 
report (UKCC, (2008)) concluded as follows: “…in many 
important respects, competition in the UK groceries industry is 
effective and delivers good outcomes for consumers, but not all 
is well. We have concerns in two principal areas. First, we found 
that several grocery retailers have strong positions in a number 
of local markets. Second, we found that the transfer of excessive 
risk and unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers 
through various supply chain practices…”. The Competition 
Authority of Ireland has, in recent years, undertaken two studies 
related to the distributive trades sector: the ﬁ   rst study – the 
“Grocery Monitor Project” – was initiated following the abolition 
of the Groceries Order in March 2006 to assess how the grocery 
retail and wholesale trade in Ireland had responded to the new 
legislative environment; the second – “Retail-related Import and 
Distribution Study” – was published in 2009.
One key ﬁ  nding from the Irish study was that the retail planning  5 
system made it difﬁ  cult for new retailers to enter the Irish grocery 
market and for existing retailers to expand their operations. A 
similar conclusion was drawn by the French competition authority 
(Autorité de la concurrence) in 2007, prompting a reform of the 
authorisation procedure for large outlets in France a year later. In 
February 2011 Germany’s federal cartel ofﬁ  ce (Bundeskartellamt) 
announced an investigation into the relationship between leading 
grocery retailers and their suppliers.13
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INTRODUCTION AND 
MOTIVATION in the aggregate productivity gap between the 
United States and the euro area that has occurred 
since the mid-1990s. These issues are presented 
in more detail in Section 1.1 of the report.
As described in Section 1.2, regulation plays 
a fundamental role in the distributive trades 
sector, particularly in terms of barriers to 
entry, operating restrictions and price controls. 
Although regulation varies primarily at the 
national level, in some countries, there is also 
an important regional element, which may help 
disentangle the effects of regulation from other 
economy-wide factors. Section 1.3 considers 
the empirical measurement of competition, 
which is often assessed in terms of the degree 
of concentration within a sector. However, the 
relationship between concentration and price 
levels and sector dynamics is ambiguous. 
Regarding price levels, the presence of 
economies of scale or scope can have a potential 
downward impact on prices stemming from 
large, efﬁ  cient players. But this effect has to be 
assessed against the potential upward impact 
from reduced competition. Other things being 
equal, increased competition should improve 
efﬁ   ciency and reduce mark-ups, and thereby 
lead to lower prices. However, increased 
competition may also give rise to ongoing 
dynamic effects via higher productivity levels 
and growth, which can result in lower inﬂ  ation 
as well as lower price levels.
Having set the scene, the second part of the 
report considers the impact of the structural 
features of the distributive trades sector on 
price level differences, price-setting behaviour, 
regional price change dynamics and the 
pass-through of costs. These are discussed in 
Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. The 
signiﬁ   cance of the regulatory and structural 
features of the distributive trades for price level 
differences is underlined in Section 2.1, which 
also investigates the “border effect” on price 
differentials. Section 2.2 considers the impact 
of store formats on price-setting and examines 
the extent to which structural differences 
and competition inﬂ   uence the frequency of 
price changes. However, competition in the 
distributive trades sector must also be considered 
from a number of different perspectives – most 
importantly, spatially (in terms of local, regional, 
national or supranational markets) and from the 
position of upstream and downstream agents 
(although consumers interact with retailers at 
the individual store level, producers usually 
interact with retailers at the parent company or 
even buying group level). Hence, Section 2.3 
considers regional price dynamics and the extent 
to which these are inﬂ  uenced by the measures 
of concentration calculated at the regional and 
local level in Section 1.3.
The link between competition and the degree of 
cost pass-through is, to some extent, ambiguous. 
In the (theoretical) case of perfect competition, 
retailers have no option but to fully pass through 
increases in upstream producer prices, as they 
have no excess proﬁ  ts that can be used as a 
buffer. In the case of imperfect competition, 
where many competing producers sell products 
that are differentiated from one another, 
the degree of pass-through will depend on many 
factors and the link between competition and 
the extent of pass-through may be less clear. 
The relationship between the structural aspects 
of the distributive trades sector and the degree 
of pass-through is considered in more detail in 
Section 2.4. An empirical analysis is undertaken 
for consumer goods in general, and for prices of 
food and clothing and footwear in particular. 
This report uses a wide range of data sources 
and some unique datasets. More speciﬁ  cally, it 
utilises: (i) detailed data and the “Quaranta 
tables” from Eurostat’s purchasing power parity 
(PPP) database to study the impact of 
competition and regulation in the distributive 
trades sector on price level differences across 
countries; (ii) individual price and survey data 
collected under the Eurosystem’s Inﬂ  ation 
Persistence Network (IPN) and Wage Dynamics 
Network (WDN) to consider the impact of 
competition and the structural features of the 
distributive trades sector on price-setting 
behaviour; (iii) country-speciﬁ  c  information 14
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011
provided by ESCB staff 6 to construct a new and 
more reﬁ  ned indicator of the extent of regulation 
on shop opening times; (iv) time series provided 
by national statistical institutes on regional 
consumer price dynamics (broken down across 
a number of product groups), which are 
combined with a unique “census-type” database 
on grocery store locations. For a complete 
overview of the main data sources used in this 
report, see Table A19 in the Appendix.
Given the original and challenging nature of 
much of the analysis contained in this report, 
the ﬁ  ndings and conclusions in some areas must 
be considered as preliminary. Nonetheless, 
the research highlights the fact that the structural 
features of the distributive trades sector, as well 
as the degree of competition within it, are of 
importance to monetary policy-makers whose 
primary aim is to maintain price stability.
These staff are members of the Monetary Policy Committee task  6 
force that was responsible for drafting this report.15
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1  AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
TRADES: STRUCTURAL, REGULATORY 
AND COMPETITION FEATURES
This chapter provides an overview of the 
distributive trades sector in the euro area in order 
to give an insight into the key features of the sector 
that will underpin the analysis in Chapter 2. 
1.1   THE IMPORTANCE, STRUCTURE 
AND PERFORMANCE OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
TRADES SECTOR
This section considers the macroeconomic 
importance and structure of the distributive 
trades, including their economic evolution, cost 
structures and labour market features. 
The main ﬁ  ndings are that the distributive trades 
are of key importance in the macroeconomy, 
both directly and – functioning as intermediaries 
between producers and consumers – indirectly. 
They have a number of distinguishing features, 
generally being more labour-intensive and 
employing more lower-skilled workers. While 
proﬁ   t margins are below average, this may 
reﬂ   ect a high degree of turnover (per unit 
of capital employed) rather than strong 
competitive pressures. The retail trade 
sub-sector displays signiﬁ  cant diversity across 
both euro area countries and segments. Key 
issues are the growing internationalisation of 
retail trade along with the growth of discounters, 
of private label brands and of online trade.
1.1.1 DEFINITIONAL ISSUES  7
The distributive trades function as 
“intermediaries” between economic agents that 
are upstream (e.g. producers) and those that 
are downstream (e.g. consumers). While they 
generally do not produce goods themselves 
(although that is changing 8), they clearly provide 
a necessary economic service.
The distributive trades sector covers three 
broad areas: motor, wholesale and retail trade.9 
The motor trade is considered to be a separate 
sub-sector with quite different characteristics, 
partly because of the close link between the 
companies in this ﬁ   eld and the automotive 
industry.10 Wholesale trade companies generally 
do not sell directly to consumers, but rather to 
businesses and retailers. Retailers generally 
sell directly to consumers, but not necessarily 
exclusively so. As will be highlighted below, 
wholesale and retail trade are by far the largest 
sub-sectors within the distributive trades sector. 
As a result, and given the speciﬁ   c nature of 
the motor trade sub-sector, this report focuses 
primarily on wholesale and retail trade.11
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
TRADES
In the euro area as a whole, the distributive 
trades sector accounts for approximately 33% of 
ﬁ  rms in the non-ﬁ   nancial business sector 
(see Chart 1).12 This is a ﬁ  gure that ranges from 
around 25% in Germany to 40% in Slovakia 
Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.2 were prepared by Magdalena Komzakova  7 
and Aidan Meyler at the ECB.
For example, with the increasing importance of private or own- 8 
label brands and with companies in the clothing and footwear 
segment both producing and selling clothing.
Table A20 in the Appendix shows the breakdown and  9 
composition of the distributive trades sector according 
to the NACE Rev. 2 system used by EU institutions for 
classifying economic activities, which was adopted in 2006 
for implementation from 2008 onwards. For reasons of data 
availability, the previous classiﬁ  cation system, NACE Rev. 1.1, 
is largely used in this report. This is broadly similar to NACE 
Rev. 2, but there are certain differences.
For a more detailed overview of the automotive sector, see the  10 
website of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Competition (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/motor_
vehicles/overview_en.html).
This section primarily uses data from Eurostat’s Structural  11 
Business Statistics (SBS) dataset; for an overview of the main 
datasets used in this report, see Table A19. SBS data are used 
owing to the rich level of disaggregation at which these data 
are available, plus the fact that there is a separate module with 
speciﬁ  c information on the features of the distributive trades. 
However, it may also be the case that for some countries, owing 
to changes in methodology, comparisons over long periods of 
time should be made with caution. For example, as regards the 
SBS data for Portugal, a gap exists for the period prior to 2004, 
as the national statistical authority only had access to 
administrative data from that year onwards. Hence, any 
comparisons related to the pre-2004 period should be made with 
care.
The non-ﬁ  nancial business sector is comprised of the total economy,  12 
excluding the agriculture and ﬁ  shing,  ﬁ  nancial  intermediation 
services and public services sectors. It includes the mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, utilities, construction, distributive trades, 
hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communication, 
and real estate, renting and business activities sectors.16
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011
(see Chart A1 in the Appendix), partly reﬂ  ecting 
differences in average ﬁ  rm size across countries 
and sectors. These aspects are discussed in more 
detail below. In terms of turnover, the share of 
the distributive trades sector is equally 
substantial, at around 35%, a ﬁ  gure  ranging 
from 30% in Germany to 55% in Greece. 
However, as the distributive trades essentially 
provide an intermediation service by buying 
goods from producers and selling them to 
consumers, their turnover is not necessarily a 
good indicator of their economic impact. In this 
regard, value added provides a more reliable 
indicator. Value added represents the difference 
between sales and the total cost of all non-labour 
inputs, including the costs of goods sold. 
According to this measure, the distributive 
trades sector accounts for around 20% of the 
non-ﬁ  nancial business sector in the euro area. 
This  ﬁ   gure is relatively lower for Germany, 
Ireland and Slovakia but relatively higher for 
Greece and Cyprus, reﬂ  ecting  perhaps 
differences in the rest of the economy, in 
particular the performance and size of the 
industry sector, rather than any features of the 
distributive trades sector itself.13 Lastly, 
productivity in the distributive trades sector is 
generally below the average for the non-ﬁ  nancial 
business sector. Meanwhile, the self-employed 
(with a share of over 30%) account for a 
relatively larger proportion of total employment 
in this sector. These issues are explored in more 
detail below.
KEY FEATURES OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES
Thus far, the distributive trades have been 
discussed as a homogeneous group. However, 
even at an aggregated level, there are substantial 
differences between the main sub-sectors 
(see Chart 2), especially with regard to 
wholesale and retail trade. Meanwhile, the 
share of the distributive trades sector accounted 
for by the motor trade sub-sector varies little 
between different measures, with values falling 
within a range from 12% to 16%. By far the 
largest sub-sector in terms of number of ﬁ  rms 
and employment is retail trade (particularly in 
respect of self-employment, where it registers 
a share of 62%), while wholesale trade is more 
important in terms of turnover, production 
value, value added, proﬁ   ts and labour costs. 
These variations suggest important differences 
in  ﬁ   rm characteristics and productivity levels 
across the various sub-sectors.
The proﬁ  t share (the share of proﬁ  ts in value 
added) is lowest in the retail sub-sector and highest 
in the wholesale sub-sector (see Chart 3a).14 
Proﬁ  t  margins, once adjusted for the implicit 
labour income of the self-employed, are broadly 
similar across the distributive trades, at around 
4% to 5%, but are only around half the size of 
margins in the non-ﬁ   nancial business sector 
(see Chart 3b). However, as will be discussed 
PPP-adjusted value added in the distributive trades sector per  13 
capita is broadly similar across countries but varies substantially 
in respect of industry.
Note that the proﬁ  t share shown in Chart 3a has been adjusted for  14 
the imputed labour income of the self-employed. The reason for 
this adjustment is to increase comparability across countries and 
sectors. For the purposes of this report, the adjustment was made 
in two stages, with average compensation per employee ﬁ  rst 
being adjusted downwards by the average amount accounted for 
by social security contributions (20%) and then further adjusted 
by an additional 20% – or 36% in total – to account for average 
differences in skill levels, etc. See Gollin (2002) for a more 
detailed discussion of this issue.
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later in Section 1.3, comparisons of proﬁ  t 
margins across sectors should be made and 
interpreted with caution.15 The fact that the 
distributive trades sector provides intermediation 
services, often involving a very high turnover 
rate for goods, means that low proﬁ  t margins do 
not necessarily imply low proﬁ  tability,  for 
example if measured in terms of return on capital.
Overall, and notwithstanding the differences 
highlighted above, the breakdown and features 
of the main sub-sectors are broadly similar 
across euro area countries. Wholesale trade 
is most important in terms of value added and 
turnover, but retail trade is more signiﬁ  cant in 
terms of employment, number of ﬁ  rms  and, 
above all, interaction with consumers. The next 
section examines the retail trade sub-sector in 
more detail.
1.1.2 A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GROCERY TRADE
Retail trade is divided roughly evenly into 
grocery trade (primarily food and certain 
household items) and non-grocery trade 
(clothing and footwear, household furnishings 
and electronic goods). These two parts of the 
Aside from the issue of imputing the labour income of the self- 15 
employed, the calculation and interpretation of proﬁ  tability 
measures is quite complex. See ECB (2004) for a more detailed 
discussion.
Chart 2 Share of sub-sectors in the 































Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff 
calculations.
Chart 3 Comparison across distributive trades sub-sectors
(average proﬁ  t share (adjusted) in euro area distributive trades 
sectors; percentages)
(average proﬁ  t margin (turnover; adjusted) in euro area 
distributive trades sectors; percentages)
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sub-sector differ substantially in terms of their 
main economic characteristics, with grocery 
trade being somewhat more homogeneous than 
non-grocery trade. This section considers the 
grocery trade in more detail.
Most consumers obtain the basic necessities 
required for daily living, such as food and 
household goods, in the grocery market. 
However, although the goods sold here may 
be broadly similar across countries, there are 
notable differences across countries in terms 
of, for example, store format, the degree of 
internationalisation, market penetration by hard 
discounters and private label brands, and the 
role of buying groups.
These differences are clearly visible in the 
summary statistics presented in Table A1. 
The total number of grocery stores in the euro 
area is approximately 850,000, the majority of 
which, unsurprisingly, are located in the larger 
economies. However, it is striking that both Italy 
and Spain feature more stores than Germany 
and France, despite having smaller populations. 
This may be due, in part, to differing deﬁ  nitions 
and thresholds for classifying stores. When 
it comes to selling space, measured in square 
metres – which is perhaps a more meaningful 
indicator – Germany (with almost 40 million m²) 
and France (with almost 30 million m²) account 
for the largest proportion of the total euro area 
grocery selling space of 150 million m². This 
inverse correlation between number of stores and 
selling space captures an important distinction 
in the European grocery trade. Southern 
European countries, such as Greece, Cyprus, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Malta, tend to have 
more traditional and smaller grocery retailers 
than certain northern European countries, for 
example Finland, Germany, France and Austria. 
In terms of real sales per store, Finland and 
France have the highest on average, but in 
the case of Finland this is mainly because the 
stores are generally of a large size – a feature 
of the grocery trade in both these countries. 
On a square metre basis, the countries with the 
highest real sales per store are Ireland, France, 
the Netherlands and Belgium. 
It should be borne in mind that these statistics 
are somewhat crude, being country averages 
only; they do not account for heterogeneity 
across stores or regions. Furthermore, when 
trying to interpret the different indicators, it is 
also necessary to consider geographical and 
economic differences between countries (such 
as population density and distribution and 
income levels), as well as socio-cultural and 
regulatory factors. 
Chart 4 presents the distribution of grocery 
sales by store format across countries; 
this varies considerably, reﬂ  ecting a combination 
of factors, such as historical legacies, societal 
preferences, socio-geographical factors and 
regulatory conditions.16
On average, supermarkets accounted for just 
over 33% of grocery sales in the euro area in 
2009. However, at the country level, their 
market share was lowest in Germany (at around 
25%), where hard discounters dominate grocery 
sales, and in Cyprus, where smaller, traditional 
retailers account for a relatively large proportion 
of sales. The market share of supermarkets was 
relatively high in the Netherlands and Malta, 
where hypermarkets account for a relatively 
small proportion of grocery sales. While a small 
market size may explain this in the case of 
Malta, this is clearly not so for the Netherlands, 
where planning restrictions are behind the 
absence of hypermarkets.17 On average, 
hypermarkets accounted for approximately 25% 
of grocery sales in the euro area. Their market 
share was highest in France, the “home” of the 
The deﬁ   nition of store formats is to some extent arbitrary.  16 
In general, the store size (in terms of square metres) and range 
(in terms of the number and breadth of goods stocked) are the 
criteria used. Hypermarkets tend to have a sales area above 
2,500 m²; supermarkets one between 1,000 m² and 2,500 m²; 
and discounters a sales area of between 400 m² and 1,000 m², 
with a relatively limited range of goods.
In its Economic Surveys of the Netherlands, the OECD has  17 
noted that “planning restrictions in the Netherlands have 
inhibited the entry and expansion of large-format operators, 
which has impeded productivity growth in the sector. While 
Dutch planning and zoning restrictions have been successful 
in protecting small and specialist retailers located in town 
centres, they also may distort competition and offer considerable 
incumbency advantages to established retailers, thus creating 
and maintaining rents”.19
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hypermarket, at over 40%, but also relatively 
high in Finland and Slovenia. Hard discounters – 
discussed in more detail below – accounted for 
nearly 14% of euro area grocery sales, but this 
ﬁ  gure was much higher for countries such as 
Germany and Austria. More traditional retail 
formats, for example small grocers and specialist 
retailers, account for a relatively large proportion 
of retail sales in Ireland, Greece and Cyprus.
In terms of their evolution over the past 
decade, the market shares of supermarkets 
and hypermarkets have remained broadly 
unchanged – although this conceals the fact 
that they have risen in some countries where 
they were previously relatively low, but fallen 
in others where they have been negatively 
impacted by hard discounters (as in the case 
of Germany and Austria). Overall, the market 
share of discounters has risen, while that of 
smaller grocers and specialist retailers for food, 
drink and tobacco has fallen. However, a more 
recent phenomenon is not captured in the chart, 
namely the growth of “superettes”18.
Retail trade, especially in larger countries, 
is dominated by domestic companies. 
For example, in Germany, all of the top eight 
grocery companies are German-controlled. 
Similarly, the six leading companies in France 
are all under French control. However, in 
Italy and Spain, foreign companies have 
broken into the ranks of the market leaders. 
More generally, there has been an ongoing trend 
of internationalisation, particularly in smaller 
economies and eastern European countries 
(see Box 5 on the distributive trades sector in 
the new Member States).
THE EVOLUTION OF DISCOUNTERS
A key development in modern grocery retailing 
is the emergence of discounters. This term 
generally refers to retailers that offer a relatively 
limited number of products (frequently 
own-brand or unbranded) in a relatively small 
sales area, keep costs to a minimum and focus 
on price competition.19 Chart 5a shows that the 
hard discounters’ share of the grocery retail 
market grew from around 10% in 1999 to almost 
15% in 2009. However, this pattern varies 
substantially across countries. For example, the 
market share of discounters in Germany and 
Austria is above 20%, whereas in most other 
countries (except for Belgium, Cyprus, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia) it is 
around 5% (see Chart 5b).
These are compact modern convenience stores. A number of  18 
leading retailers with supermarket and hypermarket chains have 
started to expand into this market with a view to extending their 
coverage of the grocery market.
Frequently, discounters offer fewer than 1,000 stock-keeping  19 
units (SKUs), which compares with the 20,000 plus SKUs of 
a typical large supermarket. Discounters also have a relatively 
small sales area of around 1,000 m² on average, which is 
much smaller than that of a typical supermarket (1,000 m² to 
2,500 m²) or a hypermarket (above 2,500 m²) but larger than that 
of a convenience store, which usually relies on much less than 
500 m². In addition, to keep costs to a minimum, discounters use 
basic display and merchandising and offer minimal additional 
services. Meanwhile, “hard discounters” are characterised by 
the fact that they predominantly offer goods that are low-priced, 
own-label and dry, while “soft discounters” carry more brands 
and fresh food products.
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Given that discounters tend to have lower 
prices (although any comparison of prices 
is made difﬁ   cult by the lack of comparable 
brands), this increase in market share over time 
and heterogeneity across countries may have 
implications for price levels and inﬂ  ation, both 
in terms of measurement issues (see the box 
entitled “Implications of developments in the 
retail trade structure for inﬂ  ation measurement”) 
and in terms of explaining country differences. 
In addition to their possible impact on average 
price levels, given the relatively small store 
size, in some countries discounters have 
found it easier to open new stores than 
supermarkets – a fact which may have 
implications for the evolution of competition 
over time and across countries.20
However, gauging the implications of this 
growth in discounters for the overall level of 
competition in the grocery market is somewhat 
complicated. Although discounters and other 
grocery retailers undoubtedly compete in the 
same overall market (grocery retailing), 
they may not always compete in the same 
market segment or for the same customer group. 
McKinsey and Company (2005) argue that 
discounters only serve 20% of the consumer 
market (i.e. “shoppers who care about price 
above all else”).21 The more recent development 
that many “conventional” retail chains are now 
starting their own discount banner further 
supports the argument that discounters and 
conventional supermarkets may not always be 
competing directly in the very same market.
McKinsey and Company (2005) argue that “discounters are  20 
growing largely because regulation allows them to open more 
quickly and easily than their non-discount rivals” (i.e. owing 
to their limited product range and smaller average store size). 
However, this has not been the case in Spain, where, up until 
2010, a special licence was required in most regions for discount 
stores and large retail outlets.
In this regard, Cleeren et al. (2010) use an empirical entry model  21 
to study competition between grocery discounters and traditional 
supermarkets in Germany. They ﬁ  nd evidence for competition 
both within and between the supermarket and discount formats. 
However, these effects may be complex and require careful 
interpretation. For instance, they ﬁ  nd that the entry of the ﬁ  rst 
two discounters has no signiﬁ  cant effect on the performance of 
supermarkets in a given area. 
Chart 5 Discount retailers
(discounters’ share in percentages)
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ONLINE RETAIL TRADE AND THE DEGREE OF CROSS-BORDER RETAIL COMMERCE  1
Online retail trade is often regarded as the epitome of a “perfect” market and associated with 
improved possibilities for market participants to compare prices 2 (increased transparency) and with 
a dramatic decrease in the importance of geographical proximity for consumption expenditure. 
The evolution of online retail trade should contribute to lower prices, less (local) pricing power 
on the part of individual market participants and increased competition. In addition, sellers would 
have a better chance of reaching more customers, which would allow for economies of scale. 
Consumers would have access to a wider range of products, as their product choice would not be 
limited to the supply of goods available in local sellers’ stores. From a monetary policy perspective, 
the evolution of online retail trade is interesting for two main reasons: the potential for lower and 
regionally (but also internationally) less divergent prices for equal or comparable products and 
the possibility of more ﬂ  exible prices (i.e. more frequent price changes).3
The e-commerce market of the EU has grown considerably compared with that of other 
economies. In 2006, it was estimated to have reached a value of €106 billion, which was roughly 
comparable to its US counterpart. Around 60% of internet users in the EU shopped online 
in 2010, though ﬁ  gures vary strongly across countries.4 In particular markets, such as airline 
travel, the emergence of online trade has completely altered the traditional operating models, 
for example airline companies selling their services via travel agents. Today, some EU low-cost 
carriers basically only sell their services online. The internet is also the fastest growing retail 
channel. In 2008, only direct retail sales (used by 79% of retailers) were more common than sales 
via e-commerce (used by 51% of retailers), and e-commerce was signiﬁ  cantly more popular than 
mail order trade (30%). Although online trade is growing rapidly, it still accounts for just a small 
proportion of overall retail trade (see Chart A(a) and Chart A(b)), with some notable exceptions 
across markets and countries (see Chart A(c) and Chart A(d)). The markets with the highest 
penetration of online trade are electronics and appliances (12%), leisure and personal goods 
(10%) and clothing and footwear.5 Penetration remains relatively low in the health and beauty, 
house and garden and grocery markets. Meanwhile, the ratio of online to store-based retail sales 
is highest in Germany, Finland, France and the Netherlands, but relatively low in Spain, Italy, 
Cyprus, Malta and Portugal.
One noticeable fact is the widening discrepancy between domestic and cross-border e-commerce. 
From 2006 to 2008, the share of all EU consumers purchasing at least one item over the internet 
rose from 27% to 33%. Meanwhile, cross-border e-commerce remains much less important 
1  Prepared by Erik Walch (Banque centrale du Luxembourg) and Aidan Meyler (ECB).
2  According to the European Commission, the internet has become a convenient alternative to “window shopping” and is shaping the 
way that consumers approach their purchasing activity: three out of ﬁ  ve Europeans with internet access at home compare prices online 
before making a purchase, either online or in a physical store.
3  However, Lünnemann and Wintr (2011) have found that internet prices are not necessarily more ﬂ  exible than those of traditional 
“brick and mortar” stores. Instead, there is substantial heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes across shop types and product 
categories.
4  In Romania, for example, only 9% of internet users were found to shop online, while the corresponding ﬁ  gure for the United Kingdom 
was much higher, at 79%. Meanwhile, 69% of the EU population is comprised of “internet users”, with 60% being “regular internet users” 
(see Eurostat (2010)).
5  According to Nielsen (2010), internet sales are particularly popular in speciﬁ  c product categories, such as books, clothing and footwear, 
electronics and music. 22
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(increasing over the same period from 6% to 7%), and only a very small proportion of e-commerce 
transactions within the EU are conducted across national borders (around 2% to 4%).6
Barriers to cross-border e-commerce: The scope for cross-border e-commerce appears to 
be enormous, yet, in practice, consumers often end up being tied to their country of origin. 
6  Source: Public Policy Exchange (see http://publicpolicyexchange.co.uk/events/BB22-PPE2.php).
Chart A Different perspectives on internet retailing
(1999 = 100) (EUR millions)
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Frequently, they are either redirected to national sites or refused a sale. In an EU-wide test of 
online shops, it was possible in only 39% of cases to place an order with an online shop that 
was not located in the same country as the buyer. The remaining 61% of orders failed either 
because traders refused to serve the consumer’s country or for other reasons (technical problems 
or because a particular payment option was not available). Language barriers may also have been 
an issue here, but their importance is not easy to quantify.
Regulatory barriers contribute to signiﬁ  cant market fragmentation at the EU level. Consumer 
law, electronic waste regulations and postal systems are affected by regulatory fragmentation. 
Complex value added tax (VAT) requirements for traders selling across borders make it difﬁ  cult 
for smaller brands and retailers to do business across the EU. These restrictions are directly 
hindering the growth and competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises now active in 
this sector or aspiring to be so in the future. 
Thus, barriers to cross-border trading appear to be the biggest obstacle to the growth of 
e-commerce in the EU. Nevertheless, the potential for more cross-border online shopping and, 
hence, for increased competition, lower prices and greater price ﬂ  exibility seems to be there. 
In 2008, one-third of EU citizens indicated that they would consider buying goods or services 
from another Member State online if these were cheaper or better. In addition, in more than half 
of all Member States, at least 50% of the products tested were found to be at least 10% cheaper 
in a foreign internet shop (shipping costs included). Furthermore, it was generally the case that 
half of the tested products could not be found in any domestic internet shop.
Cross-border shopping could play a signiﬁ  cant role in the development of the Single Market. 
The potential effect of an improved regulatory environment – with sufﬁ  cient trust between market 
participants – on cross-border online trade can also be seen from examples of particularly intense 
“traditional” cross-border retail shopping, e.g. between the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland and within the “Grande Région” encompassing Luxembourg and the surrounding regions 
of Belgium, Germany and France.7 
There are several drivers of cross-border retail shopping. Of course, price differentials (owing 
to matters of taxation (e.g. VAT), exchange rates, and perhaps also factors such as differences 
in labour costs, living standards, and in the rent levels or pricing practices of wholesalers) play 
a role. Differences in the range of available products or simply (additional) transport costs close 
to zero (e.g. if people cross the border anyway as they work in the neighbouring country or in 
the case of particular geographical proximity) are further drivers.8 Cross-border retail trade can 
increase competition and thus contribute to reducing price level differences across countries and 
regions (Section 2.1 discusses the fact that prices appear to vary more across borders/countries 
than within borders/countries). The potential impact on price levels and divergence between 
prices obviously depends on the determinants of this divergence. While cross-border shopping 
7  In Luxembourg, 9.5% of consumption expenditure by resident households took place outside national borders in 2009 (rising 
from 5.4% in 2002). Consumption by non-resident households reached 22% of total private consumption in the country. 
Thus, cross-border shopping can clearly be a bi-directional phenomenon. Some goods are cheaper in Luxembourg, while others can 
be purchased for less abroad. For instance, at its normal rate of 15%, VAT is lower in Luxembourg than in the surrounding countries, 
but some sellers complain about not having the possibility of importing goods from the most competitive foreign supplier and about 
being forced to make imports via Belgium – some of the producers here have assigned a certain “territorial exclusivity” regarding 
Luxembourg to Belgian intermediaries, which leads to additional costs. In addition, some goods produced for the German market, 
for example, cannot be offered by domestic ﬁ  rms, as these goods are not traded by the Belgian intermediary and are only offered by 
German intermediaries. 
8  See European Commission (2003), p. 8.24
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can be expected to prompt a decrease in existing price differentials, this is less so if differences 
are predominantly due to tax differentials, especially where taxes are set in conjunction with 
price controls. In such cases, cross-border shopping will contribute less to bringing the market 
closer to equilibrium.
In conclusion, it can be seen that both domestic e-commerce and cross-border retail shopping can 
be of considerable importance if several conditions are fulﬁ  lled; assuming a signiﬁ  cant initial 
Chart B Domestic versus cross-border online shopping
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE LABELS
Partially in response to, but also as a result 
of, the emergence of discounters, another key 
development in retailing over the last two 
decades, particularly in the grocery trade, has 
been the emergence of “private label” (or “own-
label”) brands.22 These are brands developed 
and owned (although not necessarily produced) 
by the retailers themselves.23 Chart 6a shows 
that the market share of private label goods has 
been increasing steadily in the euro area since 
2001 (data are only available from this point 
onwards). However, this has not occurred 
at the expense of larger brands, which have 
broadly maintained or even slightly increased 
their market share. Rather, it is smaller brands 
as well as artisanal products, such as those 
produced by traditional bakeries, that have 
seen their market shares decline.24
The penetration of private label goods in the 
market for packaged food is, at around 20% to 
25%, higher in western Europe than in any other 
geographical region, including the United States 
(where it stands at slightly above 15%).25 
A major factor that has facilitated the emergence 
of private label brands is the consolidation that 
has taken place in the retail sector and the 
growing scale of retail operations. Thus, a 
number of retailers, in many cases ones 
operating internationally, have achieved 
sufﬁ  cient scale economies to launch and develop 
their own labels. Chart 6b shows that the market 
share of private label goods in this industry 
varies substantially across countries in the euro 
area. Countries where private label brands have 
a market penetration that is above average 
(i.e. a market share of between 30% and 35%) 
include Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
In Spain, France, Portugal, Austria and Slovenia, 
the market penetration is at average levels 
(i.e. private label brands have a market share of 
between 15% and 25%), while in Greece, Italy, 
These are also sometimes referred to as “non-branded” goods.  22 
However, strictly speaking, this is incorrect, as many own-label 
goods are acknowledged as being brands in their own right.
In general, goods which are relatively generic or “commoditised”  23 
are more likely to be offered as private label goods (e.g. canned 
and packaged food products, tissues and kitchen towels, etc.), 
while goods which have a higher degree of product 
differentiation and/or for which advertising or quality is of great 
importance (e.g. cosmetics, alcoholic drinks, baby food) tend to 
exhibit a lower level of private label penetration. J. Steenkamp 
et al. (2004) report that private label brand penetration is highest 
for certain categories of food and beverage and household care 
products, but lower for many personal care products.
This pattern is consistent with submissions made to the UK  24 
Competition Commission Groceries Market Inquiry, which 
suggested that “secondary and tertiary brands may be more 
vulnerable” than brand leaders to the evolution of the private 
label concept (see UK Competition Commission (2007)).
The differing degree of penetration of private label products  25 
can possibly be explained by a mix of socio-cultural structural-
economic factors, including in respect of regulation. For a 
detailed analysis, see J. Steenkamp et al. (2004). This publication 
reports that in countries where consumers have low trust in ﬁ  rms 
and institutions (e.g. owing to unreliable standards), private label 
penetration is likely to be low. Penetration tends to be higher 
where economic development is higher, such as in western 
Europe, North America and Australasia, but other factors, such 
as structural ones (e.g. high retail concentration and high market 
penetration by discounters), also play a role.
divergence in prices and availability (across sellers or countries), the most important conditions 
are acceptable transaction costs and limited barriers to trade, whether implicit or explicit. 
These conditions have not yet been sufﬁ  ciently  fulﬁ   lled for cross-border e-commerce in 
Europe. While e-commerce in the EU as a whole is of a comparable magnitude to that of the 
United States, it remains heavily segmented and constrained by borders, not so much because 
of a lack of interest on the part of consumers or retailers but because of a number of barriers. 
A simpliﬁ  cation or harmonisation of legal dispositions in a number of ﬁ  elds (for example, as 
related to VAT regimes, the reuse of electronic waste, the management of copyright levies, 
payment systems and logistics) and an improvement in consumer protection could free up a 
market that has signiﬁ  cant potential for contributing to increased competition, lower prices and 
less price divergence across the EU. It would then become an important cornerstone for the 
further development of the Single Market.26
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Ireland, Slovakia and Finland, it is below 
average (i.e. the market share stands at around 
10%). Most of these latter countries are 
characterised by a low level of concentration 
and a relatively high degree of traditional format 
channels, such as small grocery retailers and 
independent retailers. 
Lastly, while the net competition and 
welfare-related effects of private label goods 
may be unclear a priori, an increase in the 
market penetration of private label goods is 
likely to exert downward pressure on price 
levels, as such goods are generally cheaper 
(other things being equal).26 There can be large 
differences in terms of the price premium 
commanded by manufacturer brands.27
The existence of private label goods may also offer consumers  26 
more choice and may counteract the bargaining power of the 
producers of large brands. On the other hand, a high penetration 
of private label goods might give retailers too much market 
power, particularly if competition in the retail sector itself 
is insufﬁ   ciently high. In addition, smaller brands might get 
squeezed out of the market by a combination of large branded 
and large private label goods. Thus, while a higher penetration of 
private label goods may reduce the pricing power enjoyed by the 
producers of branded goods, the overall effect on competition is 
not so straightforward owing to the complex interaction between 
the upstream (producer) and downstream (retailer) parts of the 
consumer goods chain. (For a detailed analysis of the impact 
of private labels on the competitiveness of the European food 
supply chain, see European Commission (2011).)
J. Steenkamp et al. (2004) found that “aggregated across  27 
all FMCG (fast moving consumer goods) categories, 
manufacturer brands are priced higher than private labels 
in all regions, but the price premium varies between 31% 
in Central/Eastern Europe to 119% in China”. There are 
also large differences in the average global price premium 
commanded by manufacturer brands with regard to the 
three broad categories of food and beverages (54%), 
household care (over 49%) and personal care (over 96%).
Chart 6 Different perspectives on private label brands
(market share in percentages) (percentages; 2009)
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Sources: Euromonitor and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: “Larger brands” refers to those brands for which separate market shares are reported by Euromonitor; “miscellaneous brands” refers 
to those not subject to separate reporting by Euromonitor (i.e. because their market share is either too small or regional); “EA” refers to 
the euro area.27
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IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RETAIL TRADE STRUCTURE FOR INFLATION MEASUREMENT  1
This box explains how structural developments in retail trade are treated in the Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP) and discusses the potential implications for inﬂ  ation measurement, 
drawing on the empirical evidence of previous studies. As outlined in Section 1.1, a number 
of key structural changes have taken place over recent decades. Among these, three points in 
particular pose challenges for consumer price indices, namely the trend away from:
(1) traditional outlets towards larger chain stores, franchises and discounters;
(2) stores towards non-store retailing (i.e. the internet), especially for certain product groups; 
(3) branded goods towards private label products.
This box will focus on the ﬁ  rst two issues, but, conceptually, all three issues are closely related: 
in each case, one product offer is replaced by an alternative, often at a much lower price level.
Evidence of price level differences across 
outlet types
Chart A gives an example of average price 
level differences for Camembert across 
different types of retail outlet in France. While 
the pattern of the price of Camembert moves 
in a similar manner over time, there are large 
differences in the price levels observed. A 
number of studies for the US and European 
markets have shown that such price level 
differences are common, especially between 
discounters and traditional store types. Based 
on US data, Leibtag et al. (2010) compare 
identical items at the Universal Product Code 
level, and show an expenditure-weighted 
average price discount of 7.5%, with prices 
being between 3% and 28% lower in non-
traditional stores than in traditional stores. 
In Europe, Nielsen (2007) reports that prices in 
the largest two discount groups were 30% and 
40% lower than the average across a range of 
categories. However, these differences can vary 
substantially, depending on product type.2
1  Prepared by Adrian Page, ECB.
2  The reported gaps were smaller in Germany, at 18% and 30% respectively – this may reﬂ  ect either more competitive prices or a 
different stocking strategy in this country; for example, one large German discounter also sells branded goods. Interestingly, this 
report argues that a higher level of discount does not necessarily guarantee a larger market share, as it notes that the market shares of 
discounters are relatively low for personal care goods – categories where price differentials were found to be high. Consequently, it 
concludes that other factors, such as “variations in product quality, pricing strategies and emotional pay-offs appear to be at play”.
Chart A Average price of Camembert in 
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Structural changes over time in the variety of retail outlets and their respective market shares can 
pose two distinct challenges for inﬂ  ation measurement:
First, such changes can mean that, after some time, the sample of outlets used for compiling  • 
the consumer price index (CPI) is no longer representative. Measurement errors may then 
occur because price changes in the outlets excluded from the sample may differ from those 
taking place in outlets covered by the sample or because movements in the market shares of 
different outlet types result in the weights applied to different outlets becoming outdated. 
Such errors do not necessarily move in a particular direction.3 One reason why sample 
weights may become outdated is that consumers may shift their purchases away from outlets 
which have relatively high price increases in favour of outlets which have relatively low price 
increases (outlet substitution effects). If such shifts are to be reﬂ  ected in a price index, this 
effect would, under normal circumstances, lead to an upward bias in the index.4
A second distinct issue is the method by which new outlets with a different average price  • 
level are introduced into the sample. How such price level differences should be reﬂ  ected 
in the HICP depends, in principle, on the extent to which the lower prices are due to an 
inferior retail service on the part of the seller. In practice, statistical ofﬁ  ces generally use 
a linking technique which attributes the whole of the price difference to differences in the 
quality of retail services – the new lower prices thus have no impact on the level of the index. 
The likelihood that this is an over-adjustment suggests an upward bias affecting not only the 
HICP, but almost all CPIs used around the world.
Treatment in the HICP
In constructing their HICPs, national statistical ofﬁ  ces select a sample of products and outlets 
which aims to be representative of all transactions (and therefore all outlets) within the scope 
of the index. There is no speciﬁ  c regulation regarding the frequency of sample updates, but 
currently the eight euro area countries accounting for around 49% of the euro area HICP 
update their outlet samples annually or on a continuous basis, with most of the remaining 
countries conducting an update once every ﬁ  ve years. Only four euro area countries have a 
wide coverage of internet retailers in their HICP samples for goods. In some cases, internet 
retailers are included, though only for a very limited number of products (e.g. personal 
computers and books).5 With regard to substitution between outlets in the sample, the main 
statistical approach to tackling lower level substitution – the use of the geometric mean at 
the lower levels of index compilation – is employed by the majority of euro area countries, 
3  Linz (2009) reports on the introduction of a new explicit weighting system in the German CPI which gave a much higher weight to discounters 
than that used previously. Since this change occurred during a period marked by strong increases in food commodity prices, for many food 
product price changes (as distinct from price levels) were substantially higher for discounters than for other retailers (for an analysis regarding 
the pass-through of food commodity prices and the retail structure, see Section 2.4.2). This led to upward revisions of the German CPI in 
2008. The proper representation of different outlet types in the index thus has important consequences for index dynamics, since pass-through 
may be expected to be more pronounced for low-cost outlet types, where material inputs account for a larger share of the ﬁ  nal price.
4  The HICP measures the ratio of expenditure necessary to maintain a certain ﬁ  xed consumption pattern and thus it is often assumed 
that such shifts in expenditure patterns are not relevant. Nevertheless, these consumption patterns do not refer to speciﬁ  c products in 
speciﬁ  c outlets, but rather to “consumption segments” which serve a common purpose (see Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 1334/2007). This would suggest that the HICP should reﬂ  ect lower level substitution, i.e. substitution within a single consumption 
segment to the extent that consumers may chose between different product offers (which may be in different outlet types) in order to 
fulﬁ  l the same underlying objective (“purpose of consumption”).
5  As regards services, many countries include air tickets, hotels, tickets for cultural events, etc., but these are beyond the scope 
of this report.29
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with a combined weight of nearly 65%. The table gives an overview of the sampling practices 
implemented across countries.
When an outlet goes out of business or is no longer representative, it is replaced by an alternative 
outlet via a linking procedure. Chart B gives a highly stylised example of how linking is used 
to replace high-priced outlets with lower-priced outlets. Here, all three outlets show the same 
price development over time, but with different average price levels. When Outlet 1 is replaced 
by Outlet 2, the price developments of the two outlets are linked – since the price development 
of the replacement outlet is positive, the resulting price index increases (see the dotted line). The 
difference in price levels between the two outlets is not reﬂ  ected in the index, and the price index 
even shows an opposite development compared with the trend for the average price level.
Implications for inﬂ  ation measurement
Whether or not this approach is appropriate depends on the value that consumers attach to the 
difference in the quality of the retail services (or the “retail experience”) provided by the two stores. 
For example, the store may be in a less convenient location, have less convenient opening hours, 
offer a less personal service than a traditional retailer, have a less favourable before and after-
sales service (or returns policy), or a more limited choice of products. If the replacement outlet is 
an internet retailer, the retail experience is quite 
different – the consumer is not able to examine 
the product before purchasing it, delivery comes 
with a delay and may also be more expensive 
than the cost of visiting a shop in person. Of 
course, there are also a number of beneﬁ  ts to 
internet retailing, notably lower search costs, 
no queues and fewer constraints regarding retail 
opening times.
The assumption inherent in linking is that the 
price level differences at the time of linking 
equal the consumer evaluation of how these 
differences are reﬂ  ected in the quality of retail 
services, i.e. that the market is efﬁ  cient and in 
equilibrium, with fully informed consumers. 
In reality, there have been clear trends in 
the market shares of certain types of outlet 
Overview of sampling practices in national HICPs
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
Use of geometric mean No  1) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No  1) Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Comprehensive update of 
outlet sample on annual basis No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Internet retailing (goods) No  2) Yes No No No No  3) No  4) No  2) No No No Yes Yes No No  2) No Yes
Weight in euro area HICP 3.3 25.9 0.1 1.3 3.8 12.7 20.7 18.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 4.8 3.2 2.2 0.4 0.7 1.7
Source: Eurostat.
1) The geometric mean is used in a limited number of cases.
2) Excluding personal computers and some household appliances.
3) Excluding personal computers and books.
4) Excluding mail order.











Source: Adapted from Greenlees and McClelland (2008).30
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and relatively consistent price differential patterns across outlet types. The increasing market 
shares of lower-priced discounters and internet retailers suggest that, even after accounting for 
differences in the retail services offered, many consumers consider these prices to be of better 
value, and the practice of linking therefore imparts an upward bias to the HICP inﬂ  ation rate. 
Such a bias is, however, reduced to the extent that the competitor outlets remaining in the 
sample either reduce their prices in response to the new outlet or lower the quality of their own 
retail service (to the extent that this is not adjusted for in the HICP). Equally, the bias would be 
exacerbated if competitors increased the quality of their retail service in order to differentiate 
themselves. It should be noted that since price differences are not constant across all products, 
linking also implies an inconsistent valuation of the quality of the retail service embodied in each 
product price.
Empirical evidence regarding the impact of new outlet bias on inﬂ  ation measurement
Most of the empirical evidence for the size of the new outlet bias is based on US data and relates 
to the US CPI.6 Evidence for euro area countries is scarcer and generally refers to the late 1990s. 
Lequiller (1997) considers the new outlet bias to be relevant in the case of the French CPI. 
Drawing on a previous study which suggested a bias of 0.2 percentage point per annum in the 
1980s, and adjusting this ﬁ  gure in the light of more recent market developments, Lequiller 
proposed a range of 0.05 percentage point to 0.15 percentage point per annum. With regard to the 
German CPI, Hoffmann (1998) calculated unlinked indices for 11 relatively homogeneous food 
products taken from household budget surveys and compared the results to the corresponding 
German CPI sub-indices. Over a ten-year period, the deviations for different products ranged 
from 0.2 percentage point to 1.7 percentage points per annum. These were attributed partly to 
the linking practices of new lower-priced outlets and partly to an unrepresentative outlet sample 
(which has since been signiﬁ  cantly improved).7 Extrapolating these results to the overall German 
CPI led to an estimate “unlikely to exceed 0.1 p.p. annually”. Finally, Covas and Silva (1999) 
used Portuguese micro data to conclude that during a period of rapid change in the Portuguese 
grocery sector in the early 1990s, the new outlet bias reached 0.5 percentage point per annum. 
This then decreased to 0.25 percentage point per annum by the end of the 1990s. No quantitative 
studies on bias in the euro area HICP have been conducted to date, largely as a result of the 
considerable data requirements involved and the fact that index construction practices at the 
detailed level are still quite heterogeneous across euro area countries.
Alternative approaches to dealing with changes in the retail structure
In general, the regular updating of HICP outlet samples seems to be appropriate, although in countries 
conducting an update only once every ﬁ  ve years or less, there is a danger that samples become 
unrepresentative as a result of structural changes. The limited coverage of internet retailing in many 
national HICPs is a symptom of this problem. Regarding the new outlet bias, a satisfactory approach 
would require an explicit evaluation of various facets of retail services in a similar way to how quality 
6  Reinsdorf (1993) found an upward bias of 0.25 percentage point per year in the US CPI for food at home and petrol. Lebow, Roberts 
and Stockton (1994) extrapolated these results to come to an estimate for the overall US CPI of 0.1 percentage point per year. More 
recently, Hausman and Leibtag (2004) have modelled the direct impact of the growth of discounters in the US market and the indirect 
effects of price competition in respect of the more traditional retailers, estimating a bias of 0.32 percentage point to 0.42 percentage point 
in the food component of the US CPI. Furthermore, Greenlees and McClelland (2008) make use of six years of micro data for 14 food 
categories and implement hedonic regression techniques in order to take account of differences in product characteristics. Although their 
results conﬁ  rm the potential signiﬁ  cance of the new outlet bias, they ﬁ  nd that some offsetting effects, for example the fact that the larger 
package sizes sold by certain types of discounter are valued less by consumers, partly explain the lower per unit prices.
7  See Linz (2008).31
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THE ROLE OF BUYING GROUPS
Another key feature of the grocery sector (and 
other distributive trades sub-sectors  28) – one 
not often known outside the consumer goods 
producing and distributive trades sectors – is 
the role of buying groups. A buying group is an 
organisation of retailers that combines the buying 
power of its members in order to be able to 
purchase goods at a more advantageous rate than 
might be achieved through individual negotiation. 
Buying groups are important because, by 
combining the buying power of their individual 
members, they can achieve very large economies 
of scale and potentially alter the balance of power 
in negotiations between retailers and suppliers.29 
Their existence also implies that measures of 
competition based on company-level data may 
overstate the true level of competition and 
understate the bargaining power of buying groups 
relative to suppliers.30 For example, the largest 
buying group in Europe is comprised of more 
than ten national supermarket chains operating 
across 19 countries, with a combined turnover 
of approximately €120 billion. To put this into 
perspective, the largest European retailer, which 
is also the second largest retailer in the world, has 
a total global turnover of around €90 billion.
The net impact of buying groups on competition 
and social welfare is not straightforward. On the 
one hand, proponents would argue that buying 
groups help national retail chains compete with 
large multinational producers and pass on cost 
savings to consumers. Furthermore, they may 
enable smaller manufacturers to access a larger 
market and provide them with opportunities for 
producing private brands that can then be 
distributed across Europe.31 On the other hand, it 
could be argued that their massive scale provides 
them with too much bargaining power, especially 
in relation to smaller producers and smaller 
retailers.32 Dobson (1999) argues that although 
the net effects are uncertain a priori, the 
anti-competitive effects are likely to be limited.
Buying groups exist in most other industries, for example in  28 
consumer electronics and in consumer recreation.
Balan (2007) cites the major factors behind the emergence of  29 
buying groups as: (a) the increased power of manufacturers; 
and (b) the need to compete with hard discounters. With 
regard to the former, she notes that “in France, the ﬁ  rst eight 
global industrial groups in the agro-food sector have a market 
capitalization higher than the largest retailer and that the degree 
of concentration is very high in some food industries”.
It should be noted that buying groups are usually structured in such  30 
a way as to avoid competing members. Thus, for international 
buying groups, in general, no two members come from the same 
country and spheres of operation tend not to overlap too much.
Dobson (1999) cites three possible pro-competitive effects  31 
resulting from the presence of buying groups. First, they may 
facilitate the Single Market, as the sharing of buying price 
information is likely to increase pressure on suppliers to 
reduce inter-state price discrimination and enable new branded 
products  to be introduced more quickly across a number of 
Member States. He argues that other forms of sharing retailer 
know-how within alliances may speed up the process of 
implementing best practice (e.g. as regards distribution and IT 
systems) and have positive effects on productivity. Second, they 
may provide countervailing market power to large suppliers. 
Lastly, they may result in the more efﬁ   cient development of 
private label products.
On the other hand, Dobson (1999) also indicates potential anti- 32 
competitive effects: (1) monopsony (i.e. monopoly buying) 
power; (2) opportunistic buyer behaviour that works against 
suppliers who have incurred sunk costs; (3) distortions in retail 
competition; and (4) mutual forbearance between members.
adjustments for product characteristics are approached. Hedonic approaches which regress price 
information on a range of characteristics of retail services may be one avenue that warrants further 
research. Alternatively, consumer surveys could be conducted in order to obtain direct evaluations of 
different aspects of retail services. While both approaches appear to be resource-intensive, it should 
perhaps be noted that structural changes in the retail trade sector are relatively gradual and innovations 
are much less frequent or varied than those in respect of product characteristics. Therefore, such 
research and valuations would need to be estimated relatively infrequently, but could nonetheless be 
applied to the HICP (which is calculated on a monthly basis).
Although evidence from the 1990s suggests that new outlet bias was not a source of signiﬁ  cant 
bias, recent developments in the market shares of discounters and online retailers and the growth 
of private label brands suggest that the challenges these structural developments pose for inﬂ  ation 
measurement should remain a concern for policy-makers and are worthy of further research.32
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Box 3
FIRM DEMOGRAPHICS, FIRM SIZE AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1
This box considers the demographic features – from ﬁ  rm “births” (creation of new ﬁ  rms) to 
ﬁ  rm “deaths” (ﬁ  rms ceasing to exist) – of companies in the distributive trades sector in terms 
of size, and assesses the contribution of these elements to growth developments. Understanding 
ﬁ  rm dynamics may provide some insight into the reasons behind the relatively poor productivity 
performance of the distributive trades in the euro area.2
Demographic analysis
According to information from the Eurostat SBS database related to ﬁ  rm demographics, between 
1998 and 2006 (the last year for which data are available) in the euro area as a whole, about 2.6 million 
enterprises were “born” in the distributive trades sector and 2.2 million “died”, or ceased to exist, 
implying a net increase of about 400,000 ﬁ  rms.3 In comparison, in 2006, there were approximately 
4.5 million enterprises in the sector. Since 2003, the difference between the birth rate and the 
death rate (the net turnover rate) has been constantly positive in the euro area, albeit with marked 
differences across countries.4 Most (around 98%) of births and deaths take place within the small 
ﬁ  rm categories (which feature ﬁ  rms with up to four employees), while very few larger ﬁ  rms 
enter the market. Nevertheless, the latter have a higher probability of surviving.
Most euro area countries have experienced a decrease in the number of small ﬁ  rms and an increase 
in the number of larger ones, i.e. a consolidation process. This trend was most evident in those 
countries where micro ﬁ  rms are predominant (Italy, Portugal and Spain). The aforementioned 
consolidation process can be explained by either within class effects (small ﬁ  rms having a 
negative net turnover rate and/or large ﬁ  rms having a positive net turnover rate) or between class 
effects (there are more small ﬁ  rms becoming large than there are large ﬁ  rms becoming small).5 
The data reported in the table allow an understanding of how these two effects contributed to the 
consolidation process between 1998 and 2006.6 In Italy, for example, both these effects were at 
work: in particular, the smallest ﬁ  rms were characterised by both a negative net turnover rate and 
an outﬂ  ow of existing ﬁ  rms towards upper categories. In Portugal and Spain, the between class 
1  Prepared by E. Ciapanna, Banca d’Italia. 
2  It has been argued (e.g. in ECB (2011) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000)) that the shedding of less productive ﬁ  rms and the entry of 
more productive ones (“creative destruction”) is a process that is an important driver of productivity, especially total factor productivity 
growth.
3  Eurostat provides the number of active enterprises, the number of ﬁ  rm births and the number of ﬁ  rm deaths for the period from 
1998 to 2007. According to the metadata, active ﬁ  rms are those ones whose value added is strictly positive, whereas ﬁ  rms are said 
to have ceased to exist when they have not been active for at least two years. Employment class data are also available, but follow 
an aggregation criterion which differs from the one adopted in the general SBS database: zero (the entrepreneur alone); one to four 
workers; ﬁ  ve to nine workers; and above ten workers. Survival rates, plus the number of persons employed, are available for the non-
zero classes.
4  The distributive trades sector was more dynamic than average in Spain and France, where the net turnover rate was positive throughout 
the whole sample (1998 to 2006), averaging 1.6 and 1.4 respectively. Finland and the Netherlands also recorded a positive turnover 
rate. By contrast, the number of ﬁ  rm deaths exceeded the number of ﬁ  rm births in Italy, mainly owing to the strong contraction 
experienced in the retail trade market here. Data for Germany are only available for 2005 and 2006 (thus a direct comparison with other 
countries is inappropriate): the net turnover rate was close to zero in 2005 and slightly negative in 2006.
5 The  between class effect is calculated as the difference between growth rates and turnover rates. For instance, it is generally observed 
that the ﬁ  rst class is characterised by a positive turnover rate and a negative growth rate, implying migration towards upper classes.
6  The time series is not complete for all countries: the data for France are available from 1999, and those for Austria and Germany from 
2004, while only the last two years are available for Belgium and Ireland.33
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effect prevailed among micro ﬁ  rms.7 It should be noted, however, that focusing on net turnover 
rates and concentration ignores the debate on “creative destruction”. The market entry of new 
ﬁ  rms is often associated with innovative ideas, while the market exit of ﬁ  rms is attributed, inter 
alia, to obsolete business plans. Thus, gross turnover rates may also be of importance in terms of 
consumer welfare.
Overall, the demographics of the euro area distributive trades sector suggest that this sector is 
still highly fragmented: micro and small ﬁ  rms are highly prevalent. However, it is slowly moving 
towards consolidation and the number of larger ﬁ  rms has increased somewhat recently.
Performance analysis
Moving from demographic indicators to performance measures, such as turnover, value added 
and productivity,8 it can be seen that ﬁ  rms belonging to the upper employment categories always 
show higher productivity values than those in the lower employment categories: both unit turnover 
(i.e. turnover per person employed) and value added increase with ﬁ  rm size in all countries, 
sub-sectors and years. For instance, for the euro area distributive trades sector in 2007, the average 
unit turnover for ﬁ  rms employing more than 20 workers was more than one and a half times the 
corresponding ﬁ  gure for ﬁ  rms employing 1 to 19 workers. Although the share of value generated by 
small ﬁ  rms is still considerably high all over continental Europe, it has nonetheless been decreasing 
since 1999, reﬂ  ecting a gradual reallocation towards larger enterprises.
In order to clarify what are the most relevant determinants of turnover growth in the distributive trades 
sector, a shift and share analysis is conducted, which allows the total turnover variation (ΔTt)  9 to be 
broken down into four components. These factors measure the contribution to total growth owing to:
the productivity change  1.  (productivity effect);
the average ﬁ  rm size variation  2.  (size effect);
the variation in the share of total ﬁ  rms by employment class 3.   (distribution effect);
the variation in the total number of enterprises  4.  (sector effect).
7  The difference between these two countries is that in Spain (as in Italy) the reallocation effect is beneﬁ  cial for all of the upper classes, 
while in Portugal it only supports two particular classes (ﬁ  rms employing between one and four workers and those with between ﬁ  ve 
and nine workers), so ﬁ  rms there remain small. 
8  Note that all monetary indicators (turnover, value added and gross operating surplus) are expressed in real terms, deﬂ  ated using the 
price indices for gross output and value added from the EU KLEMS database.
9  For computational details, see the mathematical derivation in the Appendix.
Demographic statistics
(1998 to 2006)
Distributive trades (euro area)
Growth Birth rate Death rate Net turnover Reallocation
Zero -1.4 9.4 8.3 1.1 -2.5
One to four -0.8 4.3 4.5 -0.2 -0.7
Five to nine 1.1 1.9 1.8 0.2 0.9
Ten or more 1.4 1.1 1.2 -0.1 1.5
Total 0.1 7.9 7.2 0.8 -0.7
Sources: Eurostat (SBS business demographic statistics) and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Data for Belgium, France and Ireland relate to the year 2007, as 2006 data were not available, while for all the other countries 
2006 is the last available year. “Zero” denotes businesses where the only employee is the entrepreneur himself (or herself). Net turnover is 
calculated as births minus deaths, while reallocation is measured as growth minus net turnover.34
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011
1.1.3 LABOUR MARKET AND PRODUCTIVITY  33
Since the launch of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1999, there has been 
considerable growth in employment within the 
distributive trades sector, with an additional 
1.8 million jobs being created across the euro 
area – over a million in retailing alone – by 
2009. The distributive trades thus accounted for 
roughly one in seven of the almost 15 million 
new jobs generated in the euro area over this 
period. In several countries, the sector’s 
contribution to overall employment growth has 
been even greater, particularly in Slovakia, 
Portugal and Greece, and, until recently, in 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain.34
In terms of labour market characteristics, the 
distributive trades sector differs from the rest 
of the economy in a number of important ways 
(see Table 1). The sector as a whole, and retailing 
in particular, is characterised by a higher than 
average share of the self-employed, part-time 
workers and women. Indeed, the retail trade 
sub-sector now accounts for roughly one in 
every  eight women with employment in the 
euro area. Furthermore, it is a big employer of 
younger workers, accounting for just over 40% 
of total euro area employment for the under 
25s. This partly explains why the sector has a 
lower than average proportion of high-skilled 
Prepared by Valerie Jarvis (ECB). 33 
According to national accounts data, between 1999 and the  34 
onset of the recession in the respective countries, the distributive 
trades accounted for: roughly one out of every six new jobs 
created in Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain; between one-
third to one-half of net employment creation in Greece; and 
the equivalent of around 220% of all net new employment for 
Slovakia since 1999.
In the chart, a shift and share decomposition 
using the 1 to 19 and 20+ employment 
categories is shown for ten euro area 
countries.10 Considering the euro area 
aggregate, sector effects contribute positively 
to both size categories. However, the other 
effects (productivity, size and distribution) 
are negligible for smaller ﬁ   rms (1 to 19 
workers), but positive for larger ﬁ  rms. 
Looking across countries, while the combined 
effect for smaller ﬁ   rms was negative for 
Belgium, France and Italy, for larger ﬁ  rms 
(20 workers and above), it was positive for 
all countries.
All in all, the performance analysis suggests 
that the distributive trades sector in the euro 
area is traditionally characterised by many 
small low-performance ﬁ  rms and a few larger 
high-performance  ﬁ   rms that contribute the 
most to turnover growth. Nevertheless, the 
modernisation process that has been taking 
place since the mid-1990s has served as a 
stimulus for small ﬁ   rms trying to survive, 
to increase their size (and even migrate to upper employment categories) and to become more 
productive (as in the case of certain ﬁ  rms in Finland and the Netherlands).
10 The analysis is based on information from the SBS database and covers the period from 1999 to 2007 for the distributive trades sector. Greece, 
Ireland and Slovakia are not included as the data for these countries are incomplete. Precise country ﬁ  gures are provided in the Appendix.








































Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: Labour productivity is deﬁ  ned as real turnover per person 
employed (in thousands of euro), deﬂ  ated using the price indices 
for gross output from the EU KLEMS database.35
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011
I   AN  OVERVIEW 




workers than other sectors of the economy. 
In terms of remuneration, the distributive 
trades tend to be characterised by low pay – 
particularly in retailing – and even in relation 
to low-skilled work in other sectors. In terms of 
wage-bargaining, while the sector is typically 
characterised by low levels of union membership, 
collective wage agreements tend to cover a 
majority of retail employees in many euro area 
countries. Meanwhile, minimum wages – at 
either a national or sectoral level – act as an 
effective wage ﬂ  oor in other countries.35
Cross-country differences can be large 
(see Chart A2 in the Appendix for further details). 
For example, self-employment is considerably 
higher in Greece and Italy; part-time work is 
signiﬁ  cantly more common in the Netherlands; 
and men outnumber women in the retail trade in 
Malta. Part of this cross-country variation simply 
reﬂ  ects national differences in business structure, 
demographics or education systems.36 But it may 
also partly reﬂ  ect differences in administrative 
regulations (e.g. minimum qualiﬁ  cations  or 
capital requirements) which limit start-ups and 
thus potentially hinder a rich and innovative 
source of competition.
Relatively low productivity in the distributive 
trades sector is often highlighted as a major 
factor behind the widening aggregate 
productivity gap between the euro area and 
the United States. Productivity growth is 
particularly low in euro area retail trade 
(see the box entitled “Productivity in the euro 
area and US distributive trades”). Productivity 
differences may also have implications for price 
level and inﬂ  ation differentials across countries, 
since for a given level of wage growth, higher 
productivity helps limit unit labour cost growth, 
thereby containing inﬂ  ation and price levels.
Since the mid-1990s, productivity in the euro 
area distributive trades sector has averaged 
around three-quarters the level for the economy 
as a whole – measured in terms of (real) value 
added per person employed. Undoubtedly, the 
lower average capital intensities in the sector  37 
help explain this, but it may also be partly a 
result of the difﬁ   culties in measuring labour 
input in a sector characterised by high 
proportions of part-time labour and self-
employment.38
Chart 7 shows how productivity estimates for 
the distributive trades sector are affected when 
adjustments are made for self-employment 
and part-time labour, i.e. by comparing “raw” 
estimates of “apparent” labour productivity 
(measured in terms of gross value added 
per person employed) with “wage-adjusted” 
productivity (which expresses apparent labour 
productivity in relation to personnel costs 
and adjusts for differences in the proportion 
Eurofound (2009). 35 
See, for example, Jarvis and Prais (1989) and Mason et al. (2007). 36 
See, for example, O’Mahony and van Ark (2003). 37 
In a sector characterised by a high degree of self-employment  38 
and family-owned concerns, labour input may be particularly 
difﬁ  cult to measure. This is because of the highly ﬂ  exible nature 
of the “casual labour” supplied by family members and the 
general tendency for the self-employed to under-report actual 
working hours.









By employment status  1)
Employed 85.2 79.3 76.2
Self-employed 14.8 20.7 23.8
By gender  2)
Male 55.1 51.6 38.0
Female 44.9 48.4 62.0
By working time  2)
Full-time 80.0 77.7 70.0
Part-time 20.0 22.3 30.0
By age  2)
Young (15-24) 9.2 13.2 15.2
Prime age (25-54) 76.9 74.9 73.0
Older (>55) 13.9 12.0 11.8
By skill level  2)
Unskilled/semi-skilled 27.2 30.5 31.7
Skilled 44.9 53.0 53.7
Highly skilled 27.9 16.5 14.6
Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) National accounts data.
2) Data from Eurostat’s European Union Labour Force Survey; 
percentages expressed in relation to total employment in the 
relevant groups, covering all of those between 15 and 99 years 
of age.36
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of self-employed workers).39 Wage-adjusted 
productivity rises in all three sectors when 
proper account is taken of the cost of labour 
input, with this increase being proportionately 
larger in retail trade, reﬂ  ecting both the higher 
incidence of part-time employment here and 
the low average wages of the sub-sector.40 
Nevertheless, the relative performance of 
the sub-sectors remains unchanged, with 
productivity being substantially lower in 
retailing than in wholesaling.
A similar picture also emerges at the country 
level (see Chart 8), but with divergent 
productivity levels across the Member States. 
No “big country” effects arise to support the 
notion that euro area productivity performance 
is simply a matter of economies of scale and 
scope. While part of the cross-country variation 
can be explained by differences in the structure 
of retailing and differing average capital 
intensities, it is likely that this is also partially 
due to variations in the composition of respective 
retail workforces.41
For consistency with the statistics included earlier in this report,  39 
these data on productivity and wage-adjusted productivity are 
taken from Eurostat’s SBS database and adjusted for cross-
country differences in price levels using Eurostat’s PPP 
conversion for consumer goods. Similar results – in terms of 
country ranking – were also obtained using national accounts 
sources. Aside from the issue of input measurement, the 
academic literature has long been cautious regarding output 
measurement in services. For the sake of brevity, these issues 
are not elaborated here; more details can be found in Dean and 
Kunze (1992), Oi (1992) and Triplett and Bosworth (2001).
Estimates for the retail sub-sector rise from around 57% of the  40 
non-ﬁ   nancial business economy (NFBE) average found for 
“apparent productivity” to almost 87% of the NFBE average 
when wage-adjusted productivity ratios are considered. 
Meanwhile, in the wholesale sub-sector, the combination of a 
lower share of part-time employment and higher average wages 
actually reduces the sub-sector’s productivity advantage from 
120% to 108% of the NFBE average.
See, for example, Dolado and Stucchi (2008). They have  41 
spearheaded a growing body of research which suggests that 
part-time workers, along with the increasing number of people 
on temporary contracts, have less access to the career and 
productivity-enhancing training typically enjoyed by their 
full-time peers.
Chart 7 Productivity in euro area 





















apparent labour productivity (left-hand scale)
wage-adjusted labour productivity ( right-hand scale)
Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: “Apparent labour productivity” is deﬁ  ned as gross value 
added per person employed (in thousands of euro), adjusted 
for cross-country price level differences using Eurostat PPPs 
for consumption goods; wage-adjusted labour productivity is 
computed as labour productivity divided by personnel costs 
(compensation per employee) adjusted for the proportion of 
employees in total employment.

















apparent labour productivity (left-hand scale)
wage-adjusted labour productivity (right-hand scale)
Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: “Apparent labour productivity” is deﬁ  ned as gross value 
added per person employed (in thousands of euro), adjusted 
for cross-country price level differences using Eurostat PPPs 
for consumption goods; wage-adjusted labour productivity is 
computed as labour productivity divided by personnel costs 
(compensation per employee) adjusted for the proportion of 
employees in total employment; “EA” refers to the euro area.37
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PRODUCTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA AND US DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES SECTORS  1
The sharp divergence in productivity growth between the euro area and United States since 
the mid-1990s has long been a major concern for policy-makers. More recently, a number of 
researchers have suggested that much of the widening differential between the two economies 
can be traced to poor productivity growth in the services industries in the euro area.2 This box 
uses the EU KLEMS database for a comparative examination of developments in the euro area 
and the United States related to productivity.3
The distributive trades: a low productivity sector?
Following nearly two decades of comparable growth, euro area aggregate productivity growth has 
slowed progressively since the mid-1990s, averaging only 1.3% per year between 1995 and 2007, 
compared with the roughly 2.0% per year for the United States (see table). As a result, aggregate 
euro area productivity decreased from roughly 90% of the US level to around 83% by 2007.4 
More than a third of the widening productivity gap was attributable to the distributive trades.
While rates of productivity growth in the distributive trades sector declined in both economies 
between 1995 and 2007, the differential remained large – standing at 1.6 percentage points 
by the mid-2000s. In the retail sub-sector, 
the differential was even greater – at 
2.2 percentage points – that is, roughly three 
times the whole-economy average. This can 
largely be explained by the much stronger 
growth in value added in the United States 
over this period.5 As a consequence, euro area 
retail productivity decreased from around 95% 
of the US level in 1995 to 71% by 2007. 
Sources of productivity growth
One argument commonly used to explain the 
notable US productivity advantage – both 
at the aggregate level and at the level of the 
distributive trades sector in particular – 
contends that much of the productivity gap can 
be explained by the United States having better 
exploited new ICT than European economies. 
1  Prepared by V. Jarvis and D. Sondermann (ECB).
2  ECB (2006) and Van Ark et al. (2005).
3  Productivity is deﬁ  ned as real gross value added per hour worked, derived from the double-deﬂ  ation method of subtracting the weighted 
growth of intermediate input from the growth of output (both at constant prices) using national supply and use tables. The euro area 
aggregate in the EU KLEMS database covers the 12 countries which have been members since 2001.
4  Productivity levels are derived using purchasing power parities for 1997. They are calculated on the basis of the expenditure and 
production approach described in Inklaar and Timmer (2008).
5  Between 1995 and 2007, real value added in the retail sub-sector increased by around 62% in the United States, compared with only 18% 
in the euro area. Over the same period, total hours worked grew by 9.6% in the United States, compared with 5.6% in the euro area.
Productivity growth
(average annual percentage change; percentage points)
(a) Gross value added per hour worked: whole economy
Euro area United States Differential
1995-2001 1.4 2.0 0.6
2001-2007 1.2 1.9 0.8
(b) Gross value added per hour worked: distributive trades
Euro area United States Differential
1995-2001 2.0 6.1 4.1
2001-2007 1.0 2.6 1.6
(c) Gross value added per hour worked: retail trade
Euro area United States Differential
1995-2001 1.5 4.1 2.7
2001-2007 0.3 2.5 2.2
Sources: EU KLEMS database (2009) and calculations by ESCB 
staff.
Note: The euro area aggregate refers to the euro 12.38
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Certainly, as any shopper knows, ICT has had 
a pervasive impact on the retail sector in recent 
decades: there are the obvious “point-of-sale” 
innovations (such as bar codes, cash registers 
providing for electronic funds transfer and 
smart card technologies) as well as important 
efﬁ   ciency gains in respect of “back ofﬁ  ce” 
functions (owing to the possibility for more 
careful supply chain and inventory management 
and the collation of more precise information 
about customers’ purchasing patterns).
The chart shows the contributions to retail 
productivity growth made by the factor inputs 
of labour, ICT capital services and non-ICT 
capital services. That part of productivity 
growth which cannot be attributed to these 
factors, but which stems from broader 
intangible structural differences and 
technological or organisational changes, is 
captured in the residual component, which is commonly referred to as “total factor productivity” 
(TFP). The chart shows that expenditure on ICT capital services (the solid bars) was somewhat 
higher in the United States than in the euro area during the period from 1995 to 2007. Moreover, 
some of the full impact of ICT capital may also be embodied in the remaining factors, since ICT 
investment is often a catalyst for broad-based restructuring (including organisational changes 
and/or human capital investments) – for instance, part of the non-ICT investment may have gone 
into building new premises in order to beneﬁ  t from greater economies of scale (or scope).
Even accepting a broad-based complementarity between the contributions from ICT investments 
and the other factors, it is unlikely that ICT and any related spillovers can adequately explain 
the substantially higher growth of TFP in US retailing. Thus, in recent years, an alternative 
point of view has gained ground, one which argues that intangible and structural factors may be 
more important in explaining the US productivity advantage since 1995. For example, it is often 
claimed that the euro area regulatory environment is more restrictive (and thus less competitive) 
for retailing than that of the United States: land zoning regulations constrain the size and density 
of larger format stores, restrict the number of stores of a certain type in a given location or impede 
cross-border expansion. Others contend that labour tends to be less ﬂ  exible (and hence more 
costly) than in the United States because of regulations governing hiring practices, working times, 
overtime and ancillary payments, all of which make it more difﬁ  cult for euro area retailers to 
exploit cyclical demand dynamics than for their US counterparts. Macroeconomic and “cultural” 
factors – namely a higher marginal propensity to consume and an earlier switch to higher value 
goods in the United States, and the preference for smaller “local” stores in the euro area plus 
language barriers which hinder economies of scale – are also likely to have played a role.
Concluding remarks
The sources of the productivity gap between the United States and euro area retail sub-sectors are 
many and varied. An earlier adaptation to technological change has undoubtedly been of importance, 
Contributions to retail productivity growth 
in the euro area and the United States, 
1995 to 2007











euro area United States
total factor productivity 
labour composition
non-ICT capital services per hour worked
ICT capital services per hour worked
Sources: EU KLEMS database (2009) and calculations by 
ESCB staff.
Note: The euro area aggregate refers to the euro 12. 39
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1.1.4 COST STRUCTURE – THE ROLE OF PRODUCT 
AND CHANNEL  42
This section considers the cost structure of 
companies in different segments of the euro area 
distributive trades sector during the period 1999 
to 2007.43 Determining and understanding cost 
structures within the distributive trades sector is 
of crucial importance for a number of reasons. 
Most notably, the cost structure is an important 
determinant of price-setting in the sector. 
An analysis of the cost structure of retailers may 
possibly help us understand differences in the 
rate of cost pass-through across markets and 
segments. In addition, the cost structure has 
been linked to price stickiness.44 Lastly, the 
presence of different cost structures across 
countries for given segments may be indicative 
of differing degrees of competition.
This analysis of cost structures distinguishes 
between three broad cost elements, namely: 
(i) the cost of goods sold (COGS); (ii) non-labour 
operating costs; and (iii) labour costs – all of which 
are expressed as a proportion of net turnover. Non-
labour operating costs include upstream distribution 
costs and margins as well as downstream 
distribution costs (such as shop ﬁ  ttings, property 
and IT equipment). The difference between net 
turnover and these three cost elements represents 
the ﬁ  rm operating margin. The cost structure of 
ﬁ  rms can vary considerably – even for ﬁ  rms within 
the same segment or of a similar size – because 
of, for example, variations in property costs. In 
the retail trade, these variations may have a key 
impact on pass-through to consumer prices.
The COGS represents the single biggest cost 
incurred by ﬁ   rms engaged in the distributive 
Prepared by Aidan Meyler (ECB) and Suzanne Linehan (Central  42 
Bank of Ireland).
Unless otherwise stated, the source of the data used in this  43 
section is the Eurostat SBS database.
Álvarez et al. (2005b), Álvarez and Hernando (2005) and Sabbatini  44 
et al. (2005) document that differences in the cost structure across 
sectors help explain differences in the degree of price ﬂ  exibility.
but much more of the gap seems to be attributable to structural and organisational factors. Research 
on retailing in the United States suggests that the strong productivity growth seen there in the 1990s 
was led, to a great extent, by new market entrants displacing less efﬁ  cient incumbent establishments.6 
Tackling restrictive regulations in the euro area distributive trades sector – so as to boost competition 
and enable euro area retailers to operate at the productivity levels implied by European “best 
practice” – would assist in the pursuit of higher long-run economic growth.7
6  L. Foster et al. (2002).
7  Analysts at the McKinsey Global Institute (2010) argue that if the EU15 were to achieve the productivity levels of the top-quartile food 
retailers, this could translate into a 21% increase in EU retail productivity, contributing alone to an additional 0.75 percentage point of EU 
value added.












Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Cost of goods sold 72.0 73.6 66.7 74.6 62.0
Gross margin 28.0 26.4 33.3 25.4 38.0
Other costs 14.4 14.7 14.8 11.1 17.0
Value added 13.5 11.7 18.5 14.3 21.0
Labour costs – unadjusted  1) 7.8 6.2 11.6 9.7 12.7
- Wages and salaries 6.1 4.8 9.0 7.6 9.9
- Social security contributions 1.7 1.4 2.5 2.1 2.8
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted  1) 5.8 5.4 6.9 4.6 8.2
Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) Not adjusted for the implicit labour income of the self-employed.40
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trades, albeit with some variation in its share of 
turnover being evident across the individual sub-
sectors (see Table 2). Within retailing, a further 
difference is to be found between the grocery 
trade, which covers the sale of non-specialised 
food, beverages and tobacco products, and other 
retail trades. The 75% COGS share for grocery 
retailing is substantially higher than that for 
most other retail markets, which varies between 
55.5% for textiles and 62.6% for DIY (hardware, 
paints and glass) – see Table A4 and Table A5 
in the Appendix. The electronics and appliances 
market is a notable exception: here, the COGS 
accounts for around 72% of sales. The higher 
COGS share for grocery and electronics and 
appliances retailing most likely reﬂ  ects the more 
internationalised, efﬁ   cient and concentrated 
nature of these retail markets (see Section 1.3 on 
concentration and competition), which helps to 
drive down costs, including unit labour costs.
Value added accounts for 13.5% of total turnover 
for the distributive trades. Of the main sub-
sectors, retail trade has the highest ratio of value 
added to total turnover, at 18.5%, and within the 
retail sub-sector itself this ratio is highest for the 
clothing trade, at 23.6%. In line with the labour-
intensive nature of activity within the distributive 
trades sector, value added is largely attributed 
to  labour costs (58%). The magnitude of the 
labour cost component differs somewhat across 
the various distributive trades; for example, it 
amounts to 9.7% for grocery retailing and to 
12.7% for non-grocery retailing.
Some variation in proﬁ  t  margins across the 
distributive trades sector is also evident. Proﬁ  t 
margins are highest in the retail sub-sector, at 
6.9%. However, this is partly due to the higher 
degree of self-employment in this sub-sector 
and its impact on unadjusted proﬁ  t margins – 
see Section 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of 
proﬁ  t margins. Within the retail sub-sector, the 
specialised food, beverages and tobacco trade 
has the highest retail margin, at 10.3%. This is 
followed by the pharmacy trade, which delivers 
a margin of 9.2%. Conversely, proﬁ  t  margin 
levels in the grocery trade were lower, at 4.6%. 
It should be noted, however, that an analysis of 
the proﬁ  tability of the grocery market solely on 
the basis of proﬁ  t margins can prove somewhat 
misleading, as it is necessary to take into 
consideration the typically high turnover (per 
unit of capital employed) involved. Hence, 
in this case, the rate of return on capital may 
provide a more realistic picture of proﬁ  tability. 
Table A6 and Table A7 in the Appendix 
present a breakdown of the cost structure for, 
respectively, grocery retailing and non-grocery 
retailing in euro area countries. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the analysis of the cost 
structure presented in this section refers to 
average ﬁ  gures for all ﬁ  rms, irrespective of size. 
A study of the operating cost proﬁ  les of retail 
operations in Ireland suggests that operating 
costs can vary considerably with ﬁ  rm size.45
1.2  REGULATION IN THE DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES 
SECTOR  46
This section considers the regulatory features 
of the distributive trades sector. A large number 
of areas of activity are subject to speciﬁ  c 
regulations in this sector, covering issues as 
diverse as planning permission, the setting-up 
of establishments, contractual relationships 
with suppliers, price controls and conditions 
for promotions and sales. While there is clear 
evidence of an easing in the degree of product 
market regulation across almost all countries, 
there remains scope for further progress.
Although some regulation is required to ensure 
the smooth functioning of markets, too much of 
it can generate numerous obstacles that hinder 
competition and overly favour incumbents. 
According to Forfás (2008), labour and property costs  45 
represented the two largest costs, regardless of the size of the 
retail outlet, albeit with considerable variation in terms of the 
proportion of operating costs absorbed. In the case of labour 
costs, the variance ranged from 32% for retail parks to a high of 
60% for multiples. Another cost differing sharply across retail 
formats was property costs, which varied from 16% for multiple 
retailers to 32% for the convenience store format. Variability in 
transportation and distribution costs was also quite pronounced, 
with such costs being largest for retail parks.
Prepared by David Cornille (Nationale Bank van België/ 46 
Banque Nationale de Belgique) and Llanos Matea (Banco de 
España), based on input from NCB experts, including inter alia, 
Pierre-Michel Bardet-Fremann (Banque de France).41
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In the distributive trades sector, there are large 
areas of activity that are subject to speciﬁ  c 
regulations (especially in the retail sub-sector), 
with notable cross-country differences, in some 
cases even between regions and municipalities 
in the same country. Regulation covers issues 
as diverse as the setting-up of establishments, 
contractual relationships with suppliers, use of 
inputs, opening hours, price controls, promotions, 
sales conditions, the after-sales service, and 
waste and recycling. Even differences for 
certain products and types of establishment can 
be found. This extensive and complex regulation 
has some effect on the market structure, on the 
types of shop present and, ultimately, on the 
degree of competition. Moreover, this sector 
may also be affected by regulation applying to 
other sectors, such as general planning rules, 
rental contracts, environmental and sanitary 
regulations, transport regulations, labour 
regulations or consumer rights.
Planning rules, in particular, are often found 
to play an important role in creating barriers to 
entry or expansion and therefore in constraining 
competition, i.e. by impeding the emergence 
of competitors – especially large ones – able to 
challenge existing retailers.47 General planning 
provisions, building permits and a speciﬁ  c 
requirement for prior authorisation to establish 
retail outlets are to be found in the majority 
of euro area countries.48 In this respect, the 
European Commission (2010) has pointed out 
that currently fragmented national, regional 
and local commercial planning frameworks, in 
conjunction with different rules on property and 
land ownership, are factors likely to dissuade 
entrepreneurs and ﬁ   rms from entering certain 
markets.
Regulations may also have unintended 
consequences. For example, some commentators 
(see, for instance, McKinsey and Company (2005)) 
have argued that the strong growth in the market 
share of discounters is due to the fact that their 
business model (a small-sized store with a limited 
range of products) has allowed them to expand to 
those areas where size thresholds have prevented 
the opening of larger store formats, such as 
supermarkets and hypermarkets. See Section 1.1 
for a more detailed discussion of discounters.
There are also regulations relating to the setting 
of prices or margins. In a number of countries, 
sales below cost have been banned in order 
to balance the relationship between small 
businesses and large retail chains, mainly in 
the groceries sector, but speciﬁ  c  regulations 
differ.49 Nevertheless, there is some evidence 
that this type of regulation eliminates or at least 
reduces intra-brand competition and results in 
price increases.50 Other speciﬁ   c regulation is 
concerned with the contractual and operational 
relationships between retailers and suppliers.
It is, however, not easy to compare legislation 
between countries. To obtain an idea of the 
degree of regulation in each country, one possible 
approach would be to refer to summary indicators. 
These indicators aim to assign “scores” to the 
main aspects of certain pieces of legislation in 
force, making it easier to assess the more or less 
restrictive nature of the law concerned. The most 
frequently used indicators in this ﬁ   eld are the 
product market regulation (PMR) indicators 
calculated by the OECD that allow the regulatory 
burden on the retail trade sub-sector to be 
measured.51 These indicators, which cover areas 
such as shop opening hours, licences, regulations 
relating to large outlets and price controls, have 
See, for example, the report on the Grocery Monitor Project of  47 
the Competition Authority of Ireland cited above: “We found 
that the retail planning system made it difﬁ  cult for new retailers 
to enter the Irish grocery market and existing retailers to expand. 
This is because the planning system can inﬂ  uence the type of 
grocery retailers, where they locate, what they offer consumers 
and the prices that consumers pay”. This report is available at 
http://www.tca.ie/EN/Promoting-Competitio/Market-Studies/
Grocery-Monitor-Project.aspx 
Prior authorisation to establish retail outlets is not required in  48 
the Netherlands, Slovenia and Slovakia.
It should be noted that this kind of regulation may have several  49 
purposes. In the economic literature, regulation that bans 
below-cost sales is considered to be primarily aimed at preventing 
anti-competitive and unfair commercial practices among 
competitors. However, health and public order considerations have 
led some governments to forbid the below-cost sale of alcohol.
See, for example, the study by Biscourp et al. (2008). This shows  50 
that the former “Loi Galland” (Galland Act), which banned sales 
below cost and non-discriminatory pricing, had these effects 
in France. Collins, Burt and Oustapassidis (2001) have found 
similar results for the Groceries Order in Ireland.
See Woelﬂ   et al. (2009). 51 42
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the advantage of being comparable internationally. 
The latest published results refer to the year 2008, 
but it has been possible to update these indicators 
for the year 2010 by using information provided 
by task force members from the participating 
Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs) – see 
Chart 9. The results of these indicators need to be 
interpreted carefully, especially when making 
comparisons at a more detailed level.52 In 
addition, for some criteria, an indicator only takes 
into account state-level regulation, and this may 
not reﬂ  ect possible regulatory differences at the 
regional level.53
It appears that there is an important divergence in 
the results for the different countries, one which 
reﬂ  ects the variety of existing regulations. Indeed, 
even similar indicator scores do not necessarily 
imply that legislation is comparable. According 
to the updated PMR indicators, Luxembourg and 
Austria exhibit the highest level of regulation, 
and most other euro area countries are also on the 
high side, excluding Ireland and Slovakia, whose 
scores are among the lowest. The tendency 
towards less regulation which has been observed 
in the past is once again conﬁ  rmed in 2010: for 
all countries where changes in legislation have 
been recorded since 2008 (i.e. France, Portugal, 
Belgium and Greece), the respective score is 
lower in 2010. This can probably be partly 
explained by the implementation of the EU 
Services Directive, even though progress here 
has not necessarily been registered in the ﬁ  eld 
where it was expected. This is because when 
legislation reduces regulatory constraints, it 
generally affects multiple areas and other sectors 
in the same way. However, in some countries, the 
anticipated impact of the Services Directive  54 is 
not yet reﬂ  ected in the indicators (e.g. Ireland, 
Germany, Portugal, Finland, Greece, Austria and 
Luxembourg).55
A new indicator of the degree of regulation 
of shop opening times has been developed by 
Eurosytem staff (for more detailed information, 
see the Appendix) in order to overcome the 
limitations of the corresponding PMR sub-
indicator of the OECD (see Chart 10). This 
topic is relevant because some studies have 
found that the regulation of opening times 
has an impact on various retail trade and 
macroeconomic variables.56 The indicator for 
In this context, it should be noted that some criteria only  52 
take into account whether or not regulations exist and do not 
differentiate between different degrees of legislation. See, for 
example, Baugnet et al. (2009).
This could be important in countries where regional authorities  53 
have some competences regarding the retail sub-sector, such as 
Spain and Germany. For a detailed analysis of the Spanish case, 
see Matea and Mora (2009).
It is assumed that the Services Directive has an impact on  54 
the  “Registration in commercial register” and “Protection of 
existing  ﬁ  rms”  sub-indicators.  In the ﬁ   rst case, this is because 
Article 13(4) imposes a reasonable deadline for the registration ofﬁ  ce 
to conﬁ  rm and/or approve the registration (a period of more than 
70 days is considered to be “unreasonable”). In the second case, this is 
because Article 14(6) forbids professional bodies or the representatives 
of trade and commercial interests to be involved in licensing decisions. 
See also Piette and van der Linden (2009), pp. 85-87.
In Spain, the implementation of the Services Directive has  55 
increased the threshold for the surface area at which regulation 
related to large outlets starts applying in the majority of regions, 
but this has not affected the indicator because the national 
threshold does not change.
For example, Skuterud (2005) provides evidence of how the  56 
relaxation of Sunday opening times in Canada resulted in 
an increase in employment in the sector. Meanwhile, while 
Burda and Weil (2005) demonstrate how more restrictive US 
regulations on shop opening times are associated with lower 
levels of employment, wages and productivity in the retail 
sector, despite there being no signiﬁ  cant impact on prices.
Chart 9 Retail sector regulation – the PMR 
indicators of the OECD updated for 2010
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opening times, which takes account of the hours, 
times and days during which establishments 
are allowed to be open to customers (i.e. 
through six intermediate variables capturing 
different regulatory provisions), shows that the 
extent of regulation on opening times varies 
markedly from country to country. Cyprus 
is the country with the strictest regulation, 
followed very closely by Austria and Belgium. 
By contrast, retailers in Ireland and Slovakia 
have full freedom to set their opening times.57 
Meanwhile, although France, Portugal, 
Germany, Spain and Malta all have regulations, 
the legislation in these countries is relatively 
less restrictive compared with the rest of the 
euro area. It should be noted that there may be 
differences between the regulation on opening 
times and the opening times actually applied 
by establishments, as the latter must also take 
into consideration other factors, such as labour 
costs, seasonal demand and the opening times 
of competitors.58
All in all, even if the regulatory environment 
seems to be moving in the right direction – 
spurred on, in particular, by the implementation 
of the Services Directive – further harmonisation 
and convergence are necessary in order to 
create the right conditions for inefﬁ  ciencies 
to be removed, competition to be fostered, 
and eventually to allow consumers to reap the 
beneﬁ   ts of the Single Market, especially in 
the form of lower prices (see Section 2.1). Of 
course, coherent regulations on their own are 
not a sufﬁ  cient condition for a well-functioning 
market and balanced competition – other 
factors also play a role here.
1.3  COMPETITION IN THE DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES 
This section reviews alternative indicators 
of the degree of competition in the distributive 
trades sector. Measuring the degree of 
competition in any market is challenging under 
normal circumstances, but for the distributive 
trades – with their considerable heterogeneity 
across sub-sectors and countries (discussed in 
Section 1.1) and their role as an intermediary 
between upstream suppliers and downstream 
customers and the complex interaction that this 
implies – this may be especially difﬁ  cult.59 The 
section ﬁ  rst provides a conceptual overview of 
alternative approaches and measures together 
with a discussion of their advantages and 
limitations.
However, in Ireland, certain retail outlets (e.g. licensed premises  57 
selling alcohol) are subject to particular requirements in relation 
to opening hours.
Shops in many countries, such as Belgium and Austria, often  58 
voluntarily opt for shorter opening hours than they would be 
allowed under law; in Greece, local retail associations recommend 
a narrower range of opening hours than what is legally permitted 
and the vast majority of small establishments adhere to this 
request; in France, because labour legislation speciﬁ  es  that 
Sunday is a weekly holiday, a large number of establishments are 
closed on this day. In addition, in some countries, for example 
the Netherlands and Austria, “tourist areas” may be subject 
to less stringent restrictions. However, for the purposes of this 
report, these are considered as exemptions; the report considers 
only general regulations governing shop opening times.
In theory, as long as there are no barriers to entry, the issue of  59 
measuring competition should not really be a concern. This is 
because any proﬁ   ts beyond those required by a competitive 
industry would be competed away by ﬁ  rms either entering or 
exiting. However, in practice, barriers to entry exist, to some 
degree, in almost every market. Some of these may reﬂ  ect 
the nature of the industry (such as scale effects), some may 
be endogenous to the behaviour of ﬁ   rms (such as product 
differentiation arising from advertising and innovation) and 
some may stem from structural rigidities created by product or 
labour market regulations.
Chart 10 ESCB indicator of the degree 
of regulation of shop opening hours
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A number of different indicators are considered 
(concentration, proﬁ   tability, pass-through) at 
different levels of spatial (local, regional and 
national) and organisational (store, parent 
company and buying group) aggregation, 
as well as both upstream (producer-related) 
and downstream (consumer-related) aspects. 
A general ﬁ  nding is that concentration at the 
national level is relatively low in the southern 
European countries owing to the persistence 
of a more traditional retail structure. However, 
a unique dataset encompassing the location of 
over 100,000 individual grocery stores across 
the euro area is also used to construct regional 
and local measures of competition. While there 
are some similarities with the results using 
national data, there are also some noteworthy 
differences, with some markets that appear to 
be relatively fragmented at the national level 
turning out to be quite concentrated at the local 
level and vice versa. Overall, the key message 
is that measuring the degree of competition in 
the retail trades is not a straightforward matter; 
it is an issue that should be carefully considered 
along a number of different dimensions. 
1.3.1 CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW  60
Given the increasing degree of consolidation in 
the distributive trades sector highlighted in 
Section 1.1, it is not surprising that competition 
authorities around Europe have considered the 
issue of how to measure competition in this 
sector from both a conceptual and empirical 
perspective.61 Therefore, much of what follows 
draws on works undertaken by international 
competition authorities to address a number of 
key questions. From a conceptual point of view, 
the section discusses: (a) what the relevant 
market is; and (b) which, if any, measure of 
competition is best.
With regard to the relevant market, markets may 
be deﬁ  ned in many ways, including in terms of 
geography, sector and segment. As concerns 
the  geographical dimension, does it make 
most sense to consider competition at the local, 
regional, national, or even international level, 
or some combination of these? As concerns 
the  sectoral dimension, not all retailers are 
competitors. For example, a pharmacy is 
presumably not competing with a clothing and 
footwear retailer. However, the situation may be 
more complex for other goods and services. For 
example, a grocer may be competing in many 
segments, for instance with petrol, specialist 
food, online or department store retailers, 
while the latter two may, in turn, be competing 
with retailers of clothing and footwear or 
electronics and appliances. Lastly, as concerns 
the  segmental dimension, it may be the case 
that within the grocery trade different types of 
retailer are not really competing with each other 
for the same market segment. For example, 
large supermarkets, which generally carry a 
wide range of products of varying quality, 
price and brand, and hard discounters, which 
generally carry a limited range of unbranded 
products, may not be in direct competition with 
each other. Another issue particularly relevant 
to the distributive trades sector is the distinction 
between upstream competition in respect of 
buying power and downstream competition in 
respect of selling power. It could be the case 
that, owing to competition from other retailers, 
a large retailer has little power downstream, but 
if it is large relative to a local supplier it may 
have complete buying (or monopsony) power 
upstream, at least for certain products.
With regard to the question of which measure 
of competition is best, the following sections 
consider two broad measures of competition 
based on: (i) concentration and (ii) proﬁ  tability.
Prepared by Aidan Meyler (ECB) and Emanuela Ciapanna and  60 
Concetta Rondinelli (the Banca d’Italia).
As mentioned above, the Competition Authority of Ireland  61 
conducted two studies on the Irish retail market in 2008 and 2009. 
The UK Competition Commission completed a comprehensive 
two-year inquiry into the UK grocery sector in 2008. More 
recently, in 2010, Austria’s federal competition authority 
(Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde) conducted some work on the liquid 
fuels market; in Spain, the National Competition Commission 
(Comisión Nacional de la Competencia) studied the automotive 
fuel sector in 2008 and 2011; in Bulgaria, the Commission 
on Protection of Competition has analysed the relationship 
between supermarket chains and suppliers; and in Portugal, the 
Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência) concluded 
the “Relationship between the Large Retail Groups and their 
Suppliers” report in 2010. Only recently, in February 2011, 
Germany’s federal cartel ofﬁ   ce (Bundeskartellamt) announced 
that it had started investigating the relationship that the country’s 
leading grocery retailers had with their suppliers.45
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EX ANTE CONCENTRATION VERSUS 
EX POST PROFITABILITY
Concentration measures
Concentration measures may be considered as 
an ex ante indicator of potential competition. 
This is because, although a market with low 
concentration (i.e. many ﬁ  rms with low market 
shares) is likely to be more competitive than one 
with high concentration (i.e. few ﬁ  rms with a 
high market share), it could actually be the case 
that a market with only two players features 
more  ﬁ   erce competition than one with many 
players where explicit or implicit collusion has 
developed.62
The concept of industry concentration and the 
construction of indices measuring concentration 
has been widely analysed in the economic 
literature. The two elements that characterise 
these measures are: number (“fewness”) of 
ﬁ   rms and market share equality/inequality. 
Whenever such indicators are used, it is 
implicitly assumed that the degree of 
competition of a market structure is higher if 
the share of demand served by each ﬁ  rm is 
lower. The most commonly employed 
concentration measures are: (1)  the  k-ﬁ  rm 
concentration ratio – CRk,63 involving the sum 
of the market shares of the k largest ﬁ  rms, 
which are all given an equal weight; limitations 
of this measure arise from the arbitrariness in 
the choice of k  and the bias induced by 
excluding the other ﬁ  rms (n-k) in the market; 
and (2) the Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman  Index  – 
HHI;64 here, the weights increase with ﬁ  rm size 
and all the n ﬁ  rms are considered.
The CRk indicator is calculated as the 
cumulated market share of the top k companies 
in a given market (e.g. CR1 is the market 
share of the leading company, whereas CR5 
is the combined market share of the top ﬁ  ve 
leading companies in the market). Although 
there is no ﬁ  xed rule as to which k to select, 
Dobson (1999), in his study of buyer power 
and its impact on competition in the food retail 
sector, uses the CR5 indicator. In Chapter 2, 
it is found that the CR5 indicator may contain 
the most information regarding price level 
differentials.65
The HHI is the most widely used concentration 
measure, and is frequently the reference 
market power index for competition authority 
guidelines relating to the evaluation of mergers 
and acquisitions. Theoretically, this measure can 
range between zero and 100 (zero being where 
there are an “inﬁ   nite” number of “inﬁ  nitely” 
small  ﬁ   rms, and 100 being where there is a 
monopoly with a market share of 100). The HHI 
takes into account both the relative size and the 
distribution of the ﬁ  rms in a particular market. 
While there is no set rule for interpreting 
the HHI, and the caveats about interpreting 
concentration as a measure of competition must 
be kept in mind, a rule of thumb is to consider 
a market with an HHI below one as highly 
competitive, a market with an HHI below ten as 
relatively unconcentrated, a market with an HHI 
between 10 to 18 as moderately concentrated, 
and a market with an HHI above 18 as highly 
concentrated.
Profitability measures
Proﬁ  tability  measures may be considered as 
ex post indicators of competition, as they are 
the outcome of decisions made by competing 
ﬁ   rms. In principle, proﬁ   tability in a highly 
competitive market should be driven down 
An additional complicating factor in respect of using concentration  62 
measures to gauge the degree of competition and social welfare 
is that it could be the case that, owing to restrictions related to 
entry and expansion, a market is highly fragmented and has 
many small incumbent players plus local monopolies that operate 
relatively inefﬁ  ciently. In contrast, in another market – one that 
has developed with “free” entry and exit – there may be a smaller 
number of larger players who compete strongly against each other 
and have operations that are relatively efﬁ  cient.
k
i=1
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∑ 64  The minimum (zero)
  is attained in the case of perfect competition, whereas the 
maximum implies a monopolistic market structure. Note that, 
depending on how the market share is deﬁ  ned, the HHI is also 
sometimes presented on a scale of zero to unity or zero to 10,000.
Choosing a low “k” may place too much emphasis on the leading  65 
ﬁ  rms, whereas choosing a high “k” may not provide much additional 
information as the market share tends to tail off at around four to 
six companies in most sectors.46
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to a minimum acceptable level. However, in 
practice, measuring proﬁ  tability is challenging, 
and the more easily calculated measures have 
limitations and thus need to be interpreted with 
caution. An ideal measure would be a ﬁ  rm’s 
rate of return on capital as, ultimately, this 
is what investors in ﬁ  rms should be trying to 
maximise. However, measuring a ﬁ  rm’s capital 
is also an extremely challenging task, one with 
many potential pitfalls.66 Therefore, this section 
focuses primarily on proﬁ   t margins, even if 
these have limitations.67, 68
Equation 1 below shows that there is a 
relationship between a ﬁ  rm’s return on capital 
and its proﬁ  t margin, which is determined by 
the “capital turnover” (or “turnover per unit 
of capital employed”). Given that competitive 
behaviour by investors should give rise to a 
tendency to equalise (risk-adjusted) rates of 
return on capital, equation 1 suggests that 
proﬁ  t margins may be a useful indicator of our 
preferred measure of proﬁ  tability.  However, 
there is one important caveat. Equation 1 
underlines that this relationship depends on the 
capital turnover, which may vary substantially, 
particularly across sectors. For example, in the 
retail trade sub-sector, it is a well-known fact 
that the degree of capital turnover is quite high. 
Therefore, comparing proﬁ   t margins across 
sectors is risky, even when they are seemingly 
similar (for example, as discussed in Section 1.1, 
proﬁ  t margins in the grocery and non-grocery 
retail trade are quite different), and may also be 
misleading if interpreted at face value.69
(1) Return on capital (P/K) = proﬁ  t margin (P/S) 
* capital turnover (S/K), 
where P = proﬁ  t, K = capital, S = turnover or sales
SHOULD COMPETITION BE ANALYSED 
AT THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL LEVEL? 70
As discussed above, an important issue when 
measuring competition is to deﬁ  ne the relevant 
market. A key aspect of this is the geographical 
dimension. Should the market be considered at a 
local, regional, national or international level? 
A priori, the answer to this question is not so 
clear-cut, as retailers operate at all these levels 
(local – store; regional – logistics; national – 
parent company administration; international – 
large players and big buying groups).
From an individual consumer’s point of view, 
what probably matters most is competition in 
his/her local catchment area.71 Furthermore, there 
is evidence to suggest that the number of rivals 
located close to a store affect its performance 
(deﬁ  ned as store-level margins excluding ﬁ  xed 
costs).72 The issue of price-setting behaviour is 
clearly one of interest to monetary policy-
makers. If competition is truly local, one would 
expect that retailers set prices according to local 
demand and supply (cost and competition) 
factors. However, it has been found that many 
large retail chains set prices at the national level, 
while perhaps allowing for some degree of price 
variation at the local store level via variable 
discounting. Another way retail chains may alter 
local margins without changing prices is by 
varying costs, for example in terms of the quality 
These pitfalls include, for example, the following questions: how  66 
is capital valued; how does a ﬁ  rm treat its property holdings (are 
they embedded with the main group or held by a separate entity, 
or does it simply rent the bulk of its property requirements); and 
whether it is possible to measure intangible capital, such as that 
generated by advertising, research and development.
The UK Competition Commission, in its 2006 to 2008 inquiry  67 
into the UK grocery sector, relied extensively on an analysis of 
margins calculated at the store level – using data provided by 
retailers themselves. For a more complete discussion of the use 
of proﬁ  tability analysis to determine the degree of competition, 
see Felet and Moiloa (2009).
This report does not discuss another proﬁ  tability-based indicator  68 
of competition, namely the “Boone indicator” or “proﬁ  t elasticity 
indicator”. However, the analysis of pass-through in Section 2.4 
would accord with this indicator.
Another caveat to be mentioned is that the data for the  69 
concentration and proﬁ   tability indicators come from 
different sources (Euromonitor and Eurostat’s SBS database 
respectively), which use different classiﬁ  cation systems (such as 
size, characteristics, sector, store/non-store). This unfortunately 
makes it difﬁ  cult to compare and cross-check measures.
Prepared by Aidan Meyler (ECB). 70 
According to the European Commission (2010), pp. 30-31, “the  71 
application of competition law to retail sales of daily consumer 
goods (i.e. hypermarkets, supermarkets and discount chains) has 
found that from the consumer perspective, the boundaries of a 
catchment area where the outlets can be reached easily concern 
a radius of approximately 20 to 30 minutes driving time”.
UK Competition Commission, “Note on store margin analysis”,  72 
prepared as part of the 2006 to 2008 inquiry into the grocery sector.47
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of service offered via stafﬁ   ng levels, in-store 
display and design.73
Empirical evidence on national and local pricing
First, considering the international evidence, 
it appears that there is a degree of national 
pricing. In the United Kingdom, the Competition 
Commission, in its 2006 to 2008 Grocery Sector 
Inquiry, reported that uniform national pricing 
was predominant. It found limited variation in 
prices across store networks, and nearly all of the 
main grocery retailers surveyed stated that they 
set national prices;74 national prices have largely 
been introduced here since 2000. However, 
the report also added that “vouchering” was 
a means by which grocery retailers might 
adjust prices locally in the context of national 
pricing. In Australia, in 2010, all of the major 
supermarket chains had a national pricing 
policy. In South Africa, Myburgh et al. (2007) 
note that in a number of retail mergers the South 
African competition authorities have relied on 
the principle that national retail chains that set 
prices centrally compete in a national market.75 
In the United States, Nakamura et al. (2010) use 
a large scanner price dataset to study grocery 
price dynamics and ﬁ  nd evidence in favour of 
national pricing.76
Given the importance of this issue, this report 
takes an agnostic stance, preferring to rely 
on empirical and survey evidence and to 
allow for the fact that some ﬁ  rms may adopt 
national pricing whereas others may adopt local 
pricing. Therefore, it ﬁ  rst reports on measures 
of competition based on national data and 
then turns to measures of competition based 
on local data.
1.3.2 EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF COMPETITION 
USING NATIONAL DATA77
CONCENTRATION
This section presents empirical measures 
of market concentration based on data from 
Euromonitor, which, in terms of the distributive 
trades sector, are only available for the retail sub-
sector. It ﬁ  rst considers the different measures 
(HHI and CRk) outlined above and how these 
correspond to each other. Thereafter, the ranking 
of concentration measures across sectors is 
considered. The patterns of concentration across 
sectors and their evolution over time are also 
discussed.
As regards the different concentration measures, 
both the HHI and a range of CRk measures of 
concentration for grocery retail trade are ﬁ  rst 
considered to illustrate their relationship and 
interpretation. Table A8 in the Appendix presents 
both the HHI and a number of CRk measures for 
grocery retailing. Generally, the cross-country 
pattern of the HHI and CRk measures is relatively 
similar, with the last row in Table A8 showing a 
high correlation between the CRk measures and 
the HHI. Chart 11, which shows the cumulated 
CRk measures for euro area countries, illustrates 
that the CRk measures tend to tail off very 
quickly after the fourth-largest ﬁ   rm, with the 
possible exception of the larger economies. The 
pattern across time is also relatively similar.
A general result, regardless of which measure 
is used, is that concentration is relatively low in 
the southern European countries (Greece, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal), followed by Slovakia and 
Belgium. The highly fragmented nature of the 
Greek grocery trade is illustrated by the fact that 
the market share of the nine leading companies 
Cotteril (2007) argues that “local market cost and demand  73 
conditions vary. The fact that ﬁ  rms charge the same shelf price 
for a product throughout the country strongly suggests the 
following alternatives. Either ﬁ  rms vary the product mix and use 
local vouchers to correspond to cost and demand changes or one 
has coordinated pricing among ﬁ  rms.”
The report also clariﬁ  ed that, although for some retailers, such  74 
as Tesco and Sainsbury’s, prices may vary between their smaller 
(convenience) and larger (supermarket) format stores, these 
price variations reﬂ   ect the higher operating costs of smaller 
stores rather than local competitive conditions (this information 
was provided by the retailers themselves).
Note that this study also argues that the use of the “national pricing  75 
principle” to justify analysis of competition at the national level 
is “an example of a heuristic. One which reduces the complexity 
of the enquiry (a region by region analysis does not need to be 
done) but increases the likelihood of error (the anticompetitive 
consequences of mergers may be over or under-estimated)”.
Although they document large differences in price movements  76 
across different grocery store chains, they note that a variance 
decomposition indicates that characteristics at the chain level 
(as opposed to the level of individual stores) explain a large 
fraction of the total variation in price dynamics. It appears that 
this pattern also applies to sales discounting.
Prepared by Magdalena Komzakova and Aidan Meyler (ECB). 77 48
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amounts to 27.7%, which compares with an 
average of 64.2% for the euro area. On the other 
hand, Finland, Slovenia, Austria and Ireland 
have the highest concentration rates. The highly 
concentrated nature of the Finnish and Slovenian 
grocery trades is underlined by the fact that the 
top three companies in these countries have a 
market share of around 75%, which compares 
with a euro area average of 44.2%. It should be 
recalled that a low degree of concentration is not 
necessarily a measure of high competition, as this 
may also represent a very fragmented sector where 
economically beneﬁ  cial consolidation is restricted 
by regulation and barriers to entry. Similarly, 
although a higher degree of concentration would 
suggest less competition, other things being 
equal, it could be the case that the beneﬁ  cial 
impact of the efﬁ  ciency gains arising from higher 
concentration might outweigh the negative effects 
emanating from lower competition.
The degree of concentration varies substantially 
across the retail trade sub-sector. On average, 
across the euro area, the most concentrated parts 
of this sub-sector tend to be the electronics 
and appliances (E&A) and the grocery (groc.) 
markets, at 14.2 and 9.8 respectively – 
see Table A9 in the Appendix. The other parts of 
the retail sub-sector tend to have lower 
concentration rates.78 There has been a slight 
upward drift in the HHI observed for grocery 
retailing, which is also seen elsewhere in the 
retail sub-sector. This mirrors the ongoing 
consolidation in the European retail sector 
discussed in Section 1.1. This consolidation may 
reﬂ   ect industry forces acting to reduce 
fragmentation, to improve economies of scale 
and to increase efﬁ  ciency. But it may also reﬂ  ect 
the difﬁ  culties created by regulatory restrictions, 
particularly in respect of planning requirements 
that hinder the opening of larger sized stores – an 
issue discussed in more detail above.79 There was 
a strong increase in concentration in electronics 
and appliances retailing, which was already the 
most concentrated part of the retail sub-sector.
PROFITABILITY
This section considers measures of proﬁ  tability, 
more speciﬁ  cally  proﬁ   t margins, as indicators 
of competition. Although they are not without 
their limitations, proﬁ  tability-based  measures 
may reﬂ   ect actual market competition 
better than concentration measures, as the 
degree of concentration can have positive or 
negative consequences depending on whether 
competitiveness or efﬁ  ciency-related  effects 
are predominant. Table 3 presents the proﬁ  t 
margins for the main parts of the distributive 
Interpreting HHI measures is far from straightforward. In the  78 
United States, when considering company mergers, competition 
authorities tend to focus on the level of the HHI after the merger, 
whereas, in the EU, authorities tend to focus on the change in the 
HHI that would be brought about by the merger as well as the 
actual level of the HHI. Beyond these issues, a far more crucial 
issue is what the relevant “market” is in terms of economic 
sector and geography, etc.
While, a priori, one might expect a positive relationship between  79 
the rankings of concentration measures across countries and 
some geographic and demographic features (e.g. geographical 
area, population or population density), no obvious or striking 
correlation was found.
Chart 11 Cumulated concentration measures 


















































Sources: Euromonitor (2011) and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: “EA*” denotes values when the euro area is considered as 
a single country; “EA**” is the average of the country values.49
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011
I   AN  OVERVIEW 




trades sector. On the basis of proﬁ  t margins being 
unadjusted for the imputed labour income of the 
self-employed, it is found that proﬁ  t  margins 
are highest in the retail sub-sector (7.6%), and 
especially in non-grocery retailing (9.5%), while 
they are lowest (4.3%) in grocery retailing. 
Although the pattern here is not as clear as that 
for concentration measures, some of the southern 
European countries, most noticeably Greece, 
Spain and Italy, tend to have relatively high proﬁ  t 
margins. However, this is partially explained by 
the high share of self-employed workers in these 
countries, as their relative rankings improve 
when margins are adjusted (see Table A10 in 
the Appendix), i.e. their proﬁ  t margins become 
relatively lower. There is also a considerable 
degree of variation in margins across countries: 
the standard deviation of around 2% on average 
is approximately 33% of average proﬁ  t margins, 
although this is reduced to nearly 1% when 
adjusted proﬁ  t margins are considered.
As regards proﬁ  t margins in speciﬁ  c parts of 
the retail sub-sector (see Table 4), these appear 
to be relatively high, at close to or above 10%, 
in specialised areas of retailing: clothing and 
footwear; books, newspapers and stationery; 
and miscellaneous retailing in specialised stores. 
Margins are slightly lower, although not as low 
as in grocery retailing, in furniture and ﬁ  ttings, 
electronics and appliances, and DIY. The 
variation across countries also tends to be higher 
Table 3 Profit margins in the distributive trades sector – unadjusted and adjusted for the 
implicit labour income of the self-employed  1)
(percentages)
Distributive trades Wholesale Retail Grocery retail Non-grocery retail
Unadjusted G G51 G52 G5211 G52X11
Euro area 6.1 5.5 7.6 4.3 9.5
Max. 9.8 GR 9.3 GR 11.5 GR 8.6 GR 12.4 GR
Min. 3.7 FR 2.9 FR 4.2 SK 1.8 SK 5.0 SI
Std. deviation 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.6 2.2
Adjusted G G51 G52 G5211 G52X11
Euro area 4.7 4.7 5.2 3.6 5.9
Max. 6.3 GR 7.5 GR 7.4 NL 6.5 SI 8.3 NL
Min. 2.8 BE 2.8 FR 2.4 IT 1.2 IT 3.2 IT
Std. deviation 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4
Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) As noted in Chapter 1.1, the high proportion of self-employed in the distributive trades sector (especially in the grocery market of some 
countries) may have an impact on the comparability of reported proﬁ  ts and proﬁ  t margins. Therefore, it may be desirable to adjust for the 
imputed labour income of the self-employed. The data in the table have been adjusted using the same method outlined in Section 1.1.








DIY Books, etc. Misc.
Unadjusted  1) G524cf G5244 G5245 G5246 G5247 G5248
Euro area 9.8 7.6 5.9 7.9 10.1 9.3
Max. 14.1 GR 12.8 GR 9.3 GR 14.5 GR 12.5 GR 12.2 NL
Min. 2.1 SK 4.2 PT 3.5 AT 3.6 AT 2.9 LU 5.3 SK
Std. deviation 2.9 2.0 1.6 2.7 3.3 2.4
Adjusted  2) G524cf G5244 G5245 G5246 G5247 G5248
Euro area 6.4 4.8 3.6 5.5 5.2 5.3
Max. 9.3 NL 8.9 SI 8.0 SK 9.2 GR 7.3 FI 9.1 NL
Min. 2.6 IT 1.9 PT 0.7 IT 2.3 AT 0.8 LU 3.4 IT
Std. deviation 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.9
Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) Not adjusted for the implicit labour income of the self-employed.
2) Adjusted for the implicit labour income of the self-employed.50
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in specialised retailing areas, at around 3%, 
but is lower for furniture and ﬁ  ttings and for 
electronics and appliances, perhaps reﬂ  ecting 
the more internationalised nature of these parts 
of the retail sub-sector.
A cross-check of the concentration and 
proﬁ   tability measures suggests that there 
is generally a positive correlation between 
concentration and proﬁ  tability for both grocery 
and non-grocery retailing as a whole, i.e. 
a higher concentration is associated with higher 
proﬁ  tability across the countries covered.80
RETAILER VERSUS SUPPLIER POWER
As already noted, a key feature of the 
distributive trades sector is that it functions as an 
intermediary between industry and consumers. 
In this regard, it is not only the degree of 
competition downstream (i.e. with respect to 
customers/consumers) that may be important, 
but also the degree of competition upstream 
(i.e. with respect to producers). The OECD’s 
2008 Roundtable on Monopsony and Buyer 
Power referred to this as “buying power”, but 
distinguished between monopsony power and 
bargaining power. It argued that “the welfare 
implications, and therefore the appropriate 
enforcement policies, of the two types of buyer 
power are very different. Both result in lower 
input prices, but the exercise of monopsony power 
usually results in higher prices downstream. 
Reductions in input prices in the case of 
bargaining power are typically beneﬁ  cial”. Mills 
(2003) reports the ﬁ  nding by the UK Competition 
Commission (2000) that the largest retailers in 
the United Kingdom paid less than their smaller 
counterparts to suppliers for certain major 
branded goods. One rationale frequently given 
for the evolution of buying groups is the desire 
of retailers to be able to counteract the bargaining 
power of leading manufacturers.81 However, it is 
often argued that small suppliers, in particular, 
are vulnerable to the anti-competitive practices 
of large supermarket chains. The interaction 
between supplier and retailer bargaining power 
is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4, in the 
context of cost pass-through to food prices.
1.3.3 EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF COMPETITION 
USING STORE-LEVEL DATA  82
Different studies have pointed out the relevance 
of measuring local-level competition in the 
distributive trades sector, as the consumer may 
primarily get information from a limited set of 
stores close to his/her home and compare the 
relative prices of the goods sold at these stores.83 
In this respect, concentration measures at the 
national level may overestimate the degree of 
competition if retail stores are geographically 
spread out, implying a lack of competition at the 
local level. However, local-level concentration 
measures may also present some shortcomings. 
For example, it may be that a deﬁ  nition of local 
markets based on distance should not apply 
equally to a large, densely populated urban area 
and a remote, sparsely populated rural area.
To evaluate the degree of concentration at the 
local level in the retail sub-sector of the larger euro 
area countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain), concentration measures 
are computed using the Nielsen structural data 
for 2010 described in the Appendix; see the 
description of the Nielsen store location data. 
Concentration is evaluated in: (a) the downstream 
market, namely among parent companies and 
However, this only holds for proﬁ  t margins adjusted for the  80 
implicit labour income of the self-employed – perhaps owing 
to the impact of a high degree of self-employment on market 
fragmentation.
Information from two Deloitte reports in 2010 – “Global powers  81 
of the consumer products industry” and “Global powers of 
retailing” – shows that in both these segments, the largest players 
have reached a substantial scale. The producers ranked 10th, 20th, 
30th, 40th and 50th have sales of USD 64 billion, USD 32 billion, 
USD 22 billion, USD 19 billion and USD 16 billion 
respectively, while the equivalent largest retailers have sales of 
USD 65 billion, USD 47 billion, USD 32 billion, USD 29 billion 
and USD 16 billion respectively.
Prepared by Aidan Meyler (ECB), Mario Izquierdo Peinado  82 
(Banco de España/ECB) and Emanuela Ciapanna and Concetta 
Rondinelli (Banca d’Italia).
See, for example, the report on the UK Competition Commission  83 
inquiry mentioned above.51
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individual stores; and (b) the upstream market, at 
the buying group level. The market shares used in 
the concentration measures are based on the sales 
area, in square metres, of the stores involved.84 
The precise deﬁ   nition of the “relevant local 
market” is subject to discussion (see, for example, 
Cotteril (2007); or Perdiguero and Borrel (2008)), 
but a similar approach is followed to that used in 
Baugnet et al. (2009), deﬁ  ning a local market 
for each store as the sum of competitors within a 
radius of 5 km and 10 km.85
This section presents a range of different 
measures of market concentration using data 
on individual store locations. This is because 
competition may be multi-dimensional and 
viewed from a number of different perspectives. 
Chart 12 provides an illustrative overview of 
some of the different dimensions considered. 
First, competition may be measured at different 
levels, i.e. at the individual store, parent 
company or buying group level. Second, 
different deﬁ  nitions of the relevant market may 
be considered: local, regional or national. While 
measures of concentration at the buying group 
and individual store levels may be more relevant 
for understanding upstream and downstream 
developments respectively, measures applied 
at the parent company level may be relevant 
in both directions. Similarly, while measures 
of competition based on deﬁ  ned national and 
regional markets may be more relevant for 
understanding the power of retailers vis-à-vis 
producers, perhaps those using local markets are 
more relevant for understanding retailer power 
vis-à-vis consumers.
Downstream local markets: store 
and parent company levels
Starting with concentration measures of most 
relevance to downstream markets, Table 5 
provides the national average of the HHIs 
computed for each local market.86 Market shares 
are computed at both the store and parent group 
levels in order to take into account the possible 
lack of competition between stores located close 
to each other and belonging to the same parent 
company.
At the store level, when using either a 5 km or a 
10 km radius to deﬁ  ne respective local markets, 
Portugal, France and Finland show the most 
concentrated market structure, with HHIs above 
the euro area average.87 By contrast, the 
Netherlands and Austria provide examples of 
more fragmented retail trade markets in the euro 
area. However, when the local market is deﬁ  ned 
Counters and turnover are other possible criteria that can be  84 
employed to construct market shares. However, square metres 
are used here, because sales area data are available for all the 
countries in the dataset. Whenever possible, the same measure is 
computed based on the three indicators and a correlation larger 
than 0.9 is found. Thus, it can be concluded that square metres 
are a good indicator of market share.
First, geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude) are  85 
computed using the precise location information available in the 
dataset. Bulkgeocoder.com was used for this purpose. A more 
detailed description of this procedure, and the issues that one 
should be aware of, is provided in the Appendix (Table A24). 
The robustness of the results will also be checked by allowing 
for a different local market that depends on the store size.
This involves calculating HHIs for each of the approximately  86 
130,000 stores in the database, which in turn requires calculating 
the distance between each store. Theoretically, there are 
approximately 10 billion store pairings, although this number has 
been reduced by eliminating clearly non-contiguous pairings (for 
example, between Finnish and Greek stores). The individual HHIs 
are then aggregated (using the store size as a weight) to provide 
the national averages presented in the tables.
Some caution is required when characterising the relative degree  87 
of concentration of the Greek retail trade market. As can be seen 
in Table A24, the precision of geo-coding results is signiﬁ  cantly 
lower for Greece than for the other countries. This may mean 
that the measures used here underestimate concentration if 
distant stores are geo-coded in the same location because of the 
lower precision.
Chart 12 Conceptual overview of different 
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as having a larger radius (10 km), Belgium 
shows a similarly low concentration level, 
followed by Italy, Spain and Germany. 
The latter two countries are both close to the 
euro area average.88
At the parent company level, the HHIs show 
a similar picture in Table 5. Portugal and 
Finland remain as the countries with a higher 
market concentration in the area of retail 
trade, while Belgium and Austria show lower 
levels of concentration. However, noteworthy 
differences appear for some countries. 
In particular, the high fragmentation of retail 
trade found at the store level in the Netherlands 
is not conﬁ   rmed once parent companies are 
taken into consideration. On the other hand, 
France shows a lower concentration in its retail 
trade, with this now being closer to the euro 
area average.
Upstream local markets: buying group level
The degree of concentration in upstream 
channels may also be relevant for the description 
of the structure of the distributive trades sector. 
The Nielsen dataset also provides information on 
buying groups, and HHIs have been computed 
aggregating buying group market shares across 
local markets. The results, which are presented 
in Table 6, show some differences compared 
with those obtained at the downstream level. 
Greece joins Finland among the countries 
with a higher degree of concentration in the 
distributive trades sector, while Portugal and 
France – which both showed high concentration 
at the downstream level – now show lower 
levels of concentration upstream (in relative 
terms), especially in the context of the 10 km 
results. Austria shows the opposite pattern, with 
market concentration being low downstream, 
The correct deﬁ  nition of the relevant local market may vary  88 
across outlet types. In particular, it is possible that the relevant 
local market for a supermarket is larger than the one for a small 
store. To check the relevance of this issue, HHI national averages   
can be computed using different local markets, depending on the 
store size. For large supermarkets, the HHI is computed using a 
10 km radius for the local market, while for smaller stores the 
index is based on a local market with a radius of 5 km. In this 
case, the country ranking is quite similar to the one observed in 
Table 5, although Austria displays a concentration level more 
similar to the euro area average.
Table 5 Downstream concentration measures using a local market definition – national 
averages of local HHIs computed at the store and parent company levels




Country 5 km Country 10 
km
NL 13 NL 4 BE 21 BE 12
AT 15 BE 6 AT 23 AT 16
IT 16 AT 7 IT 24 IT 17
ES 16 IT 7 ES 25 ES 20
BE 16 DE 7 GR 27 FR 21
DE 16 ES 9 DE 29 GR 22
GR 17 GR 11 NL 30 PT 24
PT 23 PT 14 FR 31 DE 24
FI 26 FR 16 PT 32 NL 26
FR 27 FI 19 FI 40 FI 38
Euro area average 19 Euro area average 9 Euro area average 28 Euro area average 21
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations based on information from the Nielsen store location database.
Table 6 Upstream concentration measures using 
a local market definition – national averages 
of local HHIs computed at the buying group level 
Country 5 km Country 10 km
BE 26 BE 20
IT 28 IT 21
NL 30 PT 24
PT 32 NL 25
ES 33 FR 25
DE 33 DE 27
AT 34 ES 28
FR 34 AT 30
FI 40 FI 37
GR 53 GR 50
Euro area  
average 33
Euro area  
average 26
Source: Nielsen store location database.53
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but higher upstream. Meanwhile, Belgium, 
Italy and the Netherlands feature among those 
countries with lower concentration, as was the 
case at the downstream level.
Upstream and downstream concentration 
in regional and national markets
The results of local-level measures of 
concentration may be compared with those 
obtained using national and regional markets as 
the geographical reference point. Using regions 
as the reference market shows that, among the 
mainland areas, in Finland – the most 
concentrated country at the upstream and 
downstream levels – Itä-Suomi stands out.89 
Vorarlberg is the region with the highest 
concentration in terms of Austrian buying 
groups, while Tirol is most concentrated in 
terms of both parent companies and shops. 
Meanwhile, the German upstream and 
downstream markets are very concentrated in 
Sachsen-Anhalt. In Italy, Lombardy tends to be 
the least concentrated region in the country in 
terms of all three of the measures considered. 
Excluding Corsica, in France, buying groups are 
most concentrated in the Île-de-France; the 
equivalent area for parent groups and shops is 
the Pays de la Loire. In Spain, concentration is 
high in Extremadura with regard to the upstream 
market and in the Basque Country for parent 
groups and shops. Walloon Brabant in Belgium 
and Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki in Greece 
show the highest level of concentration in their 
respective countries. In the Netherlands, the 
province of North Holland, which also includes 
Amsterdam, is relatively highly concentrated, 
while Drenthe is the least concentrated region. 
Lisbon shows a high level of concentration in 
Portugal at the shop level.
Using the Nielsen store location database, Table 7 
provides HHI concentration indices computed at 
the regional level for both the parent company 
(downstream) and buying group (upstream) 
levels.  Downstream, Finland and Germany 
have the most concentrated retail trade market, 
with Belgium also above the euro area average. 
Italy, France and Austria show a low degree 
of concentration. Furthermore, about 70% of 
the Finnish market is accounted for by the two 
largest parent companies – see Table A11 in the 
Appendix. In Germany, more than 33% of the 
retail market is served by the foremost parent 
group and about 25% by the second-largest 
one. The market structure in Italy appears more 
fragmented, as the two leading parent groups 
here have a combined market share of only 
20%, with each one holding about 10%. There 
is one main parent company responsible for 
approximately 20% of the market in Greece, 
Belgium and Spain. In Portugal, the top two 
companies have a downstream market share of 
about 40% together, while in France there are 
about 50 parent groups and the two largest ones 
account for about 30% of the French market. 
When local-level measures are considered 
(i.e. when Table 7 is compared with Table 5), 
a similar characterisation of the level of 
concentration appears for some countries. 
For instance, both Italy and Austria feature 
among those countries where retail trade is 
more fragmented, while a very high level of 
concentration is found in Finland. However, 
some differences also appear. According to 
All the islands in the sample (Ahvenanmaa, Corsica, Ionia  89 
Nisia, Voreio Aigaio and Notio Aigaio) can be considered as 
outliers (see also Section 2.3), as the mean number of shops 
is lower than the national average for their respective country. 
Ionia Nisia, Notio Aigaio and Voreio Aigaio have 24, 30 and 
19 shops respectively. This compares with an average of 300 
stores per region for Greece as a whole.
Table 7 HHI at the buying group (upstream) 
and parent company (downstream) level in the 
retail sub-sector
Country HHI – BG Country HHI – PC
IT 12.8 IT 5.8
FR 15.1 FR 7.9
PT 15.8 AT 8.2
ES 19.9 ES 9.5
GR 21.2 GR 11.0
NL 21.4 NL 12.1
BE 22.5 PT 13.2
DE 24.7 BE 19.0
AT 25.2 DE 21.6
FI 37.9 FI 31.0
EA 19.4 EA 12.6
Sources: Nielsen, BNB and Eurosystem staff calculations. 
Note: “BG” denotes buying group; “PC” denotes parent company; 
and “EA” refers to the euro area.54
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national-level measures, the retail markets 
of Germany and Belgium are much more 
concentrated at the national level than at the 
local level, while in Greece and France, local-
level measures tend to show a higher level of 
concentration.
At the upstream level, Table 7 shows that the 
Finnish and Austrian retail markets are the most 
concentrated ones, while Italy and France have 
the most fragmented upstream markets. More 
speciﬁ  cally, in both Finland and Austria, the two 
leading buying groups have a concentration ratio 
in the range of 30% to 50% (see Table A12). 
In Finland, the largest buying group, including 
just the country’s biggest parent group, has a 
market share of 45.9% – the highest in the sample. 
The second-largest buying group, including 
the second-largest parent company and other 
independent retailers, accounts for more than 33% 
of the rest of the market. Meanwhile, the ﬁ  rst and 
second-largest Austrian buying groups have an 
upstream market share of above 33%, the former 
including many discounters as it is also a parent 
company and the latter being represented by its 
banner retailers. The upstream market in Italy 
shows a much more fragmented structure; the 
biggest buying group is the only one accounting 
for a market share of more than 20%, whereas the 
third, fourth, ﬁ  fth and sixth-largest buying groups 
have a market share of about 10%. A relatively 
fragmented market structure is also typical of 
Portugal: here, the biggest buying group holds 
a 25% market share and the second-largest one 
a share of 21.4%. The other countries occupy an 
intermediate position in the ranking of upstream 
market concentration. In particular, in Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the largest buying 
group accounts for about 33% of the market; in 
France and Spain, the leading buying groups hold 
a market share of 25% and 28% respectively.
As regards the situation upstream, the comparison 
with local-level measures tends to show a more 
similar country ranking when both approaches 
are used. However, the concentration in the 
Greek distributive trades sector is higher when 
local-level measures are considered.
In conclusion, in this section, different measures 
for assessing the concentration of the retail 
trade market in euro area countries have been 
provided, using a national, regional and local 
approach based on structural data from Nielsen. 
This exercise may provide a useful insight into 
the structure of the distributive trades sector in 
the euro area. As regards the downstream market, 
some differences appear depending on the 
geographical market used. In all cases, Finland 
generally shows a high degree of concentration 
in this sector. On the other hand, Italy is among 
those countries with one of the most fragmented 
market structures. If one compares the results 
of measures based on national and regional 
markets with those of measures based on local 
markets, the ranking for some countries changes 
signiﬁ  cantly. For example, the Greek retail trade 
market appears to be quite fragmented at the 
national level but is less so when local market 
measures are applied. Equally, local market 
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measures indicate that the Austrian market may 
not be as highly concentrated as national or 
regional measures would suggest. 
As regards the upstream market, Finland 
again tends to show high concentration when 
both regional and local measures are used, 
while Belgium’s market structure appears to 
be highly concentrated in terms of regional 
measures but less so in terms of local measures. 
On the other hand, Italy displays a relatively 
fragmented market at the buying group level 
under both approaches. In contrast, while the 
French upstream market appears to be relatively 
fragmented based on regional measures, it is 
relatively highly concentrated from the point of 
view of local markets.
Overall, given the different country rankings 
provided by the various concentration measures 
(depending on whether the focus is on a 
reference market (local, regional or national) 
or on downstream or upstream market power 
(store, parent company or buying group level)) 
and the fact that these different aspects can 
be important in various contexts, one should 
rely not on a single indicator but on a more 
holistic view and understanding of individual 
markets.
Box 5
THE DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES IN THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES  1
The economic development of the new 
Member States (NMS)  2 over the last decade 
has been marked by fundamental changes that 
were largely prompted by the accession of 
these countries to the EU. A process of real 
convergence has resulted in these countries 
narrowing the per capita income gap with the 
old Member States. This economic catching-
up has been associated with an increasing 
signiﬁ   cance of the distributive trades sector 
for the economies of the NMS. This box aims 
to outline the macroeconomic importance of 
the sector for the NMS, to present its main 
characteristics and to draw, as far as possible, 
some inferences for inﬂ  ation  developments 
based on a descriptive aggregate-level analysis.
1  Prepared by Tsvetan Tsalinski and Zornitsa Vladova (Bulgarian National Bank).
2  The analysis includes the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania.


























Chart A Gross value added 


























Sources: Eurostat, National Accounts and Structural Business 
Statistics. 
Notes: “EA” refers to euro area; Greece and Malta are excluded 
due to data limitations.56
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Macroeconomic importance
Over the period 2000 to 2007 the sector’s 
share of gross value added grew substantially 
in most NMS, compared with the more 
moderate developments in euro area countries 
(see Chart A).3 A sectoral breakdown shows 
that, of the three main sub-sectors, the 
wholesale sub-sector has greater importance in 
terms of the value added generated (similarly 
to euro area countries).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an 
important driving factor behind developments 
in the distributive trades sector. Even though 
the number of foreign-controlled enterprises 
is not large, amounting to only between 1% 
and 6% of the total number of ﬁ  rms,  these 
enterprises have accounted for an increasing 
share of total turnover (see Chart B). In 2006 
the share of turnover generated by foreign 
enterprises was in the range of 20% to 30% 
in Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, and 
between 40% and 50% in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. The distributive trades sector 
represents a signiﬁ  cant proportion of economy-
wide investment, with around one-third of this 
accounted for by FDI-related ﬁ  rms.
The extensive market penetration of foreign 
companies – mainly from the EU – has 
contributed signiﬁ   cantly to transforming 
and modernising local markets, particularly 
as regards retail trade, though starting from 
different points in time in individual countries 
of the NMS (A.T. Kearney Global Retail 
Development Index (2004, 2007 and 2010), 
Dries et al. (2004) and Deloitte (2008)). 
Grocery retailing is one of the markets that 
has experienced the most profound changes 
in terms of expansion of modern formats. The 
trend towards a decline in the importance of 
traditional small shops (as evident in some of 
the more mature markets, such as that of the 
Czech Republic) indicates that a continuing 
modernisation of distribution channels in 
3  The choice of period is subject to data availability.
Chart B Share of sectoral turnover 
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Source: Eurostat SBS database.
Notes: NMS excludes Poland owing to data limitations; “EA” 
refers to the euro area, but includes only Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and France because of data limitations.
Chart C Development of modern retail 
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Bulgaria and Romania is to be expected in 
the coming years, possibly linked to a further 
increase in competition from multinational 
chains (see Chart C).
Labour market characteristics
The distributive trades sector has played a 
signiﬁ  cant role in job creation in the NMS in 
the transition process, generating an increasing 
share of total employment. In 2007 the sector’s 
share of overall employment ranged from 
around 11% in Romania to around 19% in 
Lithuania. Similar to euro area countries, retail 
trade is a larger employer than the wholesale 
and the motor and fuel sub-sectors. An 
important feature regarding the NMS, 
albeit one varying in terms of speed, has been 
the growing share of total employment in 
the distributive trades sector accounted for 
by foreign-controlled enterprises. In 2007 
this share ranged from slightly above 10% in 
Poland and Romania to about 20% in Hungary 
and Latvia.
In terms of the employment structure, developments in the NMS share certain similarities with 
those observed in the old Member States. In general, the average age of those employed is lower 
than that for the whole economy and the share of women working in the sector is relatively higher 
than that for the entire labour force. The generally higher proportion of skilled occupations in the 
sector for the euro area and some of the more mature NMS markets possibly indicates that, with the 
more widespread use of automated work processes, a similar trend towards more skilled labour in 
the sectoral employment composition is likely to occur in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria 
(see Chart D).
MARKET STRUCTURE AND IMPACT ON PRICE DEVELOPMENTS
Concentration and productivity
Retail markets in the NMS are in an ongoing process of concentration; a fact which is evident 
from the increasing share of turnover attributed to the top 1% of ﬁ  rms and, more speciﬁ  cally, 
the rising market share of the leading ﬁ  ve grocery retail companies. In addition, an increase in 
food retail surface area has been associated with both a larger number of individual stores and a 
bigger average store size (Bukeviciute et al. (2009)).
Market concentration appears to have improved efﬁ  ciency, since labour productivity in the 
distributive trades, as a whole, increased from 2003 to 2006, especially in Estonia, Latvia and 
Chart D Skill composition of employment 
in the distributive trades sector in 2009
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Bulgaria. Productivity growth has also been strongly boosted by FDI, as the productivity levels 
achieved in foreign-controlled ﬁ  rms have been, by far, superior to the respective levels for the 
whole sector in all NMS (see Chart E).
A strong increase in proﬁ  tability in the retail trade sub-sector was observed in Estonia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Latvia (see Chart F).4 The trend of rising proﬁ  tability has, in general, narrowed 
differences in the gross operating rates of countries and, in most cases, brought them closer 
to the average value for the euro area of about 7%. These developments seem to suggest that 
the observed growth in proﬁ  tability could be interpreted as being efﬁ  ciency-based and not 
necessarily a reﬂ  ection of increasing market power due to intensifying concentration.
Impact on price developments
Regardless of whether or not it was moving in parallel with the gross operating rate, the resale 
mark-up in the retail trade market increased in most countries in the period from 2003 to 2007, 
albeit to a different extent in individual cases (see Chart F).5 An exception is Hungary, where 
resale mark-ups declined, and this accounted for the relatively stabile nature of the indicator for 
the NMS as a whole. The heterogeneity in mark-up rates may be due to differences in supply 
4 Proﬁ  tability is measured by the gross operating rate. For the purposes of this box, it has not been adjusted for the implicit labour 
income of the self-employed.
5  The resale mark-up is estimated as follows: mark-up on goods for resale = gross margin on goods for resale/(purchases of goods for 
resale – change in stocks of goods for resale).
Chart E Labour productivity 
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Source: Eurostat SBS database and own calculations.
Notes: NMS excludes Poland owing to data limitations; “EA” 
refers to the euro area, but includes only Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland owing to data limitations. 
Labour productivity is deﬁ  ned as valued added at factor cost 
per person employed (in thousands of euro), adjusted for cross-
country price level differences using Eurostat data related to 
comparative price level indices for consumer goods.
Chart F Gross operating rate and resale 
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but excludes Malta owing to data limitations. Mark-up on goods 
for resale = gross margin on goods for resale/(purchases of 
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chains, relationships with service providers, subcontractors, etc. Hence, it is difﬁ  cult to tell 
whether resale mark-up dynamics alone can explain inﬂ  ation developments in these countries. 
Whilst rising mark-up rates may be one of the driving factors behind inﬂ  ation in the Baltic 
countries, in the case of Bulgaria, inﬂ  ation rates were elevated despite modest mark-up rates. 
It is also hard to disentangle developments in the structure of retail markets and in mark-ups from 
other conjunctural or fundamental factors, such as the business cycle, the input cost structure 
relating to production, the labour market, convergence processes, etc.
The empirical evidence on the implications of retail pricing policies for consumer prices in 
the NMS is rather limited. Podpiera and Raková (2008) ﬁ  nd that, in the Czech Republic, the 
increasing number of stores in the fast-moving consumer goods market over the period 2000 to 
2005 resulted in prices declining, on average, by 0.8 percentage point a year. In contrast, they 
expect the strengthening of the consolidation processes will lead to overall inﬂ  ation increasing 
by 0.5 percentage point a year by 2020. When examining the functioning of the food supply 
chain, Bukeviciute et al. (2009) indicate that the lack of sufﬁ  cient competitive pressures at the 
retail level could be one of the factors behind the higher price increases in NMS, compared with 
the euro area. The authors argue that consolidation processes may be associated with efﬁ  ciency 
gains and result in lower prices, but emphasise that increasing concentration could also lead to 
anti-competitive developments and price increases. In the case of the NMS, the authors ﬁ  nd that 
the growing number of retail stores had a certain dampening effect on consumer food prices in 
the period from 2003 to 2007.
In conclusion, the distributive trades sector has been of increasing importance to the economies 
of the NMS, playing a signiﬁ  cant role in job creation during the transition process. Prompted 
by the accession of these countries to the EU and their growth prospects, FDI has been 
instrumental in the fast development and modernisation of this sector. FDI has contributed 
strongly to enhancing productivity in all countries. At present, NMS retail markets are in an 
ongoing process of consolidation which, in most cases, has been accompanied by a general 
trend of increasing proﬁ  tability. This has led to a narrowing of proﬁ  tability differentials and has 
pushed proﬁ  t levels closer to the average for the euro area. Although resale mark-ups in the retail 
sub-sector have been on the rise in most countries, the possible implications of these 
developments for overall inﬂ  ation at an aggregate level are hard to disentangle from speciﬁ  c 
local factors as well as from other factors, such as the business cycle and convergence processes. 
Nonetheless, looking forward, given the ongoing trend towards consolidation, it is imperative that 
policymakers ensure adequate competition and “smart” regulation to minimise inﬂ  ationary 
tendencies.60
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2  THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL FEATURES 
ON PRICE LEVELS, PRICE-SETTING 
BEHAVIOUR, REGIONAL PRICE DYNAMICS 
AND PASS-THROUGH
2.1  THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL FEATURES 
ON PRICE LEVEL DIFFERENCES  90
The aim of this section is threefold: (1) to 
provide a descriptive overview of price level 
differences across the euro area in terms of their 
magnitude and characteristics across countries 
and products; (2) to examine the degree of 
convergence or otherwise in price levels; and 
(3) to combine information on the structural 
aspects of the retail sub-sector with other 
indicators in order to assess the extent to which 
these structural aspects help us to understand 
price level differences and convergence.
The main ﬁ   ndings are as follows. (1) There 
remains a considerable degree of price 
dispersion across the euro area. Whilst this is 
lower, on average, for goods than for services, 
it is still sizeable in most cases – it tends to 
be lower for electronics and for clothing and 
footwear goods but higher for food products. 
(2) Even though different measures suggest 
differing degrees of convergence, it seems that a 
limited degree of convergence has indeed taken 
place, but that this came to a halt around the 
period 2004 to 2006. (3) There is compelling 
evidence of a strong “border effect” across 
euro area countries, which suggests ample 
scope for further improving the Single Market. 
(4) Even after controlling for factors such as 
income levels and VAT rates, the structural and 
regulatory features of the distributive trades 
sector appear to play a role in explaining 
differences in price levels across countries.
2.1.1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
There have been numerous studies of price 
level differences and dispersion in Europe, 
but the evidence about the link between 
cross-country price differentials and the 
structural features of the distributive trades 
sector is scarce.
Faber and Stokman (2009) consider price level 
convergence at an aggregated level by combining 
overall HICP/CPI and PPP data over a long time 
period (from 1960 to 2003) as well as at a slightly 
more disaggregated level  91 over a shorter time 
period (from 1980 to 2003). They ﬁ  nd evidence 
of price level convergence in Europe over a long 
period of 40 to 50 years, which they attribute to 
the harmonisation of indirect taxes and to non-
traded and traded input costs (via exchange rates 
and economic openness). They also ﬁ  nd  that 
price level dispersion in the United States over 
the same period was broadly stable; at a level 
that was only reached in the EU towards the end 
of their sample period in 2003. They also “note 
that price level dispersion between the EMU 
countries already converged close to that in the 
United States before the introduction of the euro”, 
perhaps implying that further substantial progress 
in price convergence could not be expected.
Similarly, in a comprehensive study of the impact 
of the euro on prices, Sturm et al. (2009) conclude 
that “overall, the results from the literature are 
fairly conclusive. There is generally little evidence 
that price levels among EMU member countries 
have converged due to the introduction of a 
common currency. For one thing, price dispersion 
among EMU member countries was already 
disproportionately low at the time when the euro 
was adopted.” In their own analysis, they also 
argue that there is not much evidence in favour of 
price convergence in the post-EMU period, despite 
there being some convergence for speciﬁ  c products. 
Similarly, the Deutsche Bundesbank (2009) has 
also investigated price convergence in the euro 
area in the ﬁ  rst decade of EMU, concluding that 
“the empirical ﬁ  ndings point, at most, to a marginal 
convergence of prices as an underlying trend”.92
Prepared by Aidan Meyler and Luca Gattini (ECB) and Fatima  90 
Cardoso (Banco de Portugal). The assistance of the PPP team at 
Eurostat – in particular, Paulus Konijn, Barbara Kurkowiak and 
Lars Svennebye – is gratefully acknowledged. 
They looked at seven sub-components: food, alcoholic beverages  91 
and tobacco, clothing and footwear, housing, furnishings, 
transport and communications, and recreation and culture.
Berka and Devereux (2010) also combine PPP data with HICP  92 
data to study price level convergence. They ﬁ   nd that price 
dispersion is higher for non-tradables than tradables. They 
report little or no convergence for euro area countries but some 
for new Member States.61
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In terms of the determinants of price 
differences, Berka and Devereux (2010) argue 
that real exchange rates are very closely tied 
to relative GDP per capita within Europe, 
both across countries and over time. In this 
regard, Andersson et al. (2009) also ﬁ  nd 
that price level differences are a function of 
GDP per capita, whilst arguing that inﬂ  ation 
differences are a function of the business cycle 
and persistence and that the latter is, in turn, 
a function of administered prices and product 
market regulation.
At a more sectoral and micro level, there have 
been a number of studies that have looked at the 
structural features of the distributive trades 
sector and their impact on price levels, pricing 
behaviour and inﬂ  ation. However, many of these 
have been country-speciﬁ  c.93 In Italy, Schivardi 
and Viviano (2010), in a study of regional data, 
ﬁ   nd that entry barriers are associated with 
substantially larger proﬁ   t margins and lower 
productivity on the part of existing incumbent 
ﬁ  rms. In areas with more stringent market entry 
regulation, lower productivity coupled with 
larger margins results in higher consumer prices. 
For Spain, Matea and Mora (2009) ﬁ  nd that an 
increase in the level of regulation at the regional 
level increases inﬂ   ation and also diminishes 
employment in the retail trades.94 In Finland, 
Kotilainen et al. (2010) have found that VAT 
and cost disadvantages, such as a northern 
location and low population density, were 
signiﬁ  cant factors behind higher prices here.95
In a recent study, the European Commission 
(2010) highlighted considerable price 
differences within the internal market, 
prompting the suggestion that the internal 
market is still fragmented. For example, the 
Commission noted that the price of food and 
non-alcoholic beverages is, on average, 28.4% 
higher in Belgium than in the Netherlands, and 
that for certain common retail pharmaceutical 
products, the price difference can reach a factor 
of one to ﬁ  ve. On the other hand, with regard 
to the clothing retail market, the Commission 
commented that “it is surprising to note that 
prices in Ireland, France and the United Kingdom 
are below the EU average whilst those in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia are considerably 
higher than average”. This suggests that several 
factors, such as differences in average household 
disposable income or VAT, explain certain 
price differences, whilst other factors related 
to competition, the regulatory framework or 
commercial practices (e.g. territorial supply 
constraints or obstacles to parallel trade), also 
play a role. However, the comparability of price 
level data is sometimes questioned.
Before trying to assess the impact of the 
structural features of the distributive trades 
sector on price level differences across euro area 
countries, there is ﬁ  rst a descriptive analysis of 
price dispersion.
2.1.2 THE DEGREE OF PRICE DISPERSION 
AND CONVERGENCE
This section analyses the pattern of price 
dispersion over the past decade for a set of 
consumer prices and investigates the degree, 
if any, of convergence. More speciﬁ  cally,  it 
uses data containing information on relative 
price levels for a detailed set of products 
made available from Eurostat’s PPP database 
and derives simple statistics of convergence 
for these products. This analysis provides a 
ﬁ   rst impression of the extent to which price 
convergence prevails across countries and 
classes of products, such as tradables and non-
tradables. A number of different indicators 
A notable exception is Francois et al. (2008) who study the  93 
pass-through from producer and import prices across a range 
of consumer goods products and countries, ﬁ  nding “signiﬁ  cant 
interaction between various measures of retail structure and the 
rate of pass-through”.
In Finland, Rantala (2007) measures competition using the price  94 
cost margin and the Boone competition indicators discussed in 
Chapter 1.3 and shows that competition in the Finnish private 
service sectors is roughly equal to competition in other EU and 
OECD countries. Thus, it is argued that the high consumer price 
level in Finland cannot be explained by the lack of competition 
in the Finnish service sectors. As regards Spain, Hoffmeister 
(2009) argues that “price convergence emerges in Spain once 
regional barriers to entry have been accounted for”. However, 
it should be noted that this study looks at inﬂ  ation rather than 
price levels.
They suggest that the most important reasons why the consumer  95 
price level is higher in Finland than in other EU countries are the 
high level of housing prices and value added and other product 
tax rates in this country.62
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(beta and sigma) of convergence are calculated 
using both raw PPP data as well as the HICP 
interpolated using PPP data.
Table 10 uses PPP data to provide an overview 
of the degree of price dispersion (in terms of 
the maximum and minimum relative price 
levels) across the euro area in 2009 for some of 
the Classiﬁ   cation of Individual Consumption 
by Purpose (COICOP) publicly available 
groups.96 Despite the fact that the degree of 
price dispersion in the euro area was already 
relatively low at the launch of EMU, it is clear 
that a substantial amount of dispersion remains. 
For overall private consumption, price levels 
varied by almost 100% from the lowest (62.4 
in Slovakia) to the highest (122.9 in Ireland) 
registered, relative to the euro area average 
of 100.
At the relatively aggregated two-digit COICOP 
level, the lowest gap between minimum and 
maximum price levels across the euro area was 
for the household goods group (5), with a 
difference of 30% between the lowest (85.6 in 
Slovakia) and highest (111.4 in Luxembourg) 
levels. The gap is largest for the alcoholic drink 
and tobacco group (2), at 140% – presumably 
driven in large part by taxation differences – 
with a gap of 100% for alcoholic beverages and 
one of over 200% for tobacco. In terms of the 
more detailed sub-groups available, the one with 
the lowest variation was electronic equipment  97 
(9.1), with a difference of just 15% between the 
lowest (92.4 in Luxembourg) and the highest 
(106.2 in Cyprus) price levels. Relatively low 
differences were also observed for the clothing 
and footwear group (3) – see the box in 
Section 2.4 for a more detailed discussion of 
clothing and footwear prices and their evolution. 
For overall food prices, the gap between the 
highest and lowest price levels was almost 
60%.
Before considering in more detail the degree of 
dispersion in price levels across the euro area, 
it should be noted that a number of technical 
aspects are discussed in the Appendix, for 
example, how to measure price dispersion and 
convergence and which measure, if any, is 
“best”, and how PPP and HICP data are merged 
so as to optimally combine the cross-product 
and cross-time properties of both datasets.
When all of the 146 available PPP series are 
considered individually there is a considerable 
degree of volatility within and across these series 
over time and, generally, a substantial amount of 
heterogeneity. In some cases dispersion appears 
to have fallen, risen in others and, in many cases, 
no clear trend is evident. Nevertheless, when the 
data are aggregated, a number of patterns emerge, 
as demonstrated in Chart 13. First, as would 
be expected a priori, the degree of dispersion 
(as measured by the coefﬁ  cient of variation) was 
on average lower for goods (slightly below 15 
in 2009) than for services (slightly above 20 in 
2009) over the period covered by the sample 
(1995 to 2009). It should be noted that goods 
Table A14 in the Appendix provides detailed country numbers. 96 
This refers to audio-visual, photographic and information  97 
processing equipment.
Table 10 Minimum and maximum (post-tax) price levels for different product categories 
in the euro area in 2009
(euro area = 100; “cc” denotes country)
Min. (cc) Max. (cc) Max./min. (%) Rank
0 Overall consumption 62.4 SK 122.9 IE 97.1 22
1 Food/non-alcoholic drink 76.2 SK 120.6 IE 58.2 13
2 Alcoholic drink/tobacco 77.2 ES 184.4 IE 139.0 26
3 Clothing/footwear 88.1 MT 118.7 FI 34.7 5
5 Household goods 85.6 SK 111.4 LU 30.1 2
9 Recreation/culture 65.6 SK 115.8 FI 76.5 18
9.1 Electronic equipment 92.4 LU 106.2 CY 15.0 1
12 Misc. goods/services 61.0 SK 124.7 IE 104.6 24
Sources: Eurostat PPP database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: “Rank” refers to the ranking across the 32 available product categories of the range between the maximum and minimum price levels.63
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prices also include a non-traded element related 
to the retail intermediation service involved. 
The lowest price dispersion is observed for 
non-energy industrial goods (i.e. non-food, 
non-energy consumer goods), at slightly above 
10 in 2009; the highest for services. Whilst the 
dispersion of services prices was, on average, 
the highest registered, after 2006, the dispersion 
of processed food prices and energy prices 
stood at about the same level. Second, for 
consumer prices, in general, and for the prices 
of non-energy industrial goods and services, in 
particular, the degree of dispersion has fallen 
on average over the past 15 years. However, in 
respect of processed foods (and to a lesser extent 
energy goods), it has risen since the second half 
of the 2000s, whilst remaining broadly constant 
for unprocessed foods. Lastly, as regards the 
general pattern over time, the overall degree 
of price dispersion seemed to decline slightly 
between 1995 and 1998 and increase somewhat 
between 1998 and 2001, before easing thereafter 
to reach a minimum in 2009.
However, as discussed further in the Appendix, 
some caution is needed when interpreting 
Chart 13 owing to certain issues relating to both 
the measurement of price dispersion over time 
and the use of PPP data.98
Chart 14 shows both the coefﬁ  cient of variation 
and the standard deviation using pseudo price 
level data (PPLD) constructed by merging HICP 
and PPP data – see Box 3 in the Appendix for a 
more detailed explanation. Considering ﬁ  rst the 
coefﬁ  cient of variation, the pattern observed in 
Firstly, caution must be exercised because the coefﬁ  cient of  98 
variation might be biased towards showing convergence if the 
price level is increasing over time. As euro area inﬂ  ation has 
averaged slightly below 2% over the past 15 years, the average 
consumer price level has risen by over one-third. Thus, if the 
differences in price levels were to be constant in absolute terms 
(i.e. the standard deviation would be constant) the coefﬁ  cient of 
variation would decline by 25% (1/1.333). With regard to the 
time series properties of PPP data, methodological improvements 
are continuously being made in these data, thereby introducing a 
potential bias towards price convergence if harmonisation across 
countries leads to lower price dispersion.
Chart 13 Evolution of the coefficient 


























Sources: Eurostat PPP dataset and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart 14 Price dispersion (standard deviation 






















Sources: Eurostat PPP dataset and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: PPLD combine national HICPs with relative price level 
indices obtained from PPP data.64
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Chart 14 is somewhat different from that seen 
earlier in Chart 13. Using the merged HICP/PPP 
data, the decline in the coefﬁ  cient of variation 
is more evident, with there being two distinct 
phases, i.e. the period between 1995 and 1998 
and that between 2001 and 2006. However, 
since 2006 there has been an apparent increase 
in the degree of price dispersion.
Second, as concerns the standard deviation, 
although there are some similarities, such as 
the declines observed between 1995 and 1998 
and after 2001, the pattern is substantially 
different to that of the coefﬁ  cient of variation. 
In particular, the decline in price dispersion seen 
between 1995 and 2004 was relatively modest 
and dispersion increased noticeably after 2004.
Cross-checking the two measures would 
suggest that some price convergence took place 
between 1995 and 1998 and between 2001 and 
2004. However, both these measures would also 
suggest that price dispersion increased in the 
second half of the 2000s – a fact that is worrying 
from a monetary policy perspective and which 
may warrant further investigation.
Finally, Charts 15(a) and 15(b) provide two 
alternative examples of so-called “beta 
convergence”: the former presents the median 
beta coefﬁ  cient estimated across the 146 series 
in respect of relative price level indices (RPLIs) 
obtained from raw PPP data and 89 series in 
respect of PPLD (i.e. combined HICP/PPP 
data), whereas the latter shows the percentage of 
statistically signiﬁ  cant beta coefﬁ  cients obtained 
when using both sets of data. In both charts, the 
degree of beta convergence appears to have 
increased over time, being somewhat stronger 
in the case of RPLI data than when PPLD are 
used. This may be owing to a number of factors. 
First, as mentioned above, the PPP methodology 
is being continuously reﬁ  ned and this may give 
rise to apparent convergence, when in fact it 
is merely a more accurate comparison of price 
levels across countries. Second, it may be that 
price convergence is more evident at more 
disaggregated levels of data. For example, 
when using the RPLI data, there are thirty 
series for food, whereas for PPLD, there are 
nine series for food. Sturm et al. (2009) argue 
that, at an aggregate level, there is little or no 
evidence of price convergence but, at a more 
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detailed level, there is indeed some evidence of 
price convergence for certain products. It may 
be the case that convergence makes most sense 
and that this should thus be assessed at the most 
disaggregated level possible.
2.1.3 IS THERE A “BORDER EFFECT” ON PRICES?
In this section very detailed product-level 
data from the PPP dataset are used to analyse 
whether prices differ more within countries or 
across countries – the so-called “border effect”. 
The term “border effect” refers to the fact that 
price dispersion tends to be higher between 
cities across borders than between cities within 
borders. Whilst there has been an extensive and 
rich literature on this topic (e.g. Bergin and 
Glick (2006), Crucini et al. (2005), Parsley and 
Wei (2001), and Engel and Rogers (1996)), this 
effect has not yet been studied with regard to 
euro area countries using PPP data.99
Assessing the existence of a border effect is 
possible using data from “Quaranta tables”,  100 
which are compiled both at the basic heading 
(146 consumption items) and product heading 
(over 2,500 items) levels. At the product level, 
the Quaranta tables contain the following:
Price-related information for each product  • 
in each country/city – the average price 
recorded, the number of price observations 
recorded, and the coefﬁ  cient of variation of 
the prices recorded.
Information on whether each product is:  • 
(i) a speciﬁ   ed brand; (ii) a non-speciﬁ  ed 
but “well-known” brand; or (iii) without a 
brand – goods without a brand label or with a 
“pseudo” brand label that is “meaningless” to 
consumers or where “brand” is not a relevant 
term, such as in the case of fresh meat or ﬁ  sh.
Thus, these data allow us to ascertain whether 
prices vary more across countries than within 
countries and this may also be linked to whether 
the product is a speciﬁ  ed international brand or 
a brandless product. This may be relevant in the 
context of the discussion in Section 1.1 on private 
label brands and the relative bargaining power of 
producers and retailers. Whilst there are some 
caveats with regard to the use of these data, as 
will be discussed below, the ﬁ  ndings are quite 
robust, even when these are kept in mind.101
Chart 16a shows the median dispersion of 
individual price observations within countries/
cities as well as the dispersion in respect of 
average prices across countries/cities for 
356 food and non-alcoholic beverage 
products.102 On average, the degree of dispersion 
regarding average prices across countries/cities 
is substantially higher than the degree of 
dispersion for individual observations within 
countries/cities: the medians are 0.25 and 0.15, 
respectively – see Table 11. Also, the dispersion 
regarding products is higher: the inter-quartile 
range across countries is 0.12 compared with 
0.06 within countries and the lower quartile 
product dispersion is 0.20 across countries 
compared with 0.12 within countries.
Chart 16b demonstrates that the degree of 
dispersion is also a function of the “degree 
of branding” but is still always lower within 
countries/cities than across countries/cities. 
The median dispersion across products within 
Ratfai and Reiff (2010) make a comparison across the Hungarian- 99 
Slovakian border, arguing that it has virtually no effect.
These tables were originally developed as a means of validating  100 
raw price data and for quality control, and are named after their 
originator, Vincenzo Quaranta of the Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT), who ﬁ  rst proposed them to the Eurostat 
Working Party on Price Statistics in January 1990. They were 
subsequently described in “A data quality control approach 
in price surveys for PPP estimates” by Quaranta, which was 
published in Improving the Quality of Price Indices: CPI and 
PPP, Eurostat and University of Florence, Luxembourg, 1996.
The main caveat is that it is not possible to extract the coefﬁ  cient  101 
of variation of all observations across all countries; it is only 
possible to observe the coefﬁ  cient of variation of the individual 
observations recorded within a country/city and the coefﬁ  cient 
of variation of the average prices observed across countries. 
However, a priori, one would expect the coefﬁ  cient of variation 
of a sample average (i.e. the average prices observed) to be lower 
than the coefﬁ  cient of variation of the raw data (the individual 
price observations). Therefore, if the coefﬁ   cient of variation 
across countries is higher than that within countries, it strongly 
suggests the presence of the so-called “border effect”.
Data are actually available for 496 food and non-alcoholic  102 
beverage products, though not for all products across all 
countries. Therefore, in order to ensure comparability across 
countries, data are restricted to those products for which more 
than one price observation is available for at least eight countries 
(i.e. the said 356 products).66
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countries/cities is 0.08 for “named” brands, 
0.15 for “well-known” brands and 0.17 for 
“brandless” products, whereas it is higher 
across countries/cities at 0.20, 0.25 and 0.29, 
respectively.103 Given the potential importance 
of the interaction between upstream (producers) 
and downstream (retailers) agents in determining 
consumer prices (as discussed in Chapter 1), the 
ﬁ  nding of lower dispersion for “named” brands 
may warrant further investigation.
Chart 16a presents compelling evidence of the 
existence of a border effect. Nonetheless, it could 
be argued that this effect captures the impact of 
geographical distance rather than that of national 
borders. To assess this, it is helpful to take 
advantage of the fact that PPP data are available 
for a number of German cities (i.e. Berlin, Bonn, 
Karlsruhe and Munich)  104 and carry out a 
robustness check by comparing price level 
differences between these German cities and 
those between comparable capital cities in 
different countries. First, price dispersion is 
calculated for the four countries whose capital 
cities (for which raw PPP data are collected) are, 
However, two points should be noted with regard to this analysis  103 
based on branding. First, it does not say anything about price 
levels. It might be that branded goods have higher mark-ups as 
a result of product differentiation and pricing power. Second, it 
may reﬂ  ect statistical factors, in that it may simply indicate that 
it is easier to compare prices both across countries and within 
cities if a speciﬁ  ed brand name is involved.
These cities are relatively diverse geographically and  104 
demographically. The distance between these four German cities 
ranges from around 300 km to about 700 km, with the average 
distance being 500 km (all by car and using main roads).
Chart 16 Use of detailed product-level data from PPPs to assess the existence of a border 
effect for food, beverages and tobacco prices
(coefﬁ  cient of variation)
x-axis: within countries (cities)
y-axis: across countries (cities)
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broadly speaking, less heterogeneous in terms of 
distance and population.105 These countries are 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.106 The average distance between 
their capital cities is 330 km, which is actually 
substantially below the average distance between 
the four German cities. It should be noted that 
these four countries are also relatively 
homogenous in terms of their economic structure 
and relatively high living standards. Although 
their capital cities are geographically closer than 
the German cities, Chart 16c shows that price 
dispersion across these four countries (at 0.15) is 
substantially above that across the German cities 
(0.05) – see Chart 16d – but lower than the 
dispersion across all euro area countries (0.25). 
Thus, whilst price dispersion is due, in part, to 
geographical distance, there is also clearly a 
national border effect.
The results for the German cities shown in 
Chart 16d underline the fact that, ceteris paribus, 
the dispersion of sample averages is lower than 
the dispersion of individual observations and thus 
provides more robust evidence of a strong border 
effect within the euro area. From Chart 16d it is 
quite striking (especially when compared with 
Charts 16a and 16c) that the degree of dispersion 
of average prices across German cities is lower on 
average than the degree of dispersion of individual 
prices within German cities. The median across 
cities is 0.05, whereas the median within cities 
is 0.13 – this is completely the opposite of what 
has been observed across countries. In addition, 
as with the results for the euro area, dispersion 
is much lower for “named” brands than for 
“well-known” or “brandless” products, both 
across and within cities. 
In summary, thus far it has been shown that: 
(a) despite some evidence of convergence in 
euro area consumer prices over the past 15 years, 
considerable dispersion remains; and (b) despite 
the existence of a common currency since 1999, 
there appears to be a sizeable and signiﬁ  cant 
border effect, with the result that price dispersion 
across countries is higher than that within 
countries. Thus, it is important also to consider 
what factors may have been behind this and what 
role, if any, has been played by the structural 
features of the distributive trades sector. 
The four German cities are generally similarly heterogeneous,  105 
both in terms of geographic distance and in terms of population.
The populations of the respective capital cities are: Brussels (1.1  106 
to 1.8 million), Paris (2.2 to 11.8 million), city of Luxembourg 
(90,000) and Amsterdam (800,000 to 2.2 million).
Table 11 Price dispersion across and within countries/cities
Across countries/cities Within countries/cities
Euro area All NB WKB BL All NB WKB BL
Lower quartile 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.15
Median 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.17
Upper quartile 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.21
Inter-quartile range 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06
Across cities Within cities
Germany All NB other All NB other
Lower quartile 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.11
Median 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.15
Upper quartile 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.20
Inter-quartile range 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.09
Across countries/cities Within countries/cities
Four countries All NB other All NB other
Lower quartile 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.15
Median 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.18
Upper quartile 0.21 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.20
Inter-quartile range 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.05
Note: “NB”, “WKB” and “BL” denote named brand, well-known brand and brandless products respectively.68
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2.1.4 THE IMPACT OF THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES 
OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES SECTOR
This section ﬁ   rst draws on the existing 
literature, discussed above, modelling price 
level differences across countries to construct 
a benchmark model. Thereafter, the benchmark 
model is augmented with indicators of the 
structural features of the distributive trades 
sector in order to discover whether these 
features of the sector itself can help to 
explain price differentials across countries. 
This benchmark model draws on different 
strands of the literature.
Firstly, by far the most common element in this 
literature is the hypothesised link between price 
levels and living standards, which is usually 
prompted by the Balassa-Samuelson type of 
argument. Under this way of thinking, high 
living standards are driven to a large extent by 
strong productivity in the traded goods sector. 
Within this context, and given broadly constant 
wages differentials across the traded and non-
traded goods sectors, price levels, especially 
in respect of the non-traded goods sector, are 
pushed up. Therefore, relative real GDP per 
capita is included in the benchmark model.107
Secondly, although there has been some degree of 
harmonisation of indirect taxes in the EU, some 
differences remain across countries. Therefore, 
VAT rates are included in the benchmark model. 
To do so, the VAT bands (zero, reduced or 
standard) now generally used have been applied 
to each of the 146 series available to us from 
the PPP dataset. A time series of the different 
rates used within each band (zero, reduced and 
standard) has also been constructed that goes 
back to 1995.108
Thirdly, drawing on the “rational inattention” 
literature, the relative expenditure share of 
a speciﬁ   c product in a country relative to 
the euro area average is added to capture the 
expenditure intensity and presumably “attention 
intensity” for each product. For example, if 
Italian households consume proportionally 
more pasta than households in other countries, 
presumably they will invest more effort in 
searching and comparing the prices of pasta 
products. Thus, other things being equal, 
(and perhaps being helped by scale and 
competition effects) prices for pasta should be 
lower in Italy. Finally, population density is 
included as a control for potential efﬁ  ciencies 
driven by high/low population density.
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; “PLI” denotes 
the relative price level index (country, product 
group and time); “rgdppcr” denotes relative GDP 
per capita (country and time);  109 “vatrate” denotes 
the VAT rate (country, product group and time); 
“expsr” denotes the share of expenditure on a 
product relative to the euro area average (country, 
product group and time); “dens” denotes population 
density (country and time); “emhhi” denotes the 
HHI from Euromonitor relating to average data for 
the period 2004 to 2009 (country and sector-
speciﬁ  c); “emc5” denotes the CR5 indicator from 
Euromonitor relating to average data from the 
period 2004 to 2009 (country and sector-speciﬁ  c); 
“sbsm2” denotes the proﬁ  t margin adjusted for the 
implicit labour income of the self-employed; 
“pmrr” denotes the OECD PMR indicator for the 
whole retail sector (country and time – 
interpolated); “pmrrbe” denotes the OECD retail 
sector PMR indicator relating to barriers to entry 
(country and time); “pmrrpc” denotes the OECD 
retail sector PMR indicator relating to price 
controls (country and time); “pmrror” denotes the 
OECD retail sector PMR indicator relating to 
operating restrictions (country and time); and “epl” 
denotes the OECD employment protection 
indicator relative to the euro area average 
(country and time).
A panel equation is estimated pooling the data 
across both products and countries, including 
ﬁ   xed effects for products and countries. 
The results of the baseline model – see column 
As a robustness check, relative real gross national income (GNI)  107 
per capita is also used, as in some countries (most notably 
Ireland and Luxembourg) GDP per capita which is much higher 
than GNI per capita, may be distorted.
For the sake of tractability, it has been assumed that products  108 
do not move from one band to another. This assumption is not 
expected to have a material impact on the results.
The model was also run with relative real GNI per capita with  109 
broadly similar results.69
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Table 12 Estimation results for the PLI dependent variable
a b c d e f
rgdppcr 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.14 0.14
t-stat (11.32) (5.80) (5.86) (10.92) (5.42) (5.40)
vatrate 0.35 0.42 0.49 0.35 0.42 0.49
t-stat (8.24) (7.48) (8.99) (8.28) (7.45) (8.95)
expsr -0.27 -0.95 -1.01 -0.27 -0.94 -1.00
t-stat (-2.95) (-4.44) (-4.70) (-2.90) (-4.41) (-4.67)
dens -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.14
t-stat (-5.74) (-4.09) (-4.08) (-5.15) (-4.25) (-4.38)
emhhi * 100 - -0.40 - - -0.40 -
t-stat (-7.25) (-7.26)
emc5 - 0.15 - - 0.15 -
t-stat (6.68) (6.69)
sbsm2 - - 0.46 - - 0.46
t-stat (3.49) (3.49)
pmrrbe - - - 1.20 0.98 1.01
t-stat (4.83) (3.44) (3.55)
pmrrpc - - - -0.60 -0.62 -0.70
t-stat (-3.33) (-3.01) (-3.41)
pmrror - - - -0.10 - -
t-stat (-0.40)
epl - - - -1.83 -2.04 -2.19
t-stat (-5.62) (-5.48) (-5.91)
R2 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.14
N. Obs 23,925 14,580 14,580 23,925 14,850 14,850
N. Groups 145 90 90 145 90 90
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; “PLI” denotes the relative price level index (country, product group and time); “rgdppcr” denotes 
relative GDP per capita (country and time)  1); “vatrate” denotes the VAT rate (country, product group and time); “expsr” denotes the 
share of expenditure on a product relative to the euro area average (country, product group and time); “dens” denotes population density 
(country and time); “emhhi” denotes the HHI from Euromonitor relating to average data for the period 2004 to 2009 (country and 
sector-speciﬁ  c); “emc5” denotes the CR5 indicator from Euromonitor relating to average data from the period 2004 to 2009 (country 
and sector-speciﬁ  c); “sbsm2” denotes the proﬁ  t margin adjusted for the implicit labour income of the self-employed; “pmrr” denotes 
the OECD PMR indicator for the whole retail sector (country and time – interpolated); “pmrrbe” denotes the OECD retail sector PMR 
indicator relating to barriers to entry (country and time); “pmrrpc” denotes the OECD retail sector PMR indicator relating to price controls 
(country and time); “pmrror” denotes the OECD retail sector PMR indicator relating to operating restrictions (country and time); and 
“epl” denotes the OECD employment protection indicator relative to the euro area average (country and time).
1) The model was also run with relative real GNI per capita with broadly similar results.
(a) in Table 12 – are very much in line with a 
priori expectations.110 Relative income levels 
(rgdppcr) and VAT rates (vatrate) have a positive 
and signiﬁ  cant impact on relative price levels.111 
Expenditure intensity (expsr) has a negative and 
signiﬁ  cant impact on price levels – suggesting 
that either higher attention or scale effects have 
an impact on price levels. Population density 
(dens) also has a negative and signiﬁ  cant impact 
on price levels.112
The benchmark model is then augmented with 
variables capturing the structural features of the 
distributive trades sector. Three broad categories 
of variables were tested capturing: (a) market 
concentration; (b) proﬁ  tability; and (c) regulation. 
It should be noted that, as developments were 
The model was also estimated so that it allowed for heterogeneity,  110 
but this did not give rise to any substantial change in the results. 
In addition, the baseline model was estimated using only 
goods – i.e. retailed products – and the results remained similar, 
with one exception: as expected, the coefﬁ   cient on relative 
GDP per capita decreased substantially (to 0.14) but remained 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. In contrast, when the model was run 
using only products related to services, the coefﬁ  cient increased 
signiﬁ  cantly to 0.46, again, as expected.
Note: excise taxes may also have an important impact, in  111 
particular those related to alcohol, tobacco and petroleum 
products. These have not yet been controlled for. However, it was 
checked whether the results are robust by excluding these items, 
and this certainly appears to be the case. Nonetheless, further 
precision might be achieved in the estimates by including excise 
taxes, i.e. provided suitable time series can be obtained.
Some additional robustness tests were performed. First, when  112 
only goods were included in the sample, the results remained 
similar, with one exception: as expected, the coefﬁ  cient  on 
relative GDP per capita decreased substantially. The model was 
also estimated by grouping by country rather than by product 
and without product ﬁ  xed effects; the results of the baseline 
model remained robust.70
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being considered across a broad range of products, 
it was not possible to include the other structural 
indicators considered in Sections 1.1 and 
1.3 which are speciﬁ   c to the grocery market, 
such as sales per square metre or store density.
a)  Market concentration: Section 1.3 presented 
the two measures of market concentration, 
the HHI and CRk indicators, which are used 
here.113 As market concentration indicators 
are not available for all years, the average 
observed over the period from 2004 to 2009 
was used instead. Although on average it 
may be expected that there is a relationship 
between the degree of market concentration 
and the degree of competition and hence 
with price levels, it could be the case that 
a very fragmented market might also be a 
relatively inefﬁ  cient one, with the upward 
impact on prices of inefﬁ  ciency outweighing 
the downward impact of competition.
b)  Proﬁ  tability: Similarly, and as discussed in 
Section 1.3, whilst high/low proﬁ  t margins 
may be indicative of low/high competition, 
they may also reﬂ  ect other factors (such as 
capital return or high efﬁ  ciency)  driving 
down input costs. It should be noted that, 
as proﬁ  t margin indicators are not available 
for all years, the average observed over the 
period from 1999 to 2007 was used instead.
c)  Regulation: Lastly, measures of product 
market regulation in the distributive trades 
sector were incorporated, drawn from the 
OECD (in addition to its whole economy 
employment protection legislation indicator). 
It should be noted that the product market 
regulation indicators are only available 
for 1998, 2003 and 2008 and have been 
interpolated, using basic linear interpolation 
methods, for the other years.114
Firstly, as regards the market concentration 
measures, a general ﬁ  nding was that the HHI 
indicator (emhhi) impacted negatively on relative 
price levels, suggesting that the inefﬁ  ciency 
effect was predominant. In contrast, the CRk 
indicator (emcx) impacted positively on price 
levels, perhaps capturing the competitive effect – 
the most signiﬁ  cant relationship was found with 
the CR5 indicators (see column b in Table 12). 
Also, note that the number of observations 
declines signiﬁ  cantly as only retailed goods are 
now considered, but the benchmark model results 
remain broadly intact – which may indirectly 
point to the robustness of the benchmark model.
Next, the proﬁ  tability  indicator  was used, 
whereby proﬁ   t margins are adjusted for the 
implicit labour income of the self-employed. 
This had a positive and signiﬁ  cant  impact  115 
(see column c in Table 12).
Lastly, the OECD product market regulation 
indicators for the distributive trades sector were 
implemented. When just the overall indicator 
was inserted into the model it had a negative and 
signiﬁ  cant impact. This was contrary to prior 
expectations. However, on further investigation, 
it appeared that the different components of 
the overall indicator, namely barriers to entry 
(pmrrbe), operating restrictions (pmrror) and 
price controls (pmrrpc) all had quite different 
effects (see column d in Table 12). Barriers 
to entry had a positive impact, but the impact 
of price controls was negative, whilst that of 
operating restrictions was insigniﬁ  cant. At ﬁ  rst 
glance, the ﬁ  nding that price controls have a 
negative impact might appear at odds with the 
evidence reported in Section 1.2 that grocery 
price controls have been found to have an 
upward impact on prices in France and Ireland. 
However, this evidence relates to the impact of 
measures prohibiting sales below cost, whereas 
the OECD indicator involves administered 
prices. Lastly, the employment protection 
legislation indicator (epl) had a negative effect. 
This would not have been expected a priori and 
Note that the concentration indicators implemented use data at  113 
the parent company level based on a deﬁ  nition of the national 
market, as these are available across the widest range of retail 
markets and segments.
Note that the updated indicator of shop opening times presented  114 
in Chapter 1 is not utilised, as this is available for only one year: 
2010.
Note that when the proﬁ   t margin indicator not adjusted for  115 
the implicit labour income of the self-employed was used, the 
coefﬁ  cient, although positive, was not statistically signiﬁ  cant.71
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suggests that further research is required in order 
to understand the underlying mechanism here.
In summary, whilst the benchmark model with 
relative income levels, VAT rates, expenditure 
intensity and population density performs 
well, augmenting it with indicators related to 
the structural features of the distributive trades 
sector improves its performance (see columns e 
and f in Table 12). The results indicate that 
these features may indeed have an impact on 
price levels and explain some of the divergence 
across countries as well as the “border effect” 
observed in the price data.
2.2  COMPETITION, OUTLET TYPE 
AND THE FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGES  116
The aim of this section is to review evidence from 
the IPN and WDN on price-setting behaviour 
and the impact of competition in the distributive 
trades sectors, as well as the structural features 
of these sectors.
The main ﬁ  ndings are that more competition is 
associated with more frequent price changes in 
the retail sector, and that price changes are more 
frequent in supermarkets and hypermarkets, but 
not larger in average magnitude (results which 
hold across countries and product types).
Economic theory predicts that competition 
increases the responsiveness of prices to 
changes in costs or market demand, i.e. price 
ﬂ   exibility. The empirical evidence presented 
in this section supports this prediction. These 
ﬁ   ndings also show that price ﬂ  exibility,  as 
measured by the frequency of price changes, is 
higher in hypermarkets and supermarkets than in 
traditional corner shops. This can be interpreted 
in several ways.
Prices can be said to be ﬂ  exible when they fully 
adjust to changes in the desired (optimal) price, 
which in turn depends on cost and demand, 
and to be rigid when they do not adjust to such 
changes. Dhyne et al (2009) argue that it is 
useful to make the distinction between price 
stickiness and price rigidity. They deﬁ  ne price 
stickiness as a neutral term referring simply to 
the frequency of price changes, i.e. products 
ranked according to this frequency can be said 
to have stickier or less sticky prices. They deﬁ  ne 
price rigidity as prices not fully adjusting to 
changes in the desired price. The distinction 
between price stickiness and price rigidity is 
useful, as it warns the reader when interpreting 
statements on the frequency of price changes. 
Indeed, prices of products may change very 
infrequently simply because both costs and 
demand show very little variation. On the other 
hand, they may also change very infrequently 
when costs and demand vary substantially.
Unfortunately, price rigidity, as deﬁ  ned above, 
is difﬁ  cult to measure, as it has no simple direct 
empirical counterpart. In particular, the “desired/
optimal price” remains a theoretical economic 
construct that, although useful when thinking 
about the nature of price changes, is not directly 
measurable. This is why, in practice, empirical 
studies consider the frequency of price changes 
to be a relevant indicator of price rigidity.
During the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 a survey on ﬁ  rms’ 
price and wage-setting practices was carried out 
by 17 NCBs (12 of which are in the euro area, 
while ﬁ  ve are in new EU Member States), on the 
basis of a harmonised questionnaire. This survey 
was coordinated by the ECB, within the WDN. 
Overall, more than 17,000 ﬁ  rms were interviewed. 
In order to assess the impact of competition on 
price ﬂ  exibility, these data were used, focusing 
only on the answers of the retail ﬁ  rms. Answers 
for retail ﬁ  rms in the dataset are only available 
from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Estonia.
Prepared by Philip Vermeulen (ECB, coordinator), Nicoletta  116 
Berardi (FR), Fernando Martins (PT), Jarkko Kivisto (FI), 
Patrick Lünnemann (LU), Concetta Rondineli (IT), Fabio 
Rumler (AT), Patrick Sevestre (FR), Martine Druant (BE), Pawel 
Strzelecki (PL), Daniel Dias (PT) and Ladislav Wintr (LU).72
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This section also draws upon the work of the IPN 
(see below), which also addressed the impact of 
competition on the frequency of price changes. 
Fabiani et al. (2007) proposed the measure of 
competition used in the analysis, while Álvarez 
and Hernando (2007a, 2007b) use euro area and 
Spanish data, respectively, to analyse the impact 
of competition on price ﬂ  exibility.
COMPETITION INCREASES THE FREQUENCY 
OF PRICE CHANGES
Table 13 shows the answers of 1,020 retail ﬁ  rms 
surveyed as part of the WDN to the following 
question: “Under normal circumstances, how 
often is the price of the ﬁ  rm’s main  117 product 
typically changed?” There is wide heterogeneity 
in the reported frequency of price changes. 
Just under a third of the retail ﬁ  rms report that 
they have no deﬁ  ned pattern of price changing. 
Around a quarter of retail ﬁ  rms report that they 
change the price of their main product once 
a year. However, around a ﬁ   fth of the ﬁ  rms 
change their prices monthly, weekly or daily.
One important question is whether retail ﬁ  rms 
faced with competition tend to change their prices 
more frequently. In the WDN survey, the ﬁ  rms 
were asked the following question: “Suppose 
that the main competitor for your ﬁ  rm’s main 
product decreases its prices; how likely is your 
ﬁ  rm to react by decreasing its own price? Please 
choose a single option. (Very likely, Likely, 
Not likely, Not at all, It doesn’t apply).
The answers to this question can be understood 
as assessing the likelihood of a price reduction 
by competitors leading to a similar reaction by 
the retail ﬁ  rm. Table 14 shows the breakdown of 
the answers to this question. More than half of 
the retail ﬁ  rms state that they would be likely or 
very likely to reduce the price. Table 15 shows 
the breakdown of answers by the frequency of 
price changes and suggests a positive correlation 
between price competition and frequency of 
price changes. For instance, the ﬁ  rms reporting 
that they would be very likely to react to price 
changes by their main competitor more often 
answer that they would change their prices daily 
or weekly.
Reported competition has a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant effect on the reported frequency of 
price changes (see Table 16).118 Greater reported 
competition leads to more frequent price 
adjustment. Note that the negative ﬁ  gures are a 
result of the deﬁ  nition of the frequency of price 
changes variable (low values mean more 
frequent price changes). Thus the negative 
Firms were informed of the deﬁ  nition of “main product”. This is  117 
especially relevant for retail ﬁ  rms which often sell hundreds of 
products. The instruction was: “If your ﬁ  rm produces (or sells) 
more than a single good or service, the answers must refer to the 
“main product (or service)”, deﬁ  ned as the one that generated the 
highest share of your ﬁ  rm’s revenue in the “reference year”. For 
instance, if your ﬁ  rm produces (or sells) several types of hats and 
shoes, by “product” we mean “hats” and “shoes” (irrespective of 
the speciﬁ  c type), whereas by “main product” we mean the one 
that generated the highest revenue in the “reference year”.
A similar regression in Druant et al. (2009) shows similar results  118 
for the entire sample of ﬁ  rms, i.e. including ﬁ  rms outside the 
retail sector. In addition, the regression results are robust to 
alternative speciﬁ  cations with the frequency of the distribution 
of price changes being less detailed.
Table 13 Distribution of reported frequency 






Twice a year 11
Once a year 23
Less frequent than once a year 2
No deﬁ  ned pattern 31
Other 2
Note: Based on 1,020 retail ﬁ  rms from the WDN survey.
Table 14 Breakdown of the reported likelihood 
of the price of the “main product” decreasing as a 





Not at all 5
No answer/Doesn̓t apply/Don’t know 18
Note: Based on 1,020 retail ﬁ  rms from the WDN survey.73
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coefﬁ   cient means that greater reported 
competition is associated with a lower value of 
the frequency of price changes variable 
(i.e. more frequent price changes). Interestingly, 
larger retail ﬁ   rms, measured by number of 
employees, also have a higher reported 
frequency of price changes.
HYPERMARKETS AND SUPERMARKETS CHANGE 
THEIR PRICES MORE FREQUENTLY
Besides speciﬁ  c surveys such as those run within 
the context of the IPN and WDN, a whole range of 
studies in the past decade have used large-scale 
datasets of millions of individual prices to analyse 
the ﬂ  exibility of prices at the retail level. These 
datasets usually consist of the underlying data 
used to construct the national consumer price 
indices. The data are monthly price records of 
speciﬁ  c products at speciﬁ  c outlets. A summary 
of the available evidence using these data for the 
euro area from the Eurosystem IPN is presented 
in Dhyne et al. (2006) and Dhyne et al. (2009). 
One prominent measure that has been used 
in these studies is the (monthly) frequency of 
price changes. The frequency of price changes 
for a set of products is deﬁ  ned as the fraction 
of products in that set that change prices from 
one month to another. This is also the approach 
adopted here.
Dhyne et al. (2006) report that, on average over 
the period January 1996-January 2001, almost 
16% of the prices of the products included in the 
euro area HICP changed from one month to 
another. One important ﬁ   nding is that the 
frequency of price changes is greatly inﬂ  uenced 
by the type of products considered. Unprocessed 
food shows a higher frequency of price changes 
than processed food, and this in turn shows a 
higher frequency than non-energy industrial 
goods. This ranking is true across all ten euro 
area countries considered in Dhyne et al. (2006). 119 
This effect of product type on the frequency of 
price changes should always be kept in mind 
when comparing the frequency of price changes 
There were two small exceptions, as non-energy industrial goods  119 
have a higher frequency than processed food in Luxembourg 
and Finland.
Table 15 Breakdown of the answers on price competition by the frequency of reported 
price changes
(as a percentage)
Very likely Likely Not likely Not at all No answer Total
Daily 732604
Weekly 17 10 5 10 8 10
Monthly 11 136219
Quarterly 5 107237
Twice a year 9 11 11 16 6 11
Once a year 18 20 29 37 28 23
Less than once a year 324483
No deﬁ  ned pattern 29 30 33 23 44 31
Other 113022
Notes: Based on 947 retail ﬁ  rms from the WDN survey. Columns add up to 100%.
Table 16 The effect of competition on the 





Size: 20-49 employees -0.19
Size: 50-199 employees -0.31
Size: 200+ employees -0.56
Labour cost share -0.05
White collar share 0.34
High skill share 0.18
Full time permanent workers share 0.06
Employee turnover 1) -0.22
Bonus share 0.14
Note: The number of observations is 434. Country dummies are 
included. Coefﬁ  cients signiﬁ  cant at the 5% level are in bold. 
Turnover is calculated as the sum of the percentage of employees 
that left and those that joined the ﬁ   rm during the reference 
period. Other control variables are used to control for factors that 
inﬂ  uence cost structure, an element that is deemed important in 
determining the frequency of price changes. See Druant et al. 
(2009) for details.74
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011
according to (retail) outlet types. Evidently, not 
all outlet types sell the same products. However, 
cross-country analysis of price stickiness 
according to outlet type is hampered by the 
absence of a uniform European methodological 
framework for recording outlet-type information 
jointly with price information.120 Nevertheless, 
after taking these caveats into account, the 
preliminary evidence in Table 17 suggests that 
hypermarkets and supermarkets change prices 
more frequently relative to other outlets.
The effect of outlet type on price ﬂ  exibility is 
now investigated, using an analysis of variance 
which captures the relative contribution of 
country, product category and outlet type to the 
variation in the frequency of price changes. For 
France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and 
Portugal, country-level aggregate frequencies of 
price changes were constructed for three product 
categories: unprocessed food, processed food 
and non-energy industrial goods at the aggregate 
outlet-type level. For reasons of comparison, 
the same basket of 50 products was used as 
in Dhyne et al. (2006), from which energy 
and services were excluded, leaving less than 
30 products overall. The outlet types considered 
are: hypermarkets, supermarkets, discount stores, 
superettes and traditional corner stores.121
The analysis of variance results in Table 18 show 
that outlet types have a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on 
the frequency of price changes controlling for 
country and type of good effects. Hypermarkets 
have, on average, a frequency of price change 
that is 12 percentage points higher than traditional 
corner shops. For supermarkets and discount 
stores, these are, respectively, 6.3 and 6.8  122 
percentage points higher than traditional shops. 
In line with earlier research, both unprocessed 
and processed food prices also have a higher 
frequency of price changes than industrial goods. 
One explanation for the signiﬁ  cantly  higher 
For example, national statistical agencies recording the outlet  120 
type jointly with the price information refer to deﬁ  nitions made 
for internal use. These deﬁ  nitions are therefore not necessarily 
fully comparable across countries.
Owing to different classiﬁ  cations, hypermarket and superette  121 
data could not be constructed for Austria. For Finland, there 
are no data for traditional shops and discount stores. For 
Luxembourg, there are no data for superettes and discount 
stores.
The coefﬁ  cient of discount stores is signiﬁ  cant at the 10% level. 122 
Table 17 Frequency of price changes by outlet type
Hypermarket Supermarket Discount store Superette Traditional store
Unprocessed food
Finland 53.7 51.9 - 50.4 -
Austria - 44.8 52.4 - 30
Italy 37.5 40.4 12.6 20.7 22.9
France 25.2 25.4 41.3 36.6 -
Luxembourg 54.5 50.4 - - 30.6
Portugal 77.2 64.4 68.9 48.8 55.6
Processed food
Finland 17.9 18.6 - 17.3 -
Austria - 20.8 16.6 - 16.4
Italy 20.1 13.3 9.8 11.4 7.1
France 27.2 18.0 10.4 13.3 6.8
Luxembourg 18.0 8.6 - - 6.0
Portugal 42.7 24.4 53.2 15.4 9.6
Non-energy industrial goods
Finland 15.5 9.1 - 9.7 -
Austria - 11.2 18.9 - 13.5
Italy 13.5 10.8 5.4 9.7 5.8
France 15.5 11.2 6.8 8.5 8.2
Luxembourg 8.1 6.4 - - 17.7
Portugal 26.0 18.2 10.9 15.7 11.2
Note: Missing observations are due to missing outlet deﬁ  nitions in countries’ outlet classiﬁ  cations or to too small a number of observations 
for meaningful estimates.75
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frequency and magnitude of price changes in 
Austria is probably the fact that the calculations 
for Austria – in contrast to those for other 
countries – are based on data from 2006-2009, 
a time when aggregate inﬂ  ation was also higher 
than at the beginning of the decade. In addition, 
it is impossible to control for different methods 
of reporting sales prices across countries.
A number of studies support the above ﬁ  nding, 
namely that larger retail outlets change price 
more frequently than smaller outlets, even 
controlling for the type of good. Baudry et al. 
(2004) ﬁ  nd that, for France, when controlling for 
the type of good, the type of outlet matters for 
the frequency of price changes. Prices are found 
to be more ﬂ  exible in hypermarkets, but much 
stickier in hard discount stores and traditional 
corner shops. Dias et al. (2004) ﬁ  nd that big 
outlets in Portugal adjust prices more frequently 
than small outlets. Similarly, Jonker et al. 
(2004) ﬁ  nd that, for the Netherlands, on average, 
small outlets have the smallest probabilities of 
changing a price. However, the effect of the 
size of the outlet can differ quite substantially 
according to product type. For instance, they ﬁ  nd 
that food and non-alcoholic drinks, clothing and 
footwear, and furnishings, household equipment 
and household repair services provided by 
one-man businesses have a higher frequency 
of price changes than those provided by large 
outlets. For Italy, Veronese et al. (2005) report 
that traditional outlets tend to change the price of 
non-energy industrial goods and food products 
signiﬁ  cantly less than large stores.
A number of possible reasons have been offered 
in the literature to explain why larger outlets 
such as hypermarkets and supermarkets show 
a higher frequency of price changes. A more 
detailed summary of this literature can be 
found in Dhyne et al. (2009). Different pricing 
strategies by different types of outlet seem to 
be important. The marketing literature seems 
to indicate that there are two polar pricing 
policies for supermarkets (e.g. Shankar and 
Bolton (2004)). Some stores resort to the 
“Hi-Lo” price policy and base their attractiveness 
on frequent price promotions. Others adopt an 
“every day low price” (EDLP) policy, whereby 
the attractiveness of the outlet is based on low 
and less varying prices than those of “Hi-Lo” 
outlets. “Hi-Lo” strategies should lead to a 
higher frequency of price changes than “EDLP” 
Table 18 Country, product and outlet-type effects on the frequency of price changes
Frequency of… Price changes Price increases Price decreases
Constant 1.3 0.5 0.7
Country dummies
Finland 6.6 3.3 3.2
Austria 7.1 3.7 2.8
Italy -3.0 -2.2 -2.5
Portugal 17.0 9.4 8.7
Luxembourg 2.6 2.0 0.7
Product type dummies
Unprocessed food 30.9 16.8 14.3
Processed food 5.6 3.8 2.1
Outlet type dummies
Hypermarket 12.0 6.2 5.6
Supermarket 6.3 3.7 2.6
Discount store 6.8 2.7 4.0
Superette 2.8 1.9 1.1
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: The number of observations is 71. The base case is an industrial good sold in a traditional shop in France. The model estimated 
using OLS is the following fijk = c + Σαci+Σ βpj+ Σγok+ εijk where fijk is the average frequency of price changes for country i, product 
type j and outlet type k, ci are country dummies, pj are sectoral dummies, Ok are outlet dummies and εijk are normal residuals. Reported 
coefﬁ  cients are percentages. Coefﬁ  cients signiﬁ  cant at the 5% level are in bold. The results are qualitatively similar if  fijk is replaced by 
the log odds ratio log ( fijk /(1-fijk )).76
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strategies. It is indeed likely that “Hi-Lo” 
strategies are more often found in hypermarkets 
and supermarkets, while “low-price” strategies 
are found in discount stores.123
Another possible explanation for the higher 
frequency of price changes in hypermarkets and 
supermarkets is that larger stores reap increasing 
returns to scale in resetting prices, causing a 
higher frequency of price changes. Lünnemann 
and Wintr (2011), using data on internet prices 
in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, show that shops for whom 
the cost of a price change is higher (such as 
traditional retailers with an online presence and 
mail order companies) change their prices less 
often and by larger amounts than pure online 
sellers, for whom a price change is a matter of a 
keystroke (leaving aside the decision costs, etc.). 
Accordingly, the development of electronic 
price tags in hypermarkets and supermarkets 
is another possible explanation for their higher 
frequency of price changes, compared with 
traditional shops.
Finally, Table 19 shows the relative contributions 
of country, product category and outlet type to 
the variation in the magnitude of price changes. 
These suggest that outlet type does not have an 
effect on the magnitude of price changes.
2.3  RETAIL SECTOR CONCENTRATION AND PRICE 
DYNAMICS: A REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS  124
The aim of this section is to combine information 
on concentration across different dimensions of the 
grocery sector (as presented in Section 1.3) with 
disaggregated regional data on price dynamics.
The main ﬁ   nding is that higher market 
concentration is associated with higher price 
growth in food and drink products in the recent 
period. The interpretation of this correlation 
calls for further research, but it appears to be 
robust and to hold across individual countries.
INTRODUCTION
As the basic link between producers and 
consumers, the retail distribution system 
plays a key role in determining prices and 
their evolution. In fact, most of the industrial 
organisation literature looks at the well-
established relationship between competition 
and prices (see, for instance, Clarke and Davis 
(1982); Bresnahan and Reiss (1991); Nevo 
(1998 and 2001); Hausman and Sidak (2007)), 
ﬁ  nding that a more competitive market structure 
implies lower prices and enhances consumer 
welfare (Dobson and Waterson (1997), 
To the extent that these pricing strategies dominate cost reasons  123 
for price changes, it is hard to determine whether the price 
stickiness measured by the frequency of price changes also 
measures price rigidity. This issue is considered in Eichenbaum 
et al. (2008), who use scanner data from a US supermarket chain 
to make the distinction between observed prices and reference 
prices. The latter are prices which remain constant for several 
weeks and around which observed prices vary, depending 
on temporary sales or promotions. They argue that what is 
economically signiﬁ  cant is the rigidity of reference prices, as 
those prices are the ones expected to vary in response to changes 
in costs and demand.
Prepared by Emanuela Ciapanna and Concetta Rondinelli (IT).  124 
The assistance of Nicola De Carne (Nielsen Italia) is gratefully 
acknowledged.
Table 19 Country, product and outlet-type 
effects on the magnitude of price changes
Size of price 
increase










Unprocessed food 8.0 6.3




Discount store 0.4 1.1
Superette 0.1 0.7
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: The number of observations is 71. The base case is an 
industrial good sold in a traditional shop in France. The model 
estimated using OLS is the following fijk=c +∑αci+∑ βpj+∑γοk+εijk 
where fijk is the average frequency of price changes for country 
i, product type j and outlet type k, ci are country dummies, pj 
are sectoral dummies, ok are outlet dummies and εijk are normal 
residuals. Reported coefﬁ   cients are percentages. Coefﬁ  cients 
signiﬁ  cant at the 5% level are in bold.77
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and Barros et al., (2006)).125 At the 
macroeconomic theory level, many papers 
have investigated the association between 
the frequency of price adjustments and the 
degree of monopoly power, showing a positive 
relationship between the absence of price 
changes and monopoly power and, conversely, 
between frequent price changes and strong 
competition.
Ciapanna and Colonna (2011), and Viviano 
et al. (2011) recently assessed the effect of 
concentration on price levels in the Italian retail 
market, using price level records collected 
for the computation of the Italian CPI merged 
with retail trade data released by Nielsen 
for the years 2003-2008. They found that 
concentration and prices tend to move in the 
same direction when looking at the parental 
group and at the store level, whereas they tend 
to be negatively related at the buying group 
level. The approach used below is similar to 
that used in Ciapanna and Colonna (2011), but, 
for reasons of data availability, the analysis 
focuses on price dynamics rather than price 
levels. Very few contributions have analysed 
the relationship between the degree of product 
market concentration and price dynamics 
(see, for instance, Scitovsky (1978) and 
Benabou (1992) 126). Some studies, however, 
have analysed the relationship between 
product market competition and inﬂ  ation.  In 
this literature, a more competitive economy is 
expected to adjust more quickly to unanticipated 
shocks, for instance by reducing inﬂ  ation after a 
supply shock. Przybyla and Roma (2005) ﬁ  nd 
that the extent of product market competition, as 
proxied by the level of mark-up, is an important 
driver of inﬂ  ation for a panel of EU countries.127
This section represents an initial attempt to 
analyse the impact of local level competition on 
price dynamics across the euro area. A regional 
analysis of the relationship between the degree 
of retail market concentration and price changes 
is conducted for two categories of grocery goods 
in the COICOP aggregation (food and non-
alcoholic beverages; and alcoholic beverages 
and tobacco) in Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria, 
Portugal and Finland.128 Using the unique 
census-type dataset on retailers (Nielsen 
structural data) presented in Section 1.3, the HHI 
is constructed at the buying group, parent 
company and individual store level, considering 
both the regional and local market deﬁ  nitions 
(see Section 1.3 for a more detailed discussion), 
and the relationship between this measure and 
regional price growth is investigated.
It is important to note that the Nielsen structural 
data used for the concentration indices refer to 
the year 2010, while this investigation focuses 
on price changes between 2003 and 2010. 
Although it would clearly be preferable to have 
data about the retail trade market structure over 
the same time span, one can reasonably expect 
that the differences in these structures across 
regions and countries dominate their evolution 
over time, so the retail trade market structure in 
2010 remains informative about price changes 
over the whole period. Moreover, the HHI in 
2010 can be interpreted as the outcome of a 
consolidation process which started in the 1990s. 
The hypothesis is supported in the Eurostat 
Structural Business Statistics, as well as in 
the business literature. However, the very fact 
of having regional CPI data – instead of price 
levels – makes the link with the concentration 
measures less immediate and the interpretation 
of the results more difﬁ  cult.
Despite these limitations, an overall positive 
relationship is found between retail market 
concentration and price changes for food and 
beverages, as well as for alcohol and tobacco. 
In addition to impacting on relative price levels, competition  125 
may have a persistent and long-lasting impact on price 
dynamics. This may arise both from transition effects from one 
regime to another, but also from the impact of competition in 
terms of enhancing productivity growth. For a more detailed 
discussion of the impact of competition on inﬂ  ation and the 
various mechanisms at play, see, for example, Sbordone (2010), 
Jonsson (2007), OFT (2007) and Przybila and Roma (2005).
Benabou (1992), in particular, studies the inverse relationship  126 
and shows that inﬂ  ation has a negative impact on mark-ups in 
the US retail sector.
Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars (2003) also ﬁ  nd that product market  127 
imperfections play a role in explaining cross-country inﬂ  ation 
rates and have a permanent impact on average inﬂ  ation rates.
CPI regional data were not available for the other euro area  128 
countries.78
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The dataset is described below, after which the 
econometric strategy is presented and the results 
are discussed. A conclusion is then drawn and 
possible extensions are proposed.
DATA DESCRIPTION
The regional analysis is based on a unique 
dataset, constructed by using the structural 
Nielsen data along with the regional CPI data 
provided by the national statistical institutes 
for Austria, Finland, Italy, Germany, Portugal 
and Spain, and the Eurostat regional data 
(at the NUTS2 level). A complete description 
of the underlying structural dataset used in 
this analysis, including a discussion of the 
construction of locally based concentration 
measures, is provided in Section 1.3.3 and in the 
Appendix to Chapter 1.3.
The second data source includes sectoral CPI at 
the regional level from six euro area countries 
(Austria, Finland, Italy, Germany, Portugal 
and Spain) and 69 regions (NUTS2),129 thereby 
covering about 65% of the euro area in terms of 
GDP. Only product categories that are plausibly 
sold across all stores are included in the reference 
data sample, namely food and non-alcoholic 
beverages (food), and alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco (alco).130
Overall, the dataset used for estimation includes 
96 series, spanning the period from 2003 to 2010 
at an annual frequency. The price change in a 
given region i and sector j at year t denoted by 
πijt is computed as the year-on-year percentage 
change in the respective sectoral price index, 
cpiijt,
 
πijt= (cpiijt- cpiijt-1) / cpiijt-1 
 (1)
In the empirical model, some control variables 
from the Eurostat regional dataset are 
included. These are the regional density 
(population/km2) and measures of the evolution 
of labour costs.131 All these variables were 
available at the NUTS2 geographical level 
of detail.
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
The year-on-year percentage change in sectoral 
price index is modelled as follows:
πijt =  β0 + β1Xit + β2Duyear + β3Ducountry
+ β4DuCOICOPi*HHIBi + β5DuCOICOPi*HHIP
 +  β6DuCOICOPi*HHISi + εijt 
 
(2)
where the indices i, j and t respectively indicate 
the region, the COICOP category and the year.
The main variable of interest is the HHI – which 
is only available for 2010 – computed at three 
different levels of the sector:
for buying groups (HHIB); 1) 
for parental groups (HHIP);  2) 
for stores (HHIS). 3) 
Moreover, two versions of these indices 
have been considered: the ﬁ   rst measures the 
concentration at the regional level, while the 
second provides a more localised measure 
For Italy, NUTS3 was also available, but, in this case, NUTS2  129 
aggregation was used to match the geographical detail of the 
controls.
The analysis has also been conducted for COICOP categories 3,  130 
5 and 12 (clothing and footwear; furnishing, household equipment 
and maintenance; and miscellaneous goods and services, 
respectively), but these products are not representative in the 
Nielsen store dataset, as they are often only sold in hypermarkets 
and some large supermarkets, if at all, and are also sold in 
non-grocery outlets. Given the partial coverage of the dataset, 
these categories have not been included in the ﬁ  nal sample. 
However, when the model was estimated with these further 
COICOPs being included, a negative association was found 
between the concentration indices and price growth for 
categories 3 and 5 (but a positive one for category 12). 
One possible explanation for the unexpected negative 
association might be a composition effect: clothes and footwear 
sold in non-specialised retailers are generally lower-quality 
products than their counterparts sold in specialised stores. 
A higher concentration at the store level may have stimulated 
greater consumption of these low-price and low-quality 
products, with the result that a parallel negative inﬂ  ation trend is 
observed, which is due to the composition effect in consumers’ 
expenditure. A full assessment of this issue would require further 
investigation, which is beyond the scope of this report.
For the latter, labour compensation, regional GDP (both in  131 
nominal terms and in PPS) and real value added growth were 
selected. These three variables were all highly correlated with 
each other. Labour cost was retained on account of it being a 
more precise proxy of expenditure capacity. The results are 
largely unchanged when considering the other two measures. 79
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of concentration, as it is the average of 
sub-indices computed for narrow zones, deﬁ  ned 
as the set of stores operating within a 5 km 
(or 10 km) radius (see Section 1.3.3). In order 
to take into account possible differences across 
product categories, the concentration indices have 
been interacted with product dummies (for the 
two COICOP categories of interest). The model 
also includes country ﬁ  xed effects (Ducountry) 
and year dummies (Duyear). The former should 
capture country-speciﬁ   c factors, including, 
inter alia, indirect taxes. The latter are aimed at 
capturing the common component in inﬂ  ation in 
a given year (commodity prices, exchange rate, 
global economic cycle, monetary stance, etc.). 
Xit is a vector of other explanatory variables, 
having a regional and a time-varying component, 
speciﬁ  cally the regional population density and 
a measure of the evolution of local labour cost. 
The errors are clustered by region.
The model above, comprising the three measures 
of concentration (HHIB, HHIP and HHIS), 
allows the respective impact of these different 
measures of the sector’s concentration to be 
assessed. Unfortunately, as far as the regional 
analysis is concerned, HHIC and HHIB appear 
to be strongly correlated, with a correlation 
coefﬁ   cient around 0.8, reﬂ   ecting an almost 
one-to-one mapping of the parental groups to 
the buying groups for many countries (see also 
Section 1.3.3). Most countries in the sample 
show a very high correlation between the two 
measures, so a collinearity problem arises in 
considering HHIB and HHIP together, which 
does not allow a proper assessment of their 
respective impacts. The correlation between 
HHIB and HHIS on the one hand, and HHIP 
and HHIS on the other, is instead very weak 
(0.3 and 0.2, respectively). Therefore, the model 
estimated in the empirical analysis is:
    πijt= β0+β1Xit + β2Duyear
+ β3Ducountry + β4DuCOICOPi*HHIB
+ β5DuCOICOPi*HHISi + εijt 
 
(3)
The main results of the regression based on 
the indices computed at the regional level are 
summarised in Table 20. When considering the 
HHI at the buying group level, the coefﬁ  cient is 
positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 10% 
level for food and beverages, and at 1% for 
alcohol and tobacco (column 1 in Table 20). 
The interpretation of these ﬁ   ndings is that a 
higher degree of market concentration at the 
buying group level (i.e. many retailers joining 
together in large purchasing consortia), although 
increasing each retailer’s bargaining power 
towards producers, does not always seem to have 
been associated with negative price dynamics. 
Thus, no welfare-enhancing effect for consumers 
is observed in these product categories. There are 
various plausible economic explanations for this 
result. On the one hand, it could reﬂ  ect collusive 
behaviour between a dominant producer and its 
counterpart buying group; alternatively, it could 
be driven by a relatively low demand elasticity 
for local products in those regions where higher 
buying group concentration is observed. In this 
case, independently of the producer’s bargaining 
power (and even in a perfectly competitive 
upstream market), there is no incentive for the 
retailer to share its surplus with the consumer, 
and the intermediary would practise surplus 
extraction from both sides.
The relationship between the concentration index 
computed at the store level and price growth is 
conﬁ   rmed to be positive and statistically 
signiﬁ   cant for alcohol and tobacco at 5% 
statistical conﬁ   dence (column 3 in Table 20). 
Table 20 Effect of regional level 
concentration on year-on-year sectoral 
price dynamics
Buying Group Shop
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
HHI 1) food 0.007 1) 0.004 0.009 0.014
HHI 1) alco 0.054 3) 0.018 0.114 2) 0.045
Controls:
Country dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies (2003-2010) Yes Yes
Local labour cost Yes Yes
Density Yes Yes
Obs. 7,072 7,072
Sources: Calculation based on Nielsen data, the regional CPI 
(obtained from national statistical institutes) and Eurostat.
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual change in the sectoral 
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However, it loses signiﬁ   cance for the ﬁ  rst 
COICOP category, probably reﬂ  ecting  the 
dominating effect of the buying group 
concentration measure. Similar results are 
obtained when model (3) is considered, 
substituting the HHI at the buying group level 
with that at the parent company, while keeping 
the store concentration measure.132
The analysis is repeated using the HHI 
constructed at the local level (5 km and 10 km 
radius). In this case, the correlation among all 
three measures rises to 0.9. Therefore, the three 
indices are observationally equivalent and model 
(1) reduces to:
 
  ijt= β0 + β1Xit + β2Duyear  + β3Ducountr
+ β4DuCOICOPi*HHISi + εijt 
 
(4)
The main results of the regression based on the 
indices computed at the local level are summarised 
in Table 21. The coefﬁ  cient for HHI is positive and 
statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 10% level for food 
and beverages, and at 1% for alcohol and tobacco 
(Table 21). Given the high correlation among the 
three levels, it would be inappropriate to consider 
the index at the buying group, parent company or 
shop level. For the same reason, the intensity of 
the HHIS coefﬁ  cients provided in Table 21 can 
only be compared with column 1 in Table 20.
Several robustness checks of the model are 
conducted, in which different measures of wealth 
are included in the vector of controls (regional 
GDP, growth rate of real value added, etc.). 
The analysis is also repeated on a country-by-
country basis, investigating the speciﬁ  c dynamics 
of the two “extreme” countries in the sample: 
Finland (the most concentrated) and Portugal 
(the least concentrated). When controlling for 
individual market structure characteristics and 
excluding the outliers, the main results of the 
pooled analysis are left unchanged.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POSSIBLE 
EXTENSIONS
The relationship between market structure, 
and price levels and dynamics has fostered 
two economic strands of literature. On the one 
hand, the industrial organisation contributions 
ﬁ  nd that a more competitive market structure 
implies lower prices and enhances consumer 
welfare. On the other hand, the macroeconomic 
theory strand analyses the relationship between 
the frequency of price adjustments and the 
degree of monopoly power, ﬁ  nding a positive 
relationship between the absence of price 
changes and monopoly power and, conversely, 
between a high frequency of price changes and 
the degree of competition.
The relationship between market structure 
(in terms of equilibrium concentration outcomes) 
and price dynamics in six euro area countries 
was investigated. The analysis has looked at 
both the upstream and downstream aspects of 
grocery products (COICOP 1 and 2). By using 
a unique database containing both regional 
year-on-year percentage price changes and 
concentration measures, it can be seen that these 
price changes are positively affected by the 
degree of concentration. A possible extension 
of the analysis could be to test for the impact 
of competition on inﬂ   ation volatility. Another 
possible extension of the model could be the 
use of detailed price levels in conjunction with 
structural Nielsen data which varies over time 
(as in Ciapanna and Colonna (2011), and Viviano 
et al. (2011)).
This is expected, given the correlation between the HHIB  132 
and HHIG previously pointed out.
Table 21 Effect of local level (5 km radius) 




HHI  1) food 0.006  1) 0.004
HHI  1) alco 0.099  3) 0.015
Controls:
Country dummies Yes
Year dummies (2003-2010) Yes
Local labour cost Yes
Density Yes
Obs. 7,072
Sources: Calculation based on Nielsen data, regional CPI (obtained 
from national statistical institutes) and Eurostat.
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual change in the sectoral 
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Box 6
THE IMPACT OF INCREASED COMPETITION IN THE DISTRIBUTIVE SECTOR ON EMPLOYMENT 
AND OUTPUT – A DSGE MODEL ANALYSIS  1
This box assesses the domestic and cross-country macroeconomic implications of competition-
enhancing reforms implemented in the distributive services in a euro area country from a 
multi-country perspective on the basis of a simulation with the Euro Area and Global Economy 
(EAGLE) model.2 This model is a large-scale New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium 
model of the euro area and the world economy. The euro area is modelled as a two-country 
monetary union having a common monetary policy and nominal exchange rate against the rest of 
the world (which is split into two regions).
For the purpose of this box, the model has been calibrated such that the developments of the main 
macroeconomic aggregates approximate the structural features of a single euro area country 
representing 10% of the euro area GDP. The shares of imports and exports of investment and 
consumption goods from the other regions have been calibrated along the prevalent share parameters.
The model features monopolistic competition in product and labour markets. There is a mark-up 
between the marginal cost and prices. Consistent with the monopolistic competition framework, 
the mark-ups are inversely related to the degree of substitutability across product and labour 
varieties, and hence the underlying level of competition.
The model distinguishes between sectors for tradable and non-tradable intermediate products. 
Hence, its design is suitable for analysing the effect of increasing the degree of competition in 
the services sectors, which are generally considered to mainly produce non-tradables. In line 
with the ﬁ  ndings in the literature, the degree of competition is calibrated to be lower, i.e. mark-
ups on prices are higher, in the non-tradable sector: the price mark-up in the euro area is set to 
40% in the services and 20% in the manufacturing sectors. In the United States and in the rest of 
the world, the corresponding mark-ups are 28% and 20%.3
Given that the model does not have an explicit distributive sector as part of the non-trading 
sector, the distributive sector in this model is regarded as part of the sector producing 
non-tradable, intermediate products. A policy reform leading to more competition in the 
distributive sector is introduced into the model by assuming that price mark-ups in the 
distributive sector fall permanently by 15%.4 The policy change is assumed to be implemented 
in a gradual fashion, so the decline in the price mark-up is assumed to gradually phase in over a 
1  Prepared by Matthias Mohr and Pascal Jacquinot (ECB).
2  See Gomes et al. (2010). A simulation exercise similar to the one presented here is also discussed in Gomes et al. (2011).
3  These values appear to be in line with similar existing studies, such as those of Bayoumi et al. (2004), Farouqee et al. (2007), and 
Everaert and Schule (2008). Many, if not all, of these studies refer to Jean and Nicoletti (2002), Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) and 
Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) for estimates of mark-ups on the basis of OECD data. Some additional empirical evidence for 
the euro area is provided by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008).
4  Measures contributing to increased competition could entail less regulation regarding the registration, licences and permits required to 
open new shops, large outlet restrictions, zoning regulations and shop opening hours. Such measures often have the aim of strengthening 
competition from new entrants to the market and thereby decreasing the rents of incumbent market participants.  82
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period of ﬁ  ve years.5 This is implemented as a 
permanent decline of the price mark-up in the 
non-trading sector of 4.3%,6 corresponding to 
the proportion of the distributive sector relative 
to the non-trading sector (about one-third 
in terms of value added).7 This assumption 
can be justiﬁ  ed by the overall close-to-linear 
behaviour of the model: variations of shocks 
give rise to close-to-proportional variations 
in the impulse response functions and in 
steady states. Furthermore, the most crucial 
assumption affecting the qualitative properties 
of the transitional dynamics on macroeconomic 
aggregates such as total employment, output 
and inﬂ  ation is that the shock affects only the 
mark-ups on the marginal cost of services 
which are not internationally traded, whereas 
the size of the shock only gives rise to a 
proportional shift of the impulse response 
functions.
As the policy measure is assumed to cut down 
the price mark-up in the non-tradable sector 
permanently, it not only features transitional 
dynamics, but also changes the steady state 
of the model. Reforms are fully credible and, 
given the assumption of perfect foresight, their 
long-run effects and the transition path are 
5  More precisely, it is assumed that 95% of the ﬁ  nal decline of the mark-up in the new steady state has been reached after ﬁ  ve years. 
6  This implies a reduction in the mark-up factor in the non-tradables sector from 1.40 in the baseline scenario to 1.34 in the reform 
scenario. 
7 Such changes in mark-ups are not unrealistic. For instance, Badinger’s (2007) analysis of competition in the manufacturing, 
construction and services sectors in ten EU Member States concludes that mark-ups in the industry sector declined by 28% from the 
early-1990s until 1999. In contrast, he ﬁ  nds mark-ups to have gone up in most service industries in the same period, which he interprets 
as indicating the weak state of the completion of the Single Market for services.
Long-run effects of a permanent decline 
in price mark-ups in the services sector







Terms of trade 0.232
Real effective exchange rate 2.829
Real exports 0.677
Real imports 0.393
Real GDP in rest of euro area 0.002
Short-run effects of a permanent decline 
in price mark-ups in the services sector
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Notes: The horizontal axis shows quarters starting at the period 
when the policy measure is ﬁ   rst implemented. The vertical 
axis shows percentage deviations from the baseline, except for 
inﬂ  ation (annualised percentage point deviations). GDP and its 
components are reported in real terms.83
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2.4  THE RETAIL TRADES AND PASS-THROUGH
The aim of this section is to provide empirical 
evidence on the pass-through of costs into 
domestic prices (consumer and producer), 
examine how this varies across countries and 
sectors, and whether it is related to structural 
factors. In order to do so, this section analyses 
the pass-though of import and producer prices 
to consumer non-energy industrial goods prices 
in euro area countries. Additionally, evidence 
for the pass-through to food prices and the 
clothing and footwear sector is provided.
The main-ﬁ   ndings are as follows. A large 
variation is found in the transmission of costs to 
ﬁ  nal goods sold across euro area countries and 
sectors. A joint analysis of the pass-through of 
import and producer prices suggests that producer 
prices are more relevant for the determination of 
assumed to be anticipated by economic agents. Both the long-run (steady-state) effects and the 
transitional dynamics are discussed here.
The Table reports the long-run results of reducing the (gross) mark-up non-tradables in the calibrated 
model by 5 percentage points, corresponding to a reduction in the mark-up for distribution services 
of 15 percentage points. Overall, the macroeconomic impact of such an economic reform is 
sizeable: compared with the no-reform scenario, domestic output increases by 1.8%. The increase 
is driven by both higher investment (+3.8%) and higher consumption (+0.8%). Firms increase 
demand for capital and labour. Consequently, employment (hours worked) and real wages increase 
by 1.1% and 4.1%, respectively. Regarding the effect on international trade, the increase in the 
supply of services implies a depreciation of the real exchange rate and a deterioration of the terms 
of trade, as the relative price of services (non-tradables) becomes lower. Consequently, exports 
increase by 0.7%. The higher aggregate demand drives an increase in imports (+0.4%).
The Chart shows the domestic effects of reforms in the services sector along the transition from the 
initial to the new steady state as deviations from the steady state in the no-reform baseline scenario. 
As a direct impact of the reform measure, the price mark-up will decline and consumer price 
inﬂ  ation will fall below the baseline in the short run. This effect fades out and, once the reform has 
been implemented fully and all adjustments have been made, consumer price inﬂ  ation rebounds to 
the long-run monetary policy target. Perhaps counter to what might be expected, according to the 
model simulation, consumption will fall in the short run and will increase only in the medium term. 
This is because domestic households anticipate that services will be cheaper in the future, when 
their supply will be higher. Given the high services content of consumption, households postpone 
consumption to future periods, when consumption goods will be cheaper. Therefore, private 
consumption drops in the ﬁ  rst year and starts increasing afterwards, still remaining under the no-
reform scenario level for about four years, about the amount of time needed to fully implement 
reforms.8 Simultaneously, ﬁ  rms anticipate the higher future production level and increase their 
demand for capital and labour. This drives up the demand for domestic tradable goods and induces 
the real wage to increase. After a short delay, output increases towards its new long-run level. 
Domestic exports increase, while imports decrease in the short run, as the immediate lowering effect of 
lower mark-ups on domestic prices gives rise to an improvement in domestic price competitiveness as 
indicated by the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. In the medium term, both exports and 
imports will stay above the baseline path, reﬂ  ecting higher domestic and foreign demand. The spillover 
impact on the rest of the euro area, while positive in the long run, is negligibly small overall.
8  While consumption  achieves levels above the baseline steady state after four years, the full adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium 
level happens very gradually. Consumption will achieve 50% of the new equilibrium level after 17 years. 84
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consumer prices in larger euro area countries. 
This analysis ﬁ   nds no signiﬁ   cant evidence for 
the link between pass-through estimates across 
countries and sectors, and structural indicators. 
However, the degree of competition appears to 
be positively related to the pass-through if the 
estimation is restricted to the long-run elasticity 
of consumer prices to import prices. Regarding 
food prices, some relevant differences in the 
pass-through estimates have been found across 
countries and products, which can be partially 
related to structural features of the retail trade 
sector, such as cross-country differences in the 
type and composition of retailers and producers. 
In particular, a stronger presence of discounters 
seems more likely to be associated with a higher 
pass-through. Finally, the available evidence on 
price pass-through in the clothing sector points 
to a reduced transmission of the fall in import 
prices to consumer prices.
2.4.1 PASS-THROUGH INTO CONSUMER 
NON-ENERGY INDUSTRIAL GOODS PRICES  133
MOTIVATION
A robust feature found in the literature on the 
pass-through of costs into domestic prices is their 
declining size along the domestic production 
chain. This is explained partly by the presence 
of local costs, driving a wedge between border 
and retail prices.134 An alternative explanation 
is that imperfect competition gives rise to 
proﬁ  t margins which can also provide partial 
insulation from internationally transmitted 
shocks. However, the impact of the market 
structure in the retail sector seems to be an 
under-investigated area.
Pass-through variations across countries and 
sectors are difﬁ  cult to evaluate, as types of shocks 
and macroeconomic environments, for instance, 
are not the same across studies. Warmedinger 
(2004) investigates the cost transmission for ﬁ  ve 
euro area countries, ﬁ  nding a comparatively lower 
cost transmission of external shocks into import 
prices for Germany than for France, Italy and 
Spain. The lower cost transmission into German 
import prices is the effect of the adjustment of 
ﬁ  rms to competitors’ prices, which is stronger in 
Germany than in the other countries. Less than 
60% of foreign costs are passed on to German 
import prices, while for France and Spain the 
pass-through is above 80%. Although the size 
of the transmission into domestic prices varies 
across studies, it seems that some countries (such 
as Germany) often appear at the lower end of the 
pass-through spectrum, whereas other countries 
(such as France) often appear at the higher end 
of the spectrum. The latter is conﬁ  rmed  by 
Campa and Minguez (2004). They investigate 
an exchange rate shock to domestic import 
prices and ﬁ   nd that the long-run elasticity of 
exchange rates is rather high for Spain and Italy, 
but comparatively low for Germany and smaller 
countries like Ireland and Austria. For the former 
countries, the elasticities are (almost) complete, 
while a much lower pass-through into import 
prices was found for the latter countries, at about 
half of the complete pass-through.135
A number of studies in different settings report 
a lower impact of cost shocks on consumer 
prices than on producer prices.  136 Hahn (2003) 
looks at the declining size of the pass-through 
along the production chain, as well as the impact 
of different shocks for the euro area aggregate. 
The results indicate that the effect of an external 
shock on producer prices in manufacturing is 
Prepared by Friedrich Fritzer (AT), Mateja Gabrijelcic (SI) and  133 
Bettina Landau (ECB).
It should be noted that complete pass-through of a cost change  134 
to retail prices does not entail a one-to-one relationship between 
the percentage change in costs and the percentage change in 
prices. Other things being equal, the higher the portion of the 
ﬁ  nal selling price that is accounted for by the cost, the higher the 
pass-through coefﬁ  cient will be. This is unlike the exchange rate 
pass-through literature, where a one-to-one relationship tends 
to be observed between the exchange rate movement and the 
domestic price change. This is because the exchange rate change 
applies to the entire import cost, whereas the retail selling 
price is comprised of a number of costs of varying importance. 
Therefore, the pass-through coefﬁ   cient (the elasticity of the 
selling price with respect to a speciﬁ  c cost factor) may be less 
than unity even when pass-through is complete.
However, these estimates are not fully comparable, as not all  135 
types of shocks are the same and the pass-through may also vary 
across different macroeconomic environments. For instance, 
some authors argue that the impact of cost transmissions 
increases during high inﬂ  ation periods.
Among them are Campa and Minguez (2004), Goldberg  136 
and Campa (2006), and Hahn (2003), as well as Landau and 
Skudelny (2009). Clark (1999) reports similar ﬁ  ndings in the 
aftermath of a monetary policy shock.85
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most pronounced in the case of an increase in 
non-oil import prices (61% of the shock is 
transmitted after one year), followed by a shock 
to the euro exchange rate (28% cost transmission 
after one year).
Differences in the product-speciﬁ  c size of the cost 
transmission have been analysed empirically less 
frequently. Goldberg and Campa (2006) look at 
the role of the distributive margins in the aftermath 
of an exchange rate shock and their importance for 
the cost transmission into consumer prices across 
21 OECD countries. They ﬁ  nd common sectors 
across countries for which margins are typically 
high or typically low: margins are comparatively 
high in furniture, textiles and leather products, 
but lower in petroleum, natural gas and some 
mining products. Most importantly, however, the 
margins decrease in the case of depreciations and 
hence in the wake of more expensive imports. 
Unfortunately, the drivers of this variation of 
margins are not analysed.
Empirical evidence of the impact of the structure 
of the retail trade sector is scarce, although some 
studies point towards competition as a key driver 
of the pass-through. For instance, an empirical 
investigation on ﬁ  rms’ behaviour was conducted 
by Bertola et al. (2010), who found that the pass-
through of an input cost shock to prices is lower 
in an environment of highly competitive product 
markets, as ﬁ  rms have more incentives to reduce 
wage costs instead of product prices (lower 
pass-through into retail prices). However, in the 
presence of collective wage agreements and more 
stringent employment protection legislation, it is 
more likely for the ﬁ   rm to respond to shocks 
by increasing prices instead of lowering costs, 
resulting in higher pass-through retail prices.
Another attempt to explain the ultimate drivers of 
the cost transmission is made by Francois et al. 
(2008), who study the pass-through of an import 
price shock to producer and consumer prices 
across EU Member States. At the product level, 
the pass-through effect on producer prices is 
highest for household maintenance items, textiles 
and clothing, medical products and purchases of 
vehicles. At the consumer level, the pass-through 
is highest in the food sector, as well as in the 
textiles and clothing sector. Most importantly, 
the authors give empirical evidence on the 
link between indicators of retail competition 
(such as barriers to entry and price controls) and 
the size of the pass-through to consumer prices. 
In particular, they show that the pass-through 
estimates are higher in less regulated markets 
than in more regulated sectors.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section investigates the pass-through of 
changes in costs of ﬁ  nal goods for sale (using 
import and producer (PPI) prices), speciﬁ  cally 
items of HICP non-energy industrial goods.137 
The pass-through of the import prices of ﬁ  nal 
goods and of PPI for domestic sales to non-
energy industrial goods prices is examined 
in an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model. As this approach faces some limitations, 
the pass-through of total import prices is looked 
at, following Francoise et al. (2007, 2008).
In the following analysis, import prices are 
measured by unit value indices (UVI) for intra 
and extra-euro area imports.138 UVI and PPI data 
have been mapped for 15 product sectors with 
HICP data, covering about 23% of the HICP 
and about 80% of non-energy industrial goods 
for the euro area. The mapping table is shown as 
Table A15 in the Technical Appendix.139
Pass-through of import and producer prices 
to consumer prices
The pass-through of domestic and foreign costs 
is analysed ﬁ   rst, using ARDL speciﬁ  cations. 
This means that domestic consumer prices are 
While it would also be interesting to have information on the  137 
impact of the structural features on the pass-through of other 
costs, in particular wages (on a sectoral level), which are of high 
relevance for the retail sectors, the data needed for this analysis 
are not available.
Imports are based on the CPA 2002 trade data, while  138 
industrial producer prices (PPI) are based on the NACE Rev. 
2 classiﬁ  cation.
Importantly, this mapping of different classiﬁ  cation  schemes  139 
has its caveats, as, in many cases, the UVI, PPI and HICP 
cover not identical goods, but just a similar class of goods. 
Moreover, while the PPI and HICP are “real” price indices with 
a well-deﬁ  ned basket of goods and high statistical standards, 
UVI are usually of lower data quality.86
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explained by their own lagged values and the 
current and lagged values of all other main 
explanatory variables:
Δhicpt =  α +∑
i=Lh
δiΔuvit-i +  dummy(VAT) + et ∑
i=Lu
γiΔppit-i  βiΔhicpt-i +∑
i=Lp
+
Variables in lower case letters are in logs, while 
ﬁ  rst differences account for unit roots in the time 
series.140 The series are quarterly, the longest 
covering the period from the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1990 
and the third quarter of 2010, but in many cases 
the estimation period is shorter, depending on the 
availability of data.141 Owing to data limitations, 
only ten euro area countries are covered in this 
analysis: Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal 
and Finland. Estimation results are shown in 
Table A16 in the Technical Appendix, where 
only positive pass-through coefﬁ  cients signiﬁ  cant 
at the 5% level are reported.
Looking at the PPI pass-through in terms 
of the median estimate of a product 
category across countries, it appears that a 
pass-through of more than 0.5 (in descending 
order) is found for “Jewellery”, “Personal 
transport equipment”, “Information processing 
equipment”, “Equipment for reception (TV/
radio)”, “Cars”, “Textiles” and “Furniture”. 
An almost complete or full pass-through was 
found for “Jewellery” in quite a number of 
countries. A pass-through for the PPI below 
0.5 was found for “Pharmaceutical products”, 
“Personal care appliances”, “Newspapers/Books”, 
“Non-durable household goods”, “Sports 
equipment” and “Household appliances”. 
Meanwhile, UVI pass-through estimates are 
considerably lower, with only one sector 
(photographic equipment) having a pass-through 
estimate exceeding 0.5.
Overall, price changes for domestic goods 
(i.e. PPIs) tend to be of higher importance 
for prices of manufactured consumer goods 
in the larger euro area countries, reﬂ  ecting 
signiﬁ   cant domestic production, while import 
price changes (i.e. UVI) are more relevant for 
consumer prices in smaller, more “open” euro 
area countries where imports play a greater role. 
The latter seem to be linked to an import content 
that is likely to be higher in retail sales and to 
very little own production, which is also partly 
a reason for the reduced availability of PPI data 
for these countries.
However, no signiﬁ   cant association is found 
between these pass-through estimates across 
products/countries and structural features of the 
retail sector – measured by the HHI and the proﬁ  t 
share. This ﬁ  nding does not necessarily mean 
that the pass-through of costs is independent of 
structural features in the retail sector in the euro 
area economies, but rather illustrates that the 
analysis faces many difﬁ  culties, partly related 
to the availability and quality of price and cost 
data, as well as that of structural indicators, at a 
detailed sector level.
Impact of import prices on consumer prices
Given that there were some limitations to the 
previous ARDL approach, a simpler analysis is 
now applied to the impact of import prices on 
consumer prices. Mainly following the approach 
of Francoise et al. (2007, 2008), domestic 
producer prices are approximated by intra-area 
import prices.142 More precisely, long-run pass-
through elasticities of non-energy industrial 
goods prices to changes in total import prices 
are estimated using the following equation:
ln HICPt = α + β ln UVIt (+δT)
Dummy variables for changes in the country’s standard VAT  140 
rate are included if signiﬁ  cant. The lag structures are determined 
by reducing a general speciﬁ   cation to a parsimonious one 
by F-tests and t-tests on the signiﬁ   cance of sets and single 
parameter estimates. The long-run elasticity of the pass-through 





γi / (1– ) βi .
Consumer prices of clothing and footwear are seasonally adjusted,  141 
taking account of a strong and changing seasonal pattern. 
The other variables are not adjusted, as the autoregressive part 
of the equation is able to capture the seasonality adequately.
While this is a rather bold assumption, it allows use of a  142 
consistent data classiﬁ   cation set to be made, a high level 
of coverage across euro area countries and sectors, and the 
extraction of just one pass-through estimator.87
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where the log of HICP prices is regressed on a 
constant and the log of the respective UVI (intra 
and extra-area import prices). As prices of a 
number of electronic products have been on a 
downward trend due to technical progress and 
related quality adjustment in the HICP, which is 
not sufﬁ  ciently reﬂ  ected in UVI, a time trend is 
added to the equation.143 Only the estimated 
parameters which are positive and signiﬁ  cant at 
the 5% level are reported.  144
The median elasticity of import price changes to 
consumer prices is estimated at 0.45 across the 
12 euro area countries and 15 sectors considered 
in this analysis (see Table A17 in the Technical 
Appendix). However, the pass-through across 
industries and countries is rather dispersed. For 
comparison reasons, the estimated elasticities 
for the euro area as a whole are added, with an 
estimated median pass-through of 0.54. This is 
largely comparable with results in the literature, 
such as those of Hahn (2003), who estimates 
the pass-through of non-oil import prices to the 
overall euro area HICP at 0.31 after three years. 
It is possible that this latter estimate is kept down 
by the very low pass-through of import prices to 
consumer energy prices, which are included in 
the overall HICP.
In ten sectors, the median long-run import price 
elasticity of consumer prices is around 0.5, 
and, in most of these sectors, import price 
elasticities are signiﬁ   cant for almost all 
countries. This is particularly true of the sectors 
“Furniture”, “Appliances for personal care”, 
“Jewellery, clocks and watches”, “Newspapers, 
books and stationery” and “Motor cars”. 
Fewer signiﬁ   cant results at the country level 
are found in the clothing and footwear sector, 
where the median elasticity is 0.4, but with 
large country dispersion. The same applies to 
the items “Information processing equipment” 
and, albeit to a lesser extent, “Photographic 
equipment, etc.” and “Household appliances”. 
The inclusion of a time trend in the estimates for 
these two sectors, which attempts to capture the 
impact of technical progress, does not help in 
detecting a signiﬁ  cant relationship between the 
HICP and UVI. This may also explain the few 
signiﬁ  cant and meaningful results at the country 
level for the “Household appliances” sector, 
with a median pass-through of 0.1. There is also 
little discernible pass-through in the “Games, 
toys and hobbies” and “Equipment for sports, 
camping and open-air recreation” sectors.
Regarding country divergence, consumer 
prices seem to have relatively high import 
price elasticities (i.e. a median higher than 0.5) 
in Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, and a 
relatively low one (median of 0.2) in Ireland. 
Overall, the ﬁ   ndings are somewhat different 
to those of Francoise et al. (2008), but these 
are based on a different sample with respect to 
the countries, period and goods. Nevertheless, 
they conﬁ  rm that the impact of import prices on 
consumer prices varies greatly across countries 
and sectors.
There is some evidence that the magnitude 
of the estimated pass-though is related to the 
degree of competition/concentration in the 
speciﬁ  c country and sector. Chart 17 shows a 
negative, albeit weak, relationship between the 
estimated import price elasticity and the HHI, 
suggesting that the stronger the competition 
(i.e. the lower the HHI), the higher the 
elasticity of consumer prices seems to be with 
respect to import price changes. By contrast, 
no link seems to exist between the estimated 
coefﬁ  cients and the proﬁ  t share (see Chart 18).
To check the robustness of the above 
relationship, an estimation is made of whether 
competition signiﬁ   cantly impacts on the 
magnitude of the import price elasticity, 
once controlling for effects stemming from 
cross-sector differences. A panel regression 
All series have been seasonally adjusted by ARIMA X12. SUR  143 
estimation is applied to allow for contemporaneous correlation 
between the error terms across the country equations for a 
speciﬁ  c sector, as the shocks are expected to be sector rather 
than country-speciﬁ  c.
UVI and HICP series are, in most cases, non-stationary, which  144 
implies that conventionally used tests do not have standard 
asymptotic distributions. However, the HICP and UVI series 
are not expected to be co-integrated, as an important part in this 
relationship, namely the costs of domestically produced goods, 
is missing.88
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with sector ﬁ  xed effects is run, where the import 
price elasticity is explained by the HHI. As can 
be seen in Table 22, the measure of competition 
used here has some explanatory power for 
the import price elasticity, conﬁ  rming  that 
competition leads to a higher transmission of 
cost changes, although the overall impact is not 
very strong. This ﬁ  nding is in line with theory 
suggesting that transmission of cost changes 
is complete in perfectly competitive markets 
and similar to that obtained in Francoise et 
al. (2008). However, other structural indicators, 
such as the proﬁ  t share and the OECD product 
market indicator, do not help to explain the 
observed differences in pass-through estimates.
Chart 17 Estimated import price elasticity
and the HHI
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x-axis: HHI
y-axis: long-run import price elasticity
Sources: SBS, Euromonitor and Eurosystem staff estimates.
Note: Pass-through coefﬁ  cients larger than 1 have been restricted 
to avoid them biasing the results.
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R2 = 0.0006
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x-axis: long-run import price elasticity
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Sources: SBS, Euromonitor and Eurosystem staff estimates.
Note: Pass-through coefﬁ   cients larger than 1 have been 
restricted to avoid them biasing the results.
Table 22 Regression results: import price 
elasticity and competition using fixed effects
Coefﬁ  cient T-value
HHI -0.00013 -2.37
Constant 0.52478 11.75
Note: Number of observations: 96 (using elasticities only when 
they are <1), R-sq: within 0.0654, between 0.2187, overall 
0.0887, Prob>F = 0.0204.
Box 7
DEVELOPMENTS IN CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR PRICES  1
This box considers clothing and footwear prices in the euro area, focusing in particular on 
developments since the phasing-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in January 2005, 
when remaining quotas on trade in textiles and clothing were scheduled to be eliminated.2 
1  Prepared by Aidan Meyler and Chiara Osbat (both ECB), and Demetris Kapatais (CY).
2  In the immediate aftermath of the phasing-out, reports of a surge in imports from China and other countries led to 
a temporary reintroduction of controls. According to the European Commission’s website, however, “since [the] 
beginning of 2009 trade in textiles and clothing [has been] fully liberalised and there are no longer any quantitative 
restrictions in the EU”, but in the footwear sector, “anti-dumping measures put in place since 2006 [were] extended in 
December 2009 in order to counter unfair competition from China and Vietnam”.89
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In principle, the ending of the MFA should have opened up European markets to lower-cost 
imports. These lower costs would be passed on to consumer prices in the presence of competitive 
markets. This box reviews price level differences for clothing and footwear products across 
the euro area, relates them to developments in import prices and estimates the pass-through 
of producer and import prices into consumer prices. The possible relationship with structural 
features of the clothing and footwear retail sector is also analysed.
Notwithstanding considerable liberalisation in the markets for clothing and footwear products, 
both externally – via the abolition of the MFA – and internally – via the single market – price 
levels across the euro area remain heterogeneous, with differences of around 35% between the 
highest and lowest prices across countries, as was shown in Section 2.1. Chart A shows that 
clothing and footwear prices have generally been highest in Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
while relative price levels in Greece, Spain and Portugal have risen over time. By contrast, 
Ireland has recorded a sharp fall in absolute and relative clothing and footwear price levels. 
These developments mean that dispersion across countries has fallen noticeably. The standard 
deviation fell from a range of around 25-30 to a trough of 6-8, before increasing somewhat 
between 2008 and 2010.3
1) Import developments – volumes, prices and market shares
Starting with the impact on import quantities, there is no evidence of a surge in extra-euro 
area imports of textiles and clothing after 2005 (see Chart B). In fact, the share of textiles and 
3  If data from Ireland and Greece are excluded, the decline in dispersion is lower but still noteworthy – from around 15 in 1996 to 
a trough of 7 in 2008. 
Chart A Evolution of relative clothing 
and footwear price levels

































Sources: Eurostat and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: These data have been constructed by combining 
Eurostat’s PPP and HICP data. Price levels relative to the 
euro area average were constructed using the period 2007-2009 
as a base. Then the time series proﬁ  le from the HICP was used 
to cast backwards and forwards.
Chart B Extra-euro area imports of textiles 
and clothing
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Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff.
Note: “Textiles and clothing” comprises sectors 1810 and 1920 
of the ISIC system.90
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clothing in total extra-euro area imports 
of goods continued to decline, to around 
5%. The most signiﬁ  cant change was in the 
geographical breakdown of euro area imports 
of textiles and clothing. Countries that already 
enjoyed unrestricted or preferential access to 
the euro area before 2005 (e.g. non-euro area 
EU Member States and African, Caribbean 
and Paciﬁ  c (ACP) countries) have lost overall 
market share to other countries. Most notably, 
China has doubled its share in euro area 
imports of textiles and clothing since 2005, 
despite the restrictions on imports from China 
between 2005 and 2008.4 This geographical 
shift was to be expected, as China has a strong 
revealed comparative advantage in textiles and 
clothing, while its exports to the EU had been 
particularly constrained prior to 2005.5
As regards clothing and footwear prices, the close co-movement with the USD/EUR exchange 
rate points to a considerable degree of exchange rate pass-through (most imports in this sector are 
denominated in US dollar). Since 2005 import prices of clothing and footwear have ﬂ  uctuated 
without a clear trend. In terms of possible price effects of the phasing-out of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), extra-euro area import prices of textiles and clothing declined only 
marginally between 2007 and mid-2008, following the price decreases observed before 2005 
(see Chart C).6 More recent factors that have exerted upward pressure on the import prices of 
clothing and footwear include the global economic recovery and the rising world market prices of 
raw materials, such as cotton. However, the evolution of unit price indices should be interpreted 
with caution, since they are not based on a well-deﬁ  ned basket of goods and do not account for 
quality changes.7
2)   The pass-through into consumer clothing/footwear prices from import and producer 
prices
Following the approach adopted in Section 2.4, the pass-through from producer and import prices 
is estimated, using both domestic and euro area producer and import prices because, in some 
countries, domestic production may be relatively small and its correspondence with consumption 
relatively weak. Furthermore, the import price measure used (UVI) is highly volatile, particularly 
at the country level – see Chart D for the euro area aggregate.
4  Imports from China were a notable exception to the elimination of clothing and footwear trade restrictions in January 2005, as they 
remained subject to gradually easing quantitative restrictions until the end of 2008. These restrictions were based on the special 
provisions accepted by China upon its entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. See also Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 502/2008 of 5 June 2008: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/139337.htm
5  For estimates of the tariff equivalents of pre-2005 import quotas and actual quota utilisation rates, see Nordas (2004).
6  See also ECB (2008).
7  To some extent, the price decline observed in textiles may reﬂ  ect downward pressure stemming from the substitution of more expensive 
imports with cheaper ones, particularly from China. The unit values of euro area imports of clothing and footwear indicate that imports 
from China are, on average, cheaper than those from European or North African trading partners. Temporary quality downgrading – 
a regular response to the removal of import quotas – may also have played a role (see Brambilla et al. (2010)).
Chart C Extra-euro area import unit values 
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For some countries (especially the smaller 
ones, e.g. Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Portugal), aggregate euro area 
producer and import prices appear to capture 
input price pressures better, as the coefﬁ  cients 
on the country-speciﬁ  c producer and import 
price series are often not signiﬁ  cant. Also, for 
clothing consumer prices, it is difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd 
statistically signiﬁ  cant pass-through coefﬁ  cients 
for eight of the 15 countries. Lastly, the 
pass-through coefﬁ  cients are generally much 
larger for producer prices than for import 
prices. This may reﬂ   ect the fact that (1) 
clothing and footwear imports, although 
growing rapidly, still account for around a 
third of consumption, (2) the clothing and 
footwear import price data are relatively noisy 
and (3) the producer price series may also 
be capturing some of the more general price 
pressures in each country. The low estimates 
for import price pass-through may also reﬂ  ect 
the substantial increase in the share of imports from China after 2005. Therefore, the “China 
effect” (low price levels and increasing market share) may not be adequately captured.  8
Chart E shows that the estimated combined pass-through rates from import and producer prices 
vary considerably across euro area countries, while the a priori relationship with the share of the 
cost of goods sold is subject to considerable deviations. Regarding the relationship between the 
pass-through and structural features of clothing and footwear markets in individual countries, 
the correlation with indicators such as the degree of concentration (HHI or C(x)), proﬁ  t margins 
or product market regulation indicators tends to be weak.9 There is some tentative evidence, 
however, to suggest that proﬁ  t margins have increased in the euro area clothing and footwear 
sectors – perhaps reﬂ  ecting a fall in import prices that has not been passed through fully into 
consumer prices – as the share of the cost of goods sold declined from around 60% in 1999 to 
around 55% in 2007. The share of non-labour operating costs (e.g. rents, ﬁ  xtures and ﬁ  ttings, etc.) 
increased somewhat from around 17% to 20% over the same period, thus offsetting some of the 
beneﬁ  t from lower import prices.
Overall, differences in consumer clothing and footwear price levels across the euro area continue 
to persist, albeit at a relatively low level compared with other products (see Section 2.1). 
Furthermore, although the annual rate of change in clothing and footwear prices has been 
8  For Norway, Benedictow and Baug (2010) ﬁ  nd that the “China effect” (i.e. allowing for varying import shares and differences in 
price levels in addition to inﬂ  ation differences) has had an important effect since the 1990s. However, clothing and footwear prices in 
Norway are still relatively high at around 35% above average euro area levels. Kowalski (2009) highlights the difﬁ  culties in quantifying 
the impact of the phase-out of the MFA. On the one hand, even when China faced temporary restraints in its exports to the EU and 
US markets in 2005, a signiﬁ  cant increase in imports of apparel from China was observed. On the other hand, in 2008 there was a 
signiﬁ  cant drop in imports from all trading partners in textiles and clothing, owing to consumer conﬁ  dence, ﬁ  nancing issues and the 
global economic slowdown. Overall, the statistical evidence points to the rather long-run character of the adjustment process both in the 
OECD countries and in producing developing countries. 
9  It should be noted that there are very few observations to test this relationship.
Chart D Euro area clothing and footwear 
price developments




























Sources: Eurostat’s HICP, STS and COMEXT databases and 
Eurosystem staff calculations.92
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2.4.2 FOOD PRICE PASS-THROUGH 
AND STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE GROCERY 
MARKET FOR MAJOR EURO AREA ECONOMIES  145
The primary objective of this section is to assess 
whether retailers pass through upstream cost 
increases to ﬁ  nal food prices and, if so, how and 
to what extent. Furthermore, the extent to which 
cross-country market differences matter for this 
process is analysed.
The nature of the link between the degree of 
competition in the retail distribution sector and 
the size of pass-through is not immediate 
a priori. It has been argued that the transmission 
of an exogenous shock is, to a large extent, 
determined by the competition of the retail 
environment and the composition of retailing 
channels. Nakamura et al. (2010) have 
documented large differences in price 
movements across store chains, implying that, 
in addition to product characteristics, the type   
of retailer can be a crucial determinant of pricing 
dynamics. Moreover, ﬁ  ercer competition among 
retailers may lead to a faster and stronger pass-
through, since margins are narrower and ﬁ  rms 
are forced to pass on cost changes.146 Retailers 
can be involved in competition, in which both 
Prepared by Luca Gattini (ECB), and Christin Hartmann and  145 
Harald Stahl (both Deutsche Bundesbank).
Hall et al 146  . (2000) ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms in competitive markets tend to 
adjust prices faster and Weiss (1995) stresses that cost changes 
are passed through more fully in less concentrated industries. 
Alvarez and Hernando (2007) suggest that the price-setting 
strategies of the most competitive ﬁ  rms in the euro area account 
for the greatest ﬂ  exibility in their own prices. On the contrary, 
a high degree of competition may oblige companies to partially 
retain cost increases reducing margins. For example, Berck et al. 
(2009) interpret the large elasticities as a signal for imperfect 
competition, implying that companies can pass through costs.
relatively moderate across the euro area, despite a substantial increase in the share of clothing 
and footwear imports from low-cost countries, permanent declines in consumer prices have 
only been observed in a small number of euro area countries. The analysis suggests that there is 
ample room for further improving competition in this sector, particularly at the post-production, 
wholesale and retail levels. In particular, measures to encourage further online and cross-border 
retailing and the full implementation and enforcement of the services directive could help to 
ensure that the beneﬁ  ts from trade liberalisation in terms of increased productivity and lower 
consumer prices would be passed on more completely to consumers.
Chart E Correlation between the estimated pass-through of import and producer prices, 
and the share of the cost of goods sold
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the composition of retailer type and the number 
of companies matters (see Cleeren et al. 
(2008)).
This investigation of the pass-through focuses 
on the reaction of consumer and industrial 
producer prices to shocks in European farm-
gate prices.147 The study will focus on selected 
countries (BE, DE, ES, FR, IT) and food 
products (dairy, oils and fats,148 bread and 
cereals, and meat).149 Although the choice of 
countries has been dictated by data availability, 
there is sufﬁ  cient variation in the retail structure 
across these countries for a detailed analysis. 
Also, the selection of food categories is based 
upon the ability to match agricultural prices 
with industrial producer and consumer prices. 
Overall, they represent about 10% of the overall 
HICP basket and almost 60% of the HICP for 
food excluding alcohol and tobacco.150
In the past the Common Agricultural Policy of 
the European Union (CAP) had moderated the 
effect of ﬂ  uctuations in world market prices on 
internal EU prices via various mechanisms, most 
importantly price guarantees. With the surge 
in world market prices between 2006 and mid-
2008, as well as the simultaneous rolling back of 
the CAP, this was no longer the case. As a result, 
perceptible rises were recorded in producer and 
consumer prices of food products across all the 
countries and food items under consideration 
(see Chart 19).151 Prices of dairy products and 
of oils and fats displayed the largest response, 
increasing in cumulated terms by almost 20% 
in Germany and around 8% in Italy, the country 
with the smallest response, relatively speaking. 
For bread and cereal products, Belgian consumers 
were faced with the highest price rises, at 12%, 
whereas French consumers only had to bear a 
5% increase. Consumer price increases for meat 
lay between 5% and 8%.
A formal analysis based on impulse response 
functions from vector autoregression (VAR) 
models  152 conﬁ  rms the evidence stemming from 
the quantitative inspection of the data (Chart 20). 
Overall, consumer prices in Germany, Belgium 
and, to a lesser extent, Spain show a strong 
response to variations in farm-gate prices – 
particularly with dairy products, including oils 
and fats – whereas reactions in France and Italy 
are more muted. In line with their position along 
the pricing chain, industrial producer prices 
display an earlier response than consumer prices, 
with the reaction at both levels being quickest in 
Germany. The impact of a shock is also stronger 
at the producer level, as the agricultural 
commodity should have a higher share in overall 
costs. At the consumer level, where other costs, 
such as those associated with running a retail 
outlet, or taxes, are added, the response to a 
shock is less pronounced. Overall, these results 
resemble three features already supported by 
other evidence in the literature, namely: the food 
price pass-through varies across product 
categories (Vavra and Goodwin (2005)); the 
food price pass-through varies across countries 
(IMF (2008)); and the pass-through to producer 
European (EU-27) farm-gate prices are average prices  147 
(in euro), which are published on a monthly basis by the 
European Commission for Agriculture and Rural Development. 
They encompass several data series for different groups of 
agricultural commodities (cereals, dairy products, oils and 
fats, and meat products). These series are available from 1997 
onwards for both individual countries and as a cross-country 
average. The latter are used to ensure that potentially different 
responses in industrial producer and consumer prices truly 
follow from diversities in the retail structure and not from 
variations in the underlying commodity price shock. The data 
can be accessed under http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/foodprices/
index_en.htm
Dairy products have been merged with oils and fats, owing to  148 
the fact that, although data are available separately for dairy 
products and for oils and fats at the farm gate and regarding 
HICP levels, they are combined at the producer price level.
For an analysis on the euro area as a whole, see Ferrucci et al.  149 
(2010).
In terms of average weights between 1997 and 2010. 150 
Ferrucci et al. (2010) and Landau et al. (2009) have already  151 
stressed the importance of non-energy commodity prices as a 
determinant of euro area retail and producer prices.
The analysis has been conducted on the full sample. However,  152 
a cross-check has been run, excluding the surge in prices that 
started in 2006. The pass-through from commodity prices 
to consumer and producer prices becomes less statistically 
signiﬁ   cant. This can be related to the effect of the CAP. 
Signiﬁ   cant and positive impulse responses are – with the 
exception of meat, for which support prices had been abolished 
in early 2000 – mostly due to the latter part of the sample period, 
which entails the most recent hike in food prices. Still, since EU 
farm-gate prices explicitly take into account the changing role of 
the CAP, estimating VAR models over the entire sample should 
not be a problem. Note that seasonality is not controlled for as 
evidence of signiﬁ  cant seasonality is limited for processed food 
prices, unlike unprocessed food prices.94
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Chart 19 Price developments at different stages of the production chain
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Sources: Eurostat and European Commission (DG Agriculture and Rural Development).
1) HICP milk, cheese and eggs as well as HICP oils and fats aggregated with country-speciﬁ  c HICP weights. 
2) Manufacture of dairy products, and manufacture of animal oils and fats aggregated with country-speciﬁ  c CPI weights for respective 
country groups. 
3) Average prices in euro indexed to 2005 = 100. 
4) Skimmed milk powder and olive oil aggregated with cross-country average of CPI weights for respective product groups. 
5) Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products, and manufacture of starches and starch products aggregated with country-speciﬁ  c 
weights for respective product groups. 
6) Rye of bread-making quality. 
7) Processing and preservation of meat products. 
8) Beef, veal, pork and poultry aggregated with cross-country shares in total consumption (source: Euromonitor).95
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prices is higher than to consumer prices 
(Bukeviciute et al. (2009)).
Against this background, the VAR analysis 
results can be tentatively related to the varying 
importance of different retail channels. For 
example, processing costs may tend to be passed 
through more heavily and earlier in countries 
where discounters have a stronger presence. 
As already illustrated in the ﬁ   rst chapter, the 
market share of discounters is by far the highest 
in Germany, making up almost 40% of the 
overall retail grocery market in 2009. In the other 
selected euro area countries, this share was less 
than 10% between 1999 and 2009 on average, 
while in Italy, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, 
Spain, specialised and small grocery retailers – 
which are most likely owner-run, given the high 
share of self-employment (see also Chapter 1) – 
play a relevant role. These types of retailers may 
interact in more localised and niche markets, 
with potentially higher margins related to the 
customisation of products and services. Evidence 
from oils and fats, as well as meat markets, 
suggests that retailers in Italy, Belgium and 
Spain have higher proﬁ   t margins on average 
(see Chart 21). This feature may allow for a 
delayed response to a shock, since they have a 
potentially higher cushion for absorbing temporary 
cost shifts originating from the food chain.
More speciﬁ  cally, the same retailers’ distribution 
by type of seller is reﬂ  ected in the market-speciﬁ  c 
breakdown for dairy products, oils and fats, and 
bakery products (see Chart 22). 
On average, Germany has the highest share of 
discounters, ranging between 30% and 40% of 
the market in terms of expenditure shares. The 
bakery product market differs from the grocery 
market as a whole. Sellers are predominantly 
other grocery retailers,  153 such as bakeries, 
This category includes kiosks; markets selling predominantly  153 
groceries; food and drink souvenir stores and regional speciality 
stores; food/drink/tobacco specialists; bakers (bread and ﬂ  our 
confectionery); butchers (meat and meat products); ﬁ  shmongers 
(ﬁ   sh and seafood); greengrocers (fruit and vegetables); drinks 
stores (alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks); tobacconists (tobacco 
products and smokers’ accessories); cheesemongers; and 
chocolatiers and other single food categories. Moreover, direct 
home delivery, e.g. of milk/meat from farms/dairies, is included.
Chart 19 Price developments at different 
stages of the production chain (cont’d)
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Sources: Eurostat and European Commission (DG Agriculture 
and Rural Development).
1) HICP milk, cheese and eggs as well as HICP oils and fats 
aggregated with country-speciﬁ  c HICP weights. 
2) Manufacture of dairy products, and manufacture of animal 
oils and fats aggregated with country-speciﬁ  c CPI weights for 
respective country groups. 
3) Average prices in euro indexed to 2005 = 100. 
4) Skimmed milk powder and olive oil aggregated with cross-
country average of CPI weights for respective product groups. 
5) Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products, and 
manufacture of starches and starch products aggregated with 
country-speciﬁ  c weights for respective product groups. 
6) Rye of bread-making quality. 
7) Processing and preservation of meat products. 
8) Beef, veal, pork and poultry aggregated with cross-country 
shares in total consumption (source: Euromonitor).96
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Notes: The number below the bar indicates the start of the pass-through.
VAR models are used to estimate the dynamic relationship between euro area farm-gate prices and country-speciﬁ  c industrial producer 
and consumer prices. Equation systems are speciﬁ  ed for each market and country:




Ai Δyt-i + εt
Δyt includes euro area farm-gate prices, as well as industrial producer and consumer prices, and is estimated on monthly changes with the 
ordinary least squares method. The lag length i is selected using standard criteria such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SC). The average lag length selected by these criteria is around four.
The system is identiﬁ  ed using the Cholesky decomposition. The ordering of the variables follows from their position in the pricing chain, 
i.e. shocks in farm-gate prices have a contemporaneous effect only on producer prices, and shocks in producer prices only on consumer 
prices. Impulse response functions show the behaviour of producer and consumer prices in reaction to a shock in agricultural commodity 
prices over a certain period of time. Here, the shock is set equal to one standard deviation, i.e. the amount by which price changes in 
agricultural products spread around their mean value. As these shocks have a common magnitude and statistical properties, differences in 
the impulse response functions should originate from the market structure.
The cumulated impact is the sum of the impulse responses which are signiﬁ  cantly different from zero with a 95% probability.
It needs to be considered that the impulse response functions refer to an aggregate of consumer prices, in which the composition of 
products and their respective share varies across countries. For example, it has been shown for German dairy product prices that the 
pass-through of a commodity shock is stronger with less reﬁ  ned dairy products, as they have a higher commodity content (see Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2009)). Thus, composition effects in consumer prices may also inﬂ  uence cumulated impulse responses.97
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2    THE IMPACT OF 
STRUCTURAL FEATURES 
ON PRICE LEVELS, 
PRICE-SETTING 
BEHAVIOUR, REGIONAL 
PRICE DYNAMICS AND 
PASS-THROUGH
which are localised shops, mainly characterised 
by internal production. The estimated 
pass-through in the VAR analysis is lower than 
for the other food categories on average. Among 
the selected countries, France has the lowest 
pass-through. This is reﬂ   ected in the highest 
average market size of “Other grocery retailers”.
The VAR analysis has shown that producer 
prices react faster and more strongly to 
Chart 22 Market shares for single products 
by retail type
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c) Bakery products
πijt= (cpiijt- cpiijt-1) / cpiijt-1 
Source: Euromonitor.
Chart 21 Profit margins in the retail and 
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Sources: Eurostat SBS.
Note: Proﬁ  t margins measured as gross operating surplus to 
total turnover.98
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commodity price shocks (see Chart 2). On the 
one hand, quicker and higher pass-through may 
be related to greater efﬁ   ciency and/or lower 
margins. On the other hand, it may also be a 
feature that depends on the interplay between 
the upstream and downstream sides of the 
market (see Chapter 1). Producers can also be 
sellers of their own products in the retail market. 
The number of companies with a relevant 
market share 154 of their own-produced packaged 
food is limited in each country. These companies 
also have a high average market share of the 
grocery market for the whole range of grocery 
products (see Table 23). These features, together 
with a less dispersed and more efﬁ  cient 
production organisation, may make it easier to 
pass on a cost shock. Roughly 20% of the 
packaged food sold on the market is produced 
by ﬁ  rms that are also retailers in Germany. This 
can be a consequence of the dominance of 
discounters at the retail level, which is also 
reﬂ   ected in a high degree of vertical 
interconnection between upstream and 
downstream markets and the higher penetration 
of – generally cheaper – private labels 
(see Section 1.1). This feature is less evident in 
Spain, Italy and France, where more traditional 
retailing channels are accompanied by a more 
fragmented producer level.
In conclusion, the VAR analysis shows that 
consumer prices tend to respond less than 
producer prices to commodity shocks. It has 
been found that the size of the shock varies 
across markets and countries, as also stressed in 
Ferrucci et al. (2010). This feature is partially 
reﬂ  ected in cross-sectional differences between 
retailers and producers in terms of composition 
and types. A more pronounced presence of 
discounters seems more likely to be associated 
with a high pass-through while, conversely, 
markets characterised by shops with a smaller 
format seem to be less sensitive to commodity 
price shocks. This does not, however, imply 
that a higher or lower pass-through per se is a 
clear signal of the extent of competition in the 
underlying market.
Above 1% in terms of retail expenditure shares. 154 
Table 23 Statistics on the integration of retail and wholesale in the packaged food markets, 
and some structural characteristics of the upstream market
(percentage of total retail value, average 2001-2009)
Market share
Number of retail 
companies which are 
also producers of 
packaged food
Total retail market 
share of grocery retailers 
producing own products 
(packaged and fresh food)
Market share of packaged 
food produced by retail 
companies
Market share of packaged 
food produced by artisanal 
companies and other 
producers 1)
BE 4 46.6 17.4 44.0
DE 4 35.6 20.3 40.1
ES 6 46.6 8.0 40.2
FR 4 41.0 9.8 46.2
IT 4 25.1 1.5 60.7
Source: Euromonitor.
1) Producers that have never had a market share equal to or higher than 1% between 2001 and 2009.99
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1  ADDITIONAL COUNTRY DATA AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Table A1 Summary statistics for grocery retailers in the euro area (2009)
















(sq. m.) per 
100 sq. km.
Belgium 24,808 5,886 237 2.3 546 1,224 5,157 81 19
Germany 107,965 39,941 370 1.3 488 1,480 4,000 30 11
Ireland 8,764 1,957 223 2.0 439 1,441 6,450 12 3
Greece 76,763 5,578 73 6.8 495 367 5,047 58 4
Spain 157,968 21,091 134 3.4 459 648 4,852 31 4
France 93,284 28,546 306 1.4 443 1,866 6,097 17 5
Italy 260,204 25,512 98 4.3 423 432 4,404 86 8
Cyprus 1) 3,744 755 202 4.7 946 321 1,592 40 8
Luxembourg 1) 1,040 325 313 2.1 654 1,127 3,601 40 13
Malta 1) 1,074 94 87 2.6 226 436 5,006 340 30
Netherlands 33,637 5,702 170 2.0 345 915 5,399 81 14
Austria 12,894 3,952 306 1.5 473 1,422 4,639 15 5
Portugal 40,828 5,217 128 3.8 491 564 4,414 44 6
Slovenia 2,177 815 374 1.1 399 1,725 4,607 11 4
Slovakia 25,656 2,754 107 4.7 508 341 3,173 53 6
Finland 6,294 2,915 463 1.2 546 1,980 4,275 2 1
Euro area 857,100 151,039 176 2.6 459 890 5,053 33 6
Sources: Eurostat, Euromonitor and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: (1) Figures may differ from ofﬁ  cial national sources, owing to differences in deﬁ  nition, threshold for consideration, etc. (2) Real 
sales per store have been adjusted using purchasing power parities.
1) Modelled countries (means data constructed by Euromonitor using econometric techniques rather than based on ofﬁ  cial sources).100
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Table A3 Shift and share analysis of turnover growth
Employment class Country Productivity Size Distribution Sector Total
1-19 EA -0.03 0.17 -0.04 1.00 1.10
AT 0.50 -1.50 0.10 3.60 2.60
BE -2.90 0.40 -0.10 -0.70 -3.20
DE 1.90 1.20 -0.10 -0.20 2.90
ES -3.00 0.80 -0.10 2.20 0.00
FI 3.60 0.20 -0.10 0.10 3.90
FR -0.70 -1.60 0.10 1.50 -0.70
IT -1.60 1.10 0.00 -0.20 -0.70
NL 2.60 -1.00 -0.10 3.60 5.00
SI 1.40 -1.60 0.00 0.70 0.50
20+ EA -0.27 0.50 1.67 1.00 2.91
AT 0.50 0.10 -1.80 3.60 2.40
BE -2.60 1.00 2.60 -0.70 0.30
DE 1.80 0.10 1.10 -0.20 2.80
ES -2.50 2.40 3.20 2.20 5.20
FI 0.90 1.70 1.80 0.10 4.60
FR -1.00 2.60 -1.90 1.50 1.20
IT -1.80 2.50 4.00 -0.20 4.50
NL 3.80 -1.40 2.10 3.60 8.10
SI 2.10 -0.60 0.20 0.70 2.40
Sources: Eurostat (SBS) and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Labour productivity deﬁ  ned as real turnover per person employed (thousands of euro), deﬂ  ated using the price indices for gross 
output from EU KLEMS.
Table A2 Demographic statistics (1998-2006)
G sector – distributive trades
EA AT BE 1) FI FR 1) DE IE  1) IT NL SK SI ES
Zero Growth -1.4 0.6 -0.4 0.2 3.2 -0.7 -8.4 -1.5 6.9 3.2 6.0 -0.9
Birth rate 9.4 11.4 6.4 13.6 12.8 13.9 6.1 8.1 12.9 17.5 13.5 11.1
Death rate 8.3 11.1 6.5 13.7 9.9 16.2 14.5 8.3 11.7 16.2 12.3 9.5
Net turnover 1.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 2.9 -2.3 -8.4 -0.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6
Reallocation -2.5 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.0 -1.3 5.7 1.9 4.8 -2.5
1 to 4 Growth -0.8 0.6 -1.0 -1.1 -2.2 1.0 3.3 1.7 -12.9 4.3 -5.0 0.7
Birth rate 4.3 5.2 3.5 2.6 4.0 6.4 6.0 2.3 5.1 7.1 4.8 4.8
Death rate 4.5 4.4 3.1 2.3 5.8 2.8 3.2 3.3 5.9 6.0 6.1 5.1
Net turnover -0.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 -1.8 3.5 2.7 -1.0 -0.8 1.1 -1.2 -0.3
Reallocation -0.7 -0.1 -1.4 -1.4 -0.4 -2.5 0.6 2.7 -12.1 3.2 -3.8 1.1
5 to 9 Growth 1.1 -0.5 1.3 1.5 -0.7 -1.2 0.5 3.5 4.6 0.4 -0.9 3.8
Birth rate 1.9 2.4 1.2 0.4 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.9 2.3 3.0 2.1 3.3
Death rate 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.6 2.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 3.5 3.3 1.4 2.4
Net turnover 0.2 1.0 0.5 -0.2 -1.7 1.0 0.6 0.2 -1.2 -0.3 0.7 0.9
Reallocation 0.9 -1.5 0.8 1.7 1.0 -2.1 -0.1 3.2 5.9 0.7 -1.7 2.8
10 or more Growth 1.4 0.8 2.2 2.7 0.8 -0.1 0.7 3.7 3.1 -1.3 2.4 2.6
Birth rate 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.5 2.7 1.0 1.4
Death rate 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 2.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 2.3 3.4 0.6 1.1
Net turnover -0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 -1.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.7 0.4 0.3
Reallocation 1.5 0.0 1.8 2.7 2.3 -0.4 0.5 3.5 3.9 -0.6 1.9 2.3
Total Growth 0.1 0.6 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 0.6 2.3 -0.6 0.4
Birth rate 7.9 6.7 5.0 8.8 8.3 9.4 4.1 6.9 7.6 12.6 7.6 8.2
Death rate 7.2 6.0 5.0 8.7 7.6 9.3 5.8 6.9 8.0 11.1 7.7 7.2
Net turnover 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 -1.7 0.0 -0.5 1.5 0.0 1.0
Reallocation -0.7 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.5 -0.5 1.1 0.8 -0.6 -0.5
Sources: Eurostat (SBS on business demographics) and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) Data for Belgium, France and Ireland relate to 2007, as 2006 data are not available, while 2006 is the last available year for all the other 
countries. Zero denotes one-man businesses. Net turnover is calculated as births minus deaths, while reallocation is measured as growth 
minus net turnover.101
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Table A5 Cost structure – “other specialised retail trade” sub-sectors
(percentages)

































Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Costs of goods sold 55.5 56.5 56.7 59.1 71.6 62.6 62.3 62.5
Gross margin 44.5 43.5 43.3 40.9 28.4 37.4 37.7 37.5
Other costs 21.3 19.8 19.9 19.3 14.1 17.2 18.3 16.1
Value added 23.2 23.6 23.4 21.7 14.2 20.2 19.4 21.4
Labour costs – unadjusted 13.9 14.8 14.4 14.4 10.7 12.6 11.3 13.5
- Wages and salaries 10.8 11.6 11.2 11.3 8.4 9.9 8.7 10.5
- Social security contributions 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.3 2.7 2.5 2.9
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted 9.3 8.9 9.0 7.3 3.5 7.6 8.2 7.9
Table A4 Cost structure – retail trade sub-sectors
(percentages)





















Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Costs of goods sold 66.7 73.6 74.6 63.1 63.0 67.5 61.3
Gross margin 33.3 26.4 25.4 36.9 37.0 32.5 38.7
Other costs 14.8 11.4 11.1 14.8 16.7 11.0 17.7
Value added 18.5 15.0 14.3 22.1 20.3 21.5 21.0
Labour costs – unadjusted 11.6 10.2 9.7 15.3 10.0 12.3 13.4
- Wages and salaries 9.0 8.0 7.6 12.2 7.7 9.5 10.5
- Social security contributions 2.5 2.2 2.1 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.9
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted 6.9 4.8 4.6 6.8 10.3 9.2 7.6102
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Table A7 Cost structure – grocery retail across countries
(percentages)
Non-grocery retail EA BE DE IE GR ES FR IT
Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CoGS 62 64 62 63 70 67 61 55
Gross margin 38 36 38 37 30 33 39 45
Other costs 17 19 15 14 12 11 18 26
Value added 21 17 23 23 18 22 22 18
Labour costs – unadjusted 13 9 15 15 8 12 15 9
- Wages and salaries 10 7 12 13 7 10 11 6
- Social security contributions 32322342
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted 8 8 8 8 9 10 6 10
Non-grocery retail CY LU NL AT PT SI SK FI
Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CoGS 67 72 61 62 69 63 69 66
Gross margin 33 28 39 38 31 37 31 34
Other costs 11 19 16 15 14 18 17 15
Value added 2 2 92 32 21 71 91 42 0
Labour costs – unadjusted 14 4 13 15 12 10 7 13
- Wages and salaries 1 3 41 11 2 9 9 51 0
- Social security contributions 10232113
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted 8 5 10 7 6 8 8 7
Table A6 Cost structure – grocery retail across countries
(percentages)
Grocery retail EA BE DE IE GR ES FR IT
Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CoGS 75 77 74 75 83 78 79 62
Gross margin 25 23 26 25 17 22 21 38
Other costs 11 9 9 7 5 5 9 25
Value added 14 14 16 18 14 16 12 14
Labour costs – unadjusted 10 9 10 13 8 11 9 10
- Wages and salaries 878 1 16877
- Social security contributions 22212223
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted 5 5 6 5 6 6 3 4
Grocery retail CY LU NL AT PT SI SK FI
Turnover/sales (excluding taxes) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CoGS 83 75 76 73 82 71 78 75
Gross margin 17 25 24 27 18 29 22 25
Other costs 5 10 10 11 6 13 9 11
Value added 13 15 14 16 13 15 13 14
Labour costs – unadjusted 8 8 10 13 8 11 9 9
- Wages and salaries 778 1 07978
- Social security contributions 11232122
Proﬁ  ts – unadjusted 5 6 4 3 4 5 4 5103
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Table A9 HHI across sectors
(average 2004-2009)
Groc. Rank H&B Rank C&F Rank H&G Rank E&A Rank L&P Rank
BE 5.9 6 0.8 7 1.3 6 2.3 7 2.6 2 0.8 6
DE 10.2 8 1.6 9 2.5 8 2.5 8 20.0 11 1.4 9
IE 11.6 9 1.7 10 1.3 5 0.9 5 19.6 10 1.0 8
GR 1.4 1 0.7 6 0.7 4 0.3 1 3.4 3 0.5 4
ES 3.8 3 0.1 3 3.0 10 0.7 3 8.2 7 0.2 2
FR 8.6 7 0.2 4 0.7 3 3.9 10 2.4 1 1.9 10
IT 3.3 2 0.1 1 0.3 2 0.6 2 7.7 5 0.4 3
NL 11.6 10 3.1 12 2.0 7 2.3 6 7.8 6 0.8 5
AT 11.9 11 3.4 13 2.9 9 5.9 11 8.3 8 3.2 12
PT 4.9 4 0.1 2 3.8 12 0.7 4 10.1 9 1.0 7
SI 24.3 12 1.5 8 6.3 13 14.2 13 63.3 13 5.9 13
SK 5.5 5 0.3 5 0.3 1 2.7 9 27.3 12 0.2 1
FI 24.4 13 2.3 11 3.6 11 10.2 12 4.3 4 2.9 11
EA 2.3 2 0.3 5 0.5 3 64 3 4.3 5 0.4 3
Average 9.8 8 1.2 8 2.2 8 363 10 14.2 10 1.5 10
Sources: Euromonitor (2011) and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: Groc. denotes grocery; H&B health and beauty; C&F clothing and footwear; H&G house and gardening; E&A electronics and 
appliances; L&P leisure and personal.
Table A8 Selected concentration measures
(grocery sector; averages 2004-2009)
HHI Rank CR1 Rank CR3 Rank CR5 Rank CR9 Rank
BE 5.9 6 14.3 5 38.5 6 50.2 6 57.0 6
DE 10.2 8 17.8 7 47.1 8 66.9 11 75.9 11
IE 11.6 9 23.1 10 54.2 10 64.7 9 75.5 10
GR 1.4 1 9.1 1 16.8 1 22.8 1 27.7 1
ES 3.8 3 12.9 3 29.2 3 38.9 3 45.6 2
FR 8.6 7 21.3 8 41.7 7 58.5 8 71.0 8
IT 3.3 2 9.9 2 22.0 2 32.4 2 48.0 3
NL 11.6 10 30.3 11 48.4 9 56.4 7 64.4 7
AT 11.9 11 22.8 9 57.0 11 65.3 10 74.1 9
PT 4.9 4 13.4 4 33.1 4 45.7 5 53.8 5
SI 24.3 12 41.7 13 74.5 12 86.8 12 94.9 12
SK 5.5 5 17.1 6 36.2 5 45.0 4 51.0 4
FI 24.4 13 35.9 12 76.5 13 88.9 13 95.9 13
EA 2.3 2 9.1 2 18.7 2 27.1 2 39.3 2
Average 9.8 8 20.7 8 44.2 8 55.6 7 64.2 7
Correlation with HHI 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.92
Sources: Euromonitor (2011) and Eurosystem staff calculations.104
ECB
Occasional Paper No 128
September 2011












EA 4.7 4.7 5.2 3.6 - 5.9 -
BE 2.8 1 2.9 2 4.1 5 3.5 5 4.6 3
DE 6.0 14 5.1 10 6.1 12 4.1 7 7.1 13
IE 4.2 6 4.2 4 3.9 3 3.5 4 4.8 4
GR 6.3 15 7.5 15 5.8 9 5.3 14 6.0 8
ES 4.6 8 4.7 8 5.9 10 4.9 13 6.4 10
FR 3.2 2 2.8 1 4.5 6 3.6 6 5.3 6
IT 3.7 4 5.1 11 2.4 1 1.2 1 3.2 1
CY 5.4 11 6.6 14 4.7 7 2.4 2 5.5 7
LU 4.4 7 4.3 6 6.0 11 4.8 12 6.6 11
NL 5.1 10 5.0 9 7.4 15 4.7 11 8.3 15
AT 3.8 5 4.0 3 4.1 4 2.9 3 5.0 5
PT 3.6 3 4.3 5 3.5 2 4.4 9 3.8 2
SI 5.7 13 6.0 13 6.6 14 6.5 15 6.8 12
SK 5.4 12 5.4 12 6.4 13 4.1 8 7.5 14
FI 4.7 9 4.6 7 5.5 8 4.7 10 6.0 9
Max. 6.3 GR 7.5 GR 7.4 NL 6.5 SI 8.3 NL
Min. 2.8 BE 2.8 FR 2.4 IT 1.2 IT 3.2 IT
std. dev. 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4
Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
1) As noted in Section 1.1, the high proportion of self-employed in the distributive trades (especially in the grocery sector in some 
countries) may impact on the comparability of reported proﬁ  ts and proﬁ  t margins. Therefore, it may be desirable to adjust for the imputed 
labour income of the self-employed. The data in the table have been adjusted using the same method outlined in Section 1.1.105
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2nd 11.1 22th 0.6 6th 5.3
3rd 10.7 23th 0.6 7th 4.6
4th 8.4 24th 0.6 8th 4.1
5th 8.4 25th 0.6 9th 3.8
6th 6.5 26th-186th 11.2 10th 3.5
7th 6.5
FI
1st 40.4 11th 3.3
8th 5.8 2nd 33.9 12th 3.0
9th 5.0 3rd 10.4 13th 2.6
10th 5.0 4th 0.8 14th 2.5
11th 4.7
FR
1st 15.7 15th 2.3
12th 4.0 2nd 12.0 16th 2.1
13th 3.9 3rd 9.9 17th 2.0
14th 1.0 4th 8.6 18th 1.8
15th 0.9 5th 8.6 19th 1.7
16th 0.9 6th 8.3 20th 1.7
17th 0.6 7th 5.1 21th 1.6
18th 0.6 8th 4.2 22th 0.9
19-21st 1.2 9th 3.9 23th 0.6
BE
1st 31.7 10th 3.3 24th-30th 1.4
2nd 19.3 11th 3.1
NL
1st 27.1
3rd 15.0 12th 2.8 2nd 11.2
4th 9.3 13th 2.7 3rd 10.1
5th 8.1 14th 2.6 4th 8.0
6th 5.6 15th 2.5 5th 7.6
DE
1st 33.0 16th 1.1 6th 6.8
2nd 23.5 17th 1.1 7th 4.7
3rd 14.5 18th 0.7 8th 3.6
4th 12.2 19th 0.6 9th 3.6
5th 1.6 20th-47th 3.0 10th 2.7
6th 1.3
GR
1st 25.8 11th 2.4
7th 0.8 2nd 9.6 12th 1.9
8th 0.8 3rd 8.8 13th 1.7
ES
1st 21.6 4th 8.3 14th 1.6
2nd 13.9 5th 7.8 15th 1.5
3rd 13.3 6th 6.7 16th 1.1
4th 5.6 7th 5.1 17th 1.0
5th 4.7 8th 4.0 18th 0.9
6th 3.7 9th 3.8 19th 0.9
7th 3.6 10th 2.9 20th 0.7
8th 2.4 11th 2.8 21th-22th 0.9
9th 2.1 12th 2.2
PT
1st 20.7
10th 1.5 13th 2.0 2nd 17.7
11th 1.5 14th 2.0 3rd 11.3
12th 1.4 15th 1.4 4th 9.3
13th 1.3 16th 0.8 5th 8.1
14th 1.3 17th 0.7 6th 7.6
15th 1.3 18th 0.7 7th 2.1
16th 1.2 19th-27th 1.7 8th 1.5
17th 1.1
IT
1st 11.1 9th 1.4
18th 1.0 2nd 10.2 10th 0.9
19th 1.0 3rd 8.4 11th 0.8
20th 0.8 4th 7.8 12th 3.5
Source: ECB calculation from 2010 Nielsen structural data.
Notes: The residual market share for Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Finland is represented by independent 
parental groups.106
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2nd 33.1 4th 2.4 9th 2.7
3rd 10.7
FR
1st 25.5 10th 2.4
4th 7.0 2nd 16.1 11th 2.2
5th 5.8 3rd 13.8 12th 1.9
6th 4.7 4th 13.2 13th  1.7
7th 3.9 5th 9.7 14th 0.4






1st 38.9 2nd 27.1
2nd 21.7 2nd 16.0 3rd 14.8
3rd 16.9 3rd 14.4 4th 8.0
4th 10.5 4th 7.7 5th 7.6
5th 9.1 5th 5.8 6th 6.8
6th 6.3 6th 4.3 7th 2.7
DE
1st 36.3 7th 3.3 8th 0.7
2nd 26.7 8th 3.0 9th 0.5
3rd 13.7 9th 2.1
PT
1st 24.5
4th 12.8 10th 1.2 2nd 21.4
5th 9.6 11th 1.1 3rd 13.4
6th 0.9 12th 1.1 4th 11.0
7th 0.1 13th 0.7 5th 9.6
ES
1st 21.6 14th 0.3 6th 9.0
2nd 13.9 15th 0.1 7th 6.0
3rd 13.3
IT
1st 21.6 8th 2.5
4th 5.6 2nd 18.0 9th 1.1
5th 4.7 3rd 11.2 10th 0.9
6th 3.7 4th 11.2 11th 0.3
7th 3.6 5th 11.0 12th 0.2
FI
1st 45.9 6th 8.2
2nd 38.9 7th 4.1
Source: ECB calculation from 2010 Nielsen structural data.107
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Table A13 HHI at the NUTS2 level by buying group, parental group and shop
Country NUTS2 Buying group Parental group Shop
AT Burgenland 26.52 8.64 6.59
Kärnten 32.20 10.50 7.44
Niederösterreich 24.96 8.86 7.14
Oberösterreich 27.17 9.53 6.07
Salzburg 29.19 8.86 6.63
Steiermark 24.95 9.67 6.35
Tirol 28.77 16.81 13.31
Vorarlberg 37.51 11.63 7.89
Wien 30.08 13.01 12.80
BE Prov. D’anvers 24.89 20.38 6.86
Prov. de Flandre-Occidentale 22.04 18.11 5.90
Prov. de Flandre-Orientale 20.55 17.52 6.54
Prov. de Hainaut 22.79 19.46 7.81
Prov. de Limbourg 24.12 19.45 6.35
Prov. de Liège 23.48 19.98 7.13
Prov. de Luxembourg 21.06 19.32 8.96
Prov. de Namur 22.52 19.56 7.42
Prov. du Brabant Flamand 24.97 22.16 9.30
Prov. du Brabant Wallon 31.99 28.97 12.09
Région bruxelloise 24.41 21.48 9.32
DE Baden-Württemberg 25.86 24.68 5.23
Bayern 28.66 23.82 4.35
Berlin 21.94 18.03 8.66
Brandenburg 24.83 20.79 9.27
Bremen 26.42 24.73 9.12
Hamburg 27.91 24.92 8.75
Hessen 27.27 25.37 5.41
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 24.56 18.40 7.79
Niedersachsen 24.95 23.68 5.43
Nordrhein-Westfalen 23.67 20.61 4.18
Rheinland-Pfalz 23.09 20.80 5.39
Saarland 22.26 21.86 8.86
Sachsen 27.22 25.85 9.29
Sachsen-anhalt 32.06 28.07 7.98
Schleswig-holstein 22.82 18.45 7.44
Thüringen 26.31 23.98 4.49
ES Andalucía 23.04 11.84 7.69
Aragón 19.66 13.72 10.13
Asturias 24.47 15.18 8.94
Baleares 29.63 20.86 17.15
Cantabria 29.81 15.99 11.77
Castilla la Mancha 23.66 10.15 7.80
Castilla y León 22.14 10.98 7.14
Cataluña 20.62 10.23 5.95
Comunidad Valenciana 24.56 13.80 12.13
Extremadura 31.59 17.83 10.53
Galicia 21.23 14.64 8.98
Madrid 23.90 13.04 7.57
Murcia 22.42 12.80 10.42
Navarra 26.30 22.28 11.27
País Vasco 29.76 27.64 21.40
Rioja 27.01 21.54 14.34
FI Ahvenanmaa 74.78 61.31 11.93
Itä-Suomi 41.95 35.40 0.76
Länsi-Suomi 38.02 29.49 0.68
Muu Etelä-Suomi 37.11 32.53 0.57
Pohjois-Suomi 37.12 29.09 0.77
Uusimaat 37.57 31.88 0.54
Source: ECB calculation from 2010 Nielsen structural data.108
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Table A13 HHI at the NUTS2 level by buying group, parental group and shop (cont’d)
Country NUTS2 Buying group Parental group Shop
FR Alsace 15.51 8.90 7.90
Aquitaine 16.88 11.50 8.89
Auvergne 16.71 8.47 6.27
Bourgogne 15.56 9.50 6.98
Bretagne 18.08 12.58 9.14
Centre 15.82 11.06 8.04
Champagne-Ardennes 17.11 10.66 9.08
Corse 33.68 14.36 13.58
Franche-Comté 13.04 8.33 6.09
Ile-de-France 21.33 10.68 8.48
Languedoc-Roussillon 17.59 10.14 6.78
Limousin 17.78 10.05 6.94
Lorraine 13.40 9.17 8.22
Midi-Pyrénées 16.72 10.41 7.48
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 19.06 9.30 8.10
Normandie (Basse-) 21.11 10.38 8.42
Normandie (Haute-) 19.42 10.72 9.00
Pays-de-la-Loire 19.95 14.57 11.38
Picardie 16.27 10.70 8.83
Poitou-Charentes 16.97 12.05 9.54
Provence-Côte-Azur 19.10 8.57 7.01
Rhône-Alpes 19.22 8.47 6.67
GR Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 34.54 21.23 17.10
Attiki 22.84 14.30 9.09
Dytiki ellada 21.94 12.51 9.73
Dytiki Makedonia 21.83 13.30 10.71
Ionia Nisia 55.41 26.46 26.46
Ipeiros 18.27 9.64 7.94
Kentriki Makedonia 24.00 15.46 14.17
Kriti 31.29 17.82 15.73
Notio Aigaio 88.83 42.09 42.09
Peloponnisos 22.57 13.02 7.12
Sterea Ellada 26.54 15.71 13.28
Thessalia 23.93 13.16 11.74
Voreio Aigaio 50.00 28.60 28.60
IT Abruzzo 17.03 9.85 0.52
Basilicata 21.18 14.21 0.73
Calabria 13.34 7.81 0.23
Campania 18.33 9.54 0.15
Emilia-Romagna 24.84 14.86 0.21
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 22.29 11.95 0.39
Lazio 14.20 8.25 0.12
Liguria 19.13 11.78 0.38
Lombardia 10.97 6.29 0.12
Marche 17.76 12.49 0.35
Molise 16.86 11.32 1.98
Piemonte 12.33 8.79 0.19
Puglia 15.06 8.65 0.16
Sardegna 17.00 11.17 0.18
Sicilia 16.20 7.35 0.11
Toscana 23.27 15.72 0.28
Trentino-Alto Adige 30.70 16.65 0.27
Umbria 19.24 13.73 0.41
Valle D’aosta 19.16 15.94 11.07
Veneto 14.18 9.56 0.12
Source: ECB calculation from 2010 Nielsen structural data.109
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Table A13 HHI at the NUTS2 level by buying group, parental group and shop (cont’d)
Country NUTS2 Buying group Parental group Shop
NL Drenthe 18.31 11.79 6.08
Flevoland 18.65 18.90 8.52
Friesland (NL) 20.93 12.24 8.77
Gelderland 21.04 12.41 6.16
Groningen 18.45 15.33 8.54
Limburg (NL) 22.27 14.12 8.99
Noord-Brabant 21.30 14.07 8.41
Noord-Holland 30.34 15.26 10.48
Overijssel 22.36 11.96 7.01
Utrecht 23.01 14.38 8.44
Zeeland 27.01 14.51 6.67
Zuid-Holland 22.39 16.88 10.12
PT Alentejo 17.13 14.50 9.38
Algarve 16.81 13.95 8.36
Centro 15.59 13.36 7.63
Lisboa 16.22 13.49 9.70
Norte 17.11 14.73 7.70
Source: ECB calculation from 2010 Nielsen structural data.110
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Chart A1 Share of the distributive trades sector in the non-financial business sector – 
additional dimensions
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Sources: Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: SBS data not available for Malta for the years shown in the chart. SBS data for Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia and Slovakia not available for 1999. For Portugal, data are not shown for 1999, owing to a structural break in 
the database.111
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Chart A2 Cross-country differences in employment characteristics in the distributive 
trades (2009)
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Sources: Chart (a): Eurostat (national accounts data) and Eurosystem staff calculations. Charts (b) to (f): Eurostat (European Labour 
Force Survey) and Eurosystem staff calculations. Charts (g) and (h): Eurofound (2009).
1) Chart (e): Low-skilled refers to those with, at best, only basic school leaving certiﬁ  cates; medium-skilled refers to those with secondary 
school leaving certiﬁ  cates typically obtained at age 18/19 or equivalent vocational qualiﬁ  cations; high-skilled refers to those with tertiary 
(university-level or supervisory) qualiﬁ  cations.
2) Charts (g)-(h): Eurofound estimates on the basis of the European Company Survey 2009, an establishment survey of some 27,000 
establishments employing 10+ employees. Estimates of trade union membership on the basis of total union membership in participating 
ﬁ  rms, weighted by employees. Estimates of collective agreement coverage are based on employer responses.112
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Chart A2 Cross-country differences in employment characteristics in the distributive trades 
(2009) (cont’d)
(estimated percentages 2)) (estimated percentages  2))
g) Trade union membership in the retail trade, compared 
with the economy as a whole
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Sources: Chart (a): Eurostat (national accounts data) and Eurosystem staff calculations. Charts (b) to (f): Eurostat (European Labour 
Force Survey) and Eurosystem staff calculations. Charts (g) and (h): Eurofound (2009).
1) Chart (e): Low-skilled refers to those with, at best, only basic school leaving certiﬁ  cates; medium-skilled refers to those with secondary 
school leaving certiﬁ  cates typically obtained at age 18/19 or equivalent vocational qualiﬁ  cations; high-skilled refers to those with tertiary 
(university-level or supervisory) qualiﬁ  cations.
2) Charts (g)-(h): Eurofound estimates on the basis of the European Company Survey 2009, an establishment survey of some 27,000 
establishments employing 10+ employees. Estimates of trade union membership on the basis of total union membership in participating 
ﬁ  rms, weighted by employees. Estimates of collective agreement coverage are based on employer responses.
Notes: Chart (g): The ﬁ   gures indicate the percentage of employees working in establishments with employee representation at 
establishment level or above. Figures weighted by employment; Chart (h): Survey question asked “What proportion of your employees is 
covered by a collective wage agreement, be it on the level of the establishment or any higher level?” Figures weighted by employees.114
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Table A14 Price levels across the euro area in 2009 for different product categories
(euro area = 100; cc denotes country)
BE DE IE GR ES FR IT CY
GDP 108.2 100.6 112.8 88.8 88.9 109.7 97.3 86.1
0 Overall consumption 110.5 98.6 122.9 90.6 91.5 107.2 100.0 87.3
Rank 13 8 16 6 7 12 9 5
1 Food/non-alcoholic drinks 108.4 104.1 120.6 94.2 90.6 103.6 101.3 100.9
1.1 Food 107.9 104.5 118.9 92.9 90.1 104.6 102.1 98.6
1.1.1 Bread/cereals 106.4 101.3 120.5 107.3 101.7 103.2 94.7 106.2
1.1.2 Meat 109.8 114.7 109.7 86.1 77.7 110.6 101.7 81.9
1.1.3 Fish 122.9 104.3 108.5 106.7 89.4 105.6 111.2 115.0
1.1.4 Dairy/eggs 114.7 86.3 128.6 125.0 98.8 97.4 117.0 129.3
1.1.5 Oils/fats 119.2 93.5 100.6 114.8 79.6 101.8 111.2 105.5
1.1.6 Fruit/vegetables 105.0 121.4 137.0 73.4 96.3 112.9 90.7 88.5
1.1.7 Other food 98.5 99.8 116.2 109.3 96.2 96.9 123.1 114.1
1.2 Non-alcoholic drinks 114.1 104.4 140.6 113.2 95.7 95.1 92.3 127.5
2 Alcoholic drinks/tobacco 102.2 101.7 184.4 83.7 77.2 109.5 106.6 99.3
2.1 Alcoholic drinks 102.8 92.1 169.9 106.6 85.8 96.7 114.4 120.4
2.2 Tobacco 105.1 116.1 212.1 69.9 71.2 129.9 101.2 86.1
3 Clothing/Footwear 110.2 100.3 99.8 101.9 90.9 102.0 100.9 91.7
3.1 Clothing 111.3 100.8 102.1 103.0 88.6 104.3 99.0 92.4
3.2 Footwear 107.0 98.6 86.4 102.0 97.6 92.7 109.6 89.2
5 Household goods 103.4 95.0 108.4 100.6 101.3 105.1 102.1 98.1
5.1 Household furnishings 101.3 94.9 105.0 107.7 104.2 102.3 105.1 98.4
5.3 Household appliances 100.4 91.8 97.6 96.3 108.9 109.0 105.6 116.7
9 Recreation/Culture 101.2 98.8 111.7 95.8 94.0 106.1 100.9 89.2
9.1 Electronic equipment 104.2 94.4 104.5 96.6 100.8 105.8 103.2 106.2
12 Misc. goods/services 111.3 98.6 124.7 86.5 86.6 107.6 101.2 84.4
Sources: Eurostat’s PPP database and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Notes: The highest price levels for each product category are shown in italics, while the lowest are shown in bold.115
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LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
112.6 70.0 106.0 105.6 79.0 78.6 63.6 113.6
122.7 70.7 103.4 105.0 81.7 78.6 62.4 116.8
1 52 1 0 1 1431 1 4
109.7 87.9 91.6 109.3 86.7 90.1 76.2 111.9
110.9 85.4 91.4 110.0 85.7 90.3 74.4 110.4
113.5 77.3 90.7 115.3 97.5 92.4 71.5 115.9
106.1 68.4 104.4 116.3 72.6 83.5 61.7 109.0
116.7 91.3 101.6 110.8 77.4 96.9 79.9 98.7
112.7 105.7 87.3 94.5 105.1 95.3 86.5 104.6
117.8 105.9 79.8 112.9 94.2 116.8 104.0 107.4
120.4 87.2 100.2 117.2 77.4 88.3 70.3 123.4
103.0 111.0 75.6 108.9 109.2 97.5 101.4 108.2
104.2 116.1 94.9 106.0 100.6 91.1 98.8 128.7
90.0 93.9 103.7 94.6 83.7 78.2 81.6 136.0
95.3 100.2 100.7 96.9 87.4 103.3 98.2 172.8
85.4 91.6 107.9 94.3 83.0 63.4 71.5 107.2
104.2 88.1 101.8 99.8 94.6 96.2 95.9 118.7
103.2 89.3 100.7 100.1 99.6 99.8 101.1 117.8
104.1 87.9 103.9 96.0 84.8 85.6 90.4 114.6
111.4 104.3 96.1 105.8 92.1 91.7 85.6 107.2
108.9 116.3 97.6 102.0 99.0 92.6 88.6 106.3
95.9 123.4 89.3 91.7 92.5 102.4 94.3 106.0
96.2 72.2 99.3 103.5 86.8 86.2 65.6 115.8
92.4 102.7 97.7 97.8 101.7 102.0 95.8 105.6
112.4 66.6 100.9 106.7 81.1 79.3 61.0 118.4116
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Table A15 Mapping of HICP, PPI and import prices (measured by UVI)
HICP (COICOP) PPI (NACE Rev. 2) Import prices (UVI) (CPA2002)
Textile (030000) Textile (NS0012) Textile (17)
Cars (071100) Manufacture of motor vehicles (2C2910) – 
for BE, IE, LU, NL, T, FI (2C2900)
Motor vehicles (341)
Furniture (051100) Manufacture of furniture (2C3100) Furniture (361)
Sound and picture equipment (091100) Manufacture of consumer electronics 
(2C2640)
TV and radio receivers (323)
Information processing equipment 
(091300)
Manufacture of computers and peripheral 
equipment (2C2620)
Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers (300)
Photographic and cinematographic 
equipment and optical instruments 
(091200)
Manufacture of optical instruments and 
photographic equipment (2C2670)
Optical instruments and photographic 
equipment (334)
Personal care appliances (1212_3) Manufacture of perfumes and toilet 
preparations (2C2042)
Soap, detergents, perfumes (245)
Household appliances (0531_2) Manufacture of domestic appliances 
(2C2750)
Domestic appliances n.e.s. (297)
Jewellery, clocks and watches (123100) Manufacture of jewellery, bijouterie and 
related articles (2C3210)
Jewellery and related articles (362), 
watches and clocks (335)
Non-durable HH goods (.056100) Manufacture of soap, detergents, etc. 
(2C2040)
Soap, detergents, perfumes (245)
Pharmaceuticals (061100) Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical preparations 
(2C2100)
Pharmaceuticals (244)
Games, toys and hobbies (093100) Manufacture of games and toys (2C3240) Games and toys (365)
Equipment for sport, camping and 
open-air recreation (093200)
Manufacture of sports goods (2C3230) Sport goods (364)
Newspapers, books and stationery 
(095000)
Printing and service activities related to 
printing (2C1810)
Printing and services activity related to 
printing (222)
Spare parts for personal transport 
equipment (072100)
Manufacture of parts and accessories for 
motor vehicles (2C2930)
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
(343)117
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Table A16 Estimated pass-through of producer prices and import prices to consumer prices 
in ARDL model
Estimated pass-through of PPI and UVI to consumer prices (ARDL)
BE DE FR IE IT ES
PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI
Clothing and footwear 0.61 0.11 0.60 0.55
Motor cars 0.13 0.87 0.32 N/A 0.20 0.11 0.90
Furniture and furnishings 0.15 0.53 0.48 N/A 0.49 0.65
Equipment for reception, recording 
and reproduction of sound and 
pictures 0.94 N/A N/A N/A 0.43 0.34 0.50 0.33
Information processing equipment N/A N/A N/A 0.77
Photographic and cinematographic 
equipment and optical instruments N/A N/A 0.78 N/A N/A
Appliances for personal care 0.10 0.56 0.19 0.68 0.11 N/A 0.06 0.32
Household appliances N/A 0.20 0.04
Jewellery, clocks and watches 0.39 0.03 1.00 N/A 1.04 1.10
Non-durable household goods 0.27 0.16 0.12 N/A
Pharmaceutical products 0.35 N/A
Games, toys and hobbies N/A 0.20 0.03 0.19 N/A 0.10
Equipment for sports, camping 
and open-air recreation 0.01 0.10 0.17 N/A N/A N/A
Newspapers, books and stationery 0.47 0.05 0.39 0.02
Spare parts and accessories for 
personal transport equipment 0.18 N/A N/A N/A 0.05 0.97
Median 0.15 0.13 0.53 0.05 0.40 0.15 0.49 0.20 0.35 0.23 0.71 0.33
Notes: The pass-through estimates are long-run elasticities according to section 2.3.2.A. Blank entries are due to the statistical 
insigniﬁ  cance of estimates; N/A: not available due to time series being missing or too short.
Table A16 Estimated pass-through of producer prices and import prices to consumer prices in 
ARDL model (cont’d)
Estimated pass-through of PPI and UVI to consumer prices (ARDL)
NL AT PT FI Median
PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI PPI UVI
Clothing and footwear 0.23 0.57 0.11
Motor cars 0.01 0.12 0.40 0.59 0.12
Furniture and furnishings 0.63 0.17 0.51 0.17
Equipment for reception, recording 
and reprod. of sound & pictures N/A 0.49 N/A 0.81 N/A 0.72 0.43
Information processing equipment N/A N/A 0.27 N/A 0.26 0.77 0.26
Photographic and cinematographic 
equipment and optical instruments N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.41 0.59
Appliances for personal care N/A N/A 0.44 0.11
Household appliances N/A 0.12 N/A 0.04 0.16
Jewellery, clocks and watches N/A 0.13 N/A N/A 1.02 0.08
Non-durable household goods N/A 0.30 N/A N/A 0.08 0.21 0.12
Pharmaceutical products 0.63 N/A 0.49
Games, toys and hobbies N/A N/A N/A 0.14
Equipment for sports, camping 
and open-air recreation N/A 0.20 N/A N/A 0.08 0.10 0.13
Newspapers, books and stationery N/A 0.39 0.05
Spare parts and accessories for personal 
transport equipment N/A N/A N/A 0.97 0.12
Median 0.20 0.12 0.63 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.50 0.17
Notes: The pass-through estimates are long-run elasticities according to section 2.3.2.A. Blank entries are due to the statistical 
insigniﬁ  cance of estimates; N/A: not available due to time series being missing or too short.118
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Table A17 Estimated long-run elasticity of consumer prices to import price changes
BE DE GR FR IE IT ES LU NL AT PT FI Median Euro
area
Clothing and footwear 1.09 0.24 2.67 0.55 0.28 0.25 0.42 0.39
Motor cars 0.56 0.77 0.31 0.24 0.58 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.76 0.41 0.44
Furniture and furnishings 0.68 0.43 0.57 0.45 0.82 0.90 1.28 0.53 0.62 0.32 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.79
Equipment for reception, 
recording and reproduction 
of sound and pictures 1) 0.28 0.18 0.49 0.24 0.57 0.05 0.76 0.54 0.30 0.30 0.47
Information processing 
equipment 1) 1.63 0.20 1.75 0.51 0.60 0.56 0.58
Photographic and 
cinematographic equipment 
and optical instruments 1) 0.31 0.16 0.25 0.75 0.47 0.60 1.08 0.47 0.64
Appliances for personal care 0.87 0.22 0.91 0.77 0.14 0.45 0.75 0.52 0.64 0.51 0.25 0.52 0.59
Household appliances 1) 0.10 0.31 0.04 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.04
Jewellery, clocks and watches 0.78 0.31 0.32 0.73 0.19 1.06 0.32 0.54 0.23 0.65 1.21 0.45 0.49 0.81
Non-durable household goods 1.22 0.84 0.66 0.11 0.50 0.57 0.43 0.26 0.15 0.50 0.50
Pharmaceutical products 0.90 0.17 0.28 0.64 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.49
Games, toys and hobbies 0.13 0.18 0.15
Equipment for sports, camping 
and open-air recreation 0.42 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.05
Newspapers, books and 
stationery 0.40 0.23 0.98 0.52 0.46 0.93 0.21 0.76 0.66 0.18 0.49 0.94
Spare parts and accessories for 
personal transport equipment 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.71 0.50 0.35 0.55 0.53 1.11 0.50 0.73
Median 0.68 0.31 0.39 0.47 0.21 0.48 0.57 0.43 0.57 0.39 0.41 0.32 0.45 0.54
Note: The estimation is based on iterated SUR regression using a balanced sample (Q1 1999-Q2 2010).
1) Estimation includes a time trend.
Table A18 Main source countries of euro 
area imports of textiles and clothing
(percentages and percentage point change)
2000-2004 2005-2009 p.p. change
Intra-euro area 39.9 47.0 7.1
China 10.7 20.1 9.4
Turkey 5.7 5.7 -0.1
India 2.5 3.5 1.0
United Kingdom 2.9 2.9 -0.1
Bangladesh 2.6 3.1 0.5
Romania 4.8 3.3 -1.5
Tunisia 3.7 2.8 -0.9
Morocco 2.8 2.4 -0.4
Poland 2.0 1.2 -0.9
Sum 77.7 92.0 14.3
Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff.
Note: The intra-euro area concept changes with time, meaning 
that part of the increase in intra-euro area imports is due to the 
accession of Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia to the euro area.119
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Chart A3 Dispersion of euro area clothing and footwear prices
std. dev. (left-hand scale)
inter-quartile range (left-hand scale)
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2  ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Table A19 Overview of main datasets used in report
Source Name  Dimensions  Comments 
Eurostat  National accounts  Information on the main 
macroeconomic variables, such as 
output, value added, employment, etc. 
Publicly available. In theory, these are the most 
internally consistent and harmonised across 
countries, but there is less detail on sectors and 
variables for distributive trades than in the SBS 
dataset 
Eurostat  SBS Information on key macroeconomic 
variables, such as output, value 
added, employment, etc. 
Publicly available. Although there is more 
detail on sectors and variables for the 
distributive trades sectors, there may be breaks 
across countries and time 
Eurostat  PPP  Data on relative price levels for 
48 product groups 
Publicly available 
Eurostat  PPP basic heading 
level 
Data on relative price levels for 
148 product categories 
Available upon request for research purposes 
Eurostat  PPP product level 
quaranta tables 
Data on actual average prices and 
price dispersion for approximately 
3,000 products 
Access restricted 
Nielsen  Store database  Approximately 130,000 store 
locations with information on store 
type and size, etc. 
Private database. For a more detailed overview, 
see Annex 2 
Euromonitor  Industry passport  Detailed market information, 
including market shares by company, 
brand, etc. 




Regional CPIs  Six countries, 84 regions, 12 coicop 
groups, 1995-2010 
Availability depends on the individual country’s 




Agricultural prices  Data on agricultural prices covering 
meats, dairy products, oils and grains 





Qualitative survey  Qualitative information on the main 
features and trends in individual 
countries 
Provided by NCB task force members 
NCBs  IPN and WDN data  Quantitative and survey information 
of price-setting behaviour 
Restricted access. IPN and WDN 
OECD  PMR  Indicators of the degree of product 
market regulation – barriers to 
entry, price controls and operating 
restrictions 
Aggregated data publicly available. Updates to 
2010 based on information received from NCBs 122
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX TO BOX 3: FIRM 
DEMOGRAPHICS, FIRM SIZE AND PERFORMANCE 
ANALYSIS
The following terminology will be adopted:
– T  indicates the turnover produced by a ﬁ  rm, 
deﬂ  ated using gross production prices;
– E  indicates total employment (number of 
persons employed);
– N  indicates the number of enterprises.
Each variable refers to a speciﬁ  c  year, 
indicated by the pedix t=1999, 2000, etc. 
If the variable is considered for two 
employment sub-classes (1-19 and 20+), then 
the pedix i=1,2 is introduced. Thus:
–  T t,i
E t,i
   indicates a productivity index computed 
for the employment class i in year t;
–  E t,i
N t,i
   indicates the number of persons per 
ﬁ  rm employed in class i and year t;
–  N t,i
N t
   indicates the share of ﬁ  rms in class i 
and year t.
Table A20 Statistical classification of distributive trades sectors1)
Section  G – Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Division  45 – Trade and repair 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
46 – Wholesale trade (except in motor 
vehicles and motorcycles) 
47 – Retail trade (except in motor vehicles and 
motorcycles) 
Group  45.1 – Sale of motor 
vehicles 
45.2 – Maintenance and 
repair of motor vehicles 
45.3 – Sale of motor vehicle 
parts and accessories 
45.4 – Sale, maintenance 
and repair of motorcycles 
and related parts and 
accessories 
46.1 – Wholesale on a fee or contract 
basis 
46.2 – Wholesale of agricultural raw 
materials and live animals 
46.3 – Wholesale of food, beverages 
and tobacco 
46.4 – Wholesale of household goods 
46.5 – Wholesale of information and 
communication equipment 
46.6 – Wholesale of other machinery, 
equipment and supplies 
46.7 – Other specialised wholesale 
46.9 – Non-specialised wholesale trade 
47.1 – Retail sale in non-specialised stores 
47.2 – Retail sale of food, beverages and 
tobacco in specialised stores 
47.3 – Retail sale of automotive fuel in 
specialised stores 
47.4 – Retail sale of information and 
communication equipment in specialised stores 
47.5 – Retail sale of other household equipment 
in specialised stores 
47.6 – Retail sale of cultural and recreational 
goods in specialised stores 
47.7 – Retail sale of other goods in specialised 
stores 
47.8 – Retail sale via stalls andmarkets 
47.9 –  Retail trade not in stores, stalls or markets 
Class  Six classes  48 classes – including, for example: 
46.31 Wholesale of fruit and 
vegetables; 
46.39 Non-specialised wholesale of 
food, beverages and tobacco; 
46.43 Wholesale of electrical 
household appliances; 
46.74 Wholesale of hardware, 
plumbing and heating equipment and 
supplies, etc. 
37 classes – including, for example: 
47.11 Retail sale in non-specialised stores with 
food, beverages or tobacco predominating 
(grocery); 
47.3 Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised 
stores (petrol stations); 
47.71 Retail sale of clothing in specialised 
stores, etc. 
Source: Eurostat (2008) NACE Rev. 2 – statistical classiﬁ  cation of economic activities in the European Community.
1) In 2002 a major revision of NACE was launched. The Regulation establishing NACE Rev. 2 was adopted in December 2006. 
NACE Rev. 2 should, in general, be used for statistics referring to economic activities performed from 1 January 2008 onwards. 
Although they are broadly similar, there are some differences between NACE Rev. 1.1 and Rev. 2. One substantial difference between 
the two classiﬁ  cations is the retail sale of automotive fuel, which was classiﬁ  ed under motor trade in Rev. 1.1, but under retail 
trade in Rev. 2. Other differences relate to certain food and alcohol processing activities (under wholesale activities under Rev. 1.1, 
but under manufacturing in Rev. 2) and consumer goods repair activities (classiﬁ  ed under retail trade in Rev. 1.1, but under services 
in Rev. 2). Lastly, under the NACE Rev. 2 classiﬁ  cation, the motor, wholesale and retail trade sectors are denoted as G45, G46 and 
G47 respectively, whereas under the former NACE Rev. 1.1 they were denoted as G50, G51 and G52. For reasons of data availability, 
the latter (Rev. 1.1.) classiﬁ  cation is most frequently used in this report.123
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–  Finally, the gt(·) operator applied to the Xt 
variable indicates the ratio Xt/Xt-1.
The objective of the shift and share decomposition 
is to decompose the growth rate of T:
a) Labour productivity growth (productivity 
effect);
b) Average  ﬁ  rm size variation (size effect);
c) The change in the distribution of the 
number of ﬁ  rms in the employment classes 
(distribution effect);
d) The change in the total number of ﬁ  rms 
(sector effect).
For every employment class i=1,…,I
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The growth rate for T in class i is the product 
of the growth rates of the four determinants 
a)-d) discussed above. The same decomposition 
is applicable to the whole population. 
In this case, the instantaneous growth rate 
(rt) of the T variable for the entire population 
is equal to the mean of the instantaneous 
growth rates, weighted by qt-1,i, which are 
the shares of turnover T of each class at t-1. 
Using the Taylor ﬁ   rst order approximation, 
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where  ε(2) represents a second-order effect, 
reﬂ  ecting the interaction among the four variables.
ANNEX: INDICATOR OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH 
OPENING TIMES ARE REGULATED
The replies to the OECD’s 2007 questionnaire to 
construct regulation indicators provide very rich 
information on opening times. Yet this information 
has not been sufﬁ  ciently exploited,155 most likely 
because not all countries provide such information. 
It has been provided and updated by the task force 
members from the participating Eurosystem 
NCBs. The information in Table A21 is used to 
construct an indicator of regulations concerning 
the degree of restrictiveness of opening times in 
the euro area countries.156
Given the substantial heterogeneity regarding 
exceptions applied by countries to speciﬁ  c 
establishments, the indicator solely considers 
the general regulations governing opening 
times. In the case of countries with regional 
or local regulations, exceptions for smaller 
retailers or for different months of the year, the 
country’s most representative regulations have 
been taken.
As a step prior to constructing the indicator, 
six variables have been deﬁ  ned which attempt 
to capture the time during which establishments 
are not allowed to open. Thus, the ﬁ  rst variable 
(opening time) consists of the time from which 
establishments may open. As there may be 
differences between the different days of the 
week, this variable is calculated as the weekly 
average of the opening time,157 meaning that 
The OECD indicators only take into account whether opening  155 
hours are regulated or not; accordingly, it is not possible to 
qualify the degree of regulation borne by each country in this 
respect. See, for example, Wölﬂ   et al. (2009).
With the exception of Slovenia, owing to a lack of information. 156 
That is to say, the regulations governing each of the seven days  157 
of the week, including Sundays (even though opening is not 
a possibility every Sunday), are averaged out. If there are no 
regulations, the value 0 is assigned to the opening time, whereas, 
if opening is not possible on Sundays, the opening time is 24. If 
there are no speciﬁ  c regulations for Sundays, but there are for 
the other days of the week, then these regulations are applied 
to Sundays. If the regulations for Mondays and Fridays differ 
from those for Saturdays, the same regulations are considered to 
govern Sundays as they do Saturdays. Moreover, it is taken into 
account for Cyprus that ﬁ  ve months of the year have a winter 
timetable and seven months a summer timetable.124
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the greater the weekly average for the opening 
time, the more restrictive the regulations. 
The second variable (closing time) is similar to 
the ﬁ  rst, but takes into account the time from 
which establishments are not allowed to be 
open. Speciﬁ  cally, the weekly average of the 
closing time is calculated: the variable reﬂ  ected 
in the indicator is deﬁ  ned as 24 less the weekly 
average for the closing time in order to ensure 
that an increase in the variable entails a greater 
degree of regulation.158
The third variable (daily hours open) is deﬁ  ned 
as 24 less the maximum number of hours that 
establishments can open daily, while the fourth 
variable (weekly hours open) is calculated as 
168 (the number of hours in a week) less the 
maximum number of hours establishments can 
open weekly. In countries where one or both of 
these two variables are not explicitly regulated, 
de facto regulation has been taken into account, 
based on the restrictions on opening and/or 
closing times.159
Furthermore, the ﬁ   fth and sixth variables are 
deﬁ  ned respectively as the minimum number of 
days establishments must close per year (closing 
days) and the minimum number of Sundays and 
bank holidays (closing holidays) that they cannot 
open.160 This latter variable is deﬁ  ned as 52, the 
average number of Sundays in a year, less the 
maximum number of Sundays and bank holidays 
establishments can open. So that all the variables 
are in a range from 0 (minimal regulation) to 1 
(maximum regulation), the six foregoing variables 
have been re-scaled using the min-max method.
The treatment is symmetrical to that applied to the weekly  158 
average for the opening time. That is to say, if there are no 
regulations, the closing time is 24 and, if it is not possible to 
open on Sundays, the closing time is 0.
If opening and closing times are not regulated, the maximum  159 
number of hours per day is 24, and, per week, 168; accordingly, 
the transformation of these two variables is zero.
Ideally, in each country, 52 would be replaced by 52 plus the  160 
number of bank holidays per year in each related country, but 
this information is not available for all countries.
Table A21 Regulation of shop opening hours in the euro area 1)
AT BE FI FR DE GR
Does regulation exist? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of regulation National National National National Nat./Reg. National
Maximum number of opening hours 
per day 15 16 14 16
Maximum number of opening hours 
per week 72 91
Opening time
Ordinary weekdays 657 5
Saturdays 657 5
Sundays and holidays 51 2 1 3 5
Special weekdays 5
Closing time
Ordinary weekdays 21 20 21 21
Saturdays 18 20 18 20 20
Sundays and holidays 20 18 18 20
Special weekdays 21 (Friday)
Minimum number of closing days 
per year 52 3) 4
Maximum number of Sundays and 
holidays per year 0 15 5 4 2
Exemptions to general regulation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sources: Eurosystem staff calculations based on information from the OECD and NCBs.
1) If there is no speciﬁ  c regulation, the related space is left blank. 
2) Summer opening hour regulation. In winter, maximum hours are 14.5 hours daily and 82 hours weekly, while the closing time 
is 7.30 p.m. on weekdays and 7 p.m. on Sundays. 
3) One day per week.125
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Finally, all the variables have been aggregated 
with ad hoc weights, which are detailed in 
Table A22. Speciﬁ   cally, the six variables 
have been put into three groups, based on 
the type of regulation. The ﬁ  rst group is the 
limits on opening and closing times, the 
second group is the maximum number of 
daily or weekly hours, while the third group 
is Sunday and bank holiday opening, and the 
minimum number of days establishments are 
closed, both per year. Each of these groups 
is assigned the same weight but, within each 
group, more weight is given to those situations 
that seem more restrictive from the standpoint 
of commercial practices (closing time instead 
of opening time, or opening on Sundays and 
bank holidays instead of the minimum number 
of days establishments are closed). The 
outcome is the indicator depicted in Chart 10. 
However, an exercise has been conducted on 
IE IT LU NL PT SK ES CY 2) MT
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
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(c) = (a) x (b)
1 Opening time 0.25 0.333 0.083
Closing time 0.75 0.250
2 Daily hours open 0.50 0.333 0.167
Weekly hours open 0.50 0.167
3 Closing days 0.25 0.333 0.083
Closing holidays 0.75 0.250
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.126
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the sensitivity of the indicator to the weights, 
replicating the indicator assigning the same 
weight to the six variables, the result of which 
is given in Chart A4. Comparison of the charts 
shows that this change in weights does not 
entail substantial changes in the ordering of the 
countries, with the sole exception of Portugal, 
which moves from fourth to seventh in terms 
of countries with the least regulation, when 
the weights make no distinction based on type 
of regulation.
MEASURING CONCENTRATION USING 
EUROMONITOR DATA
As discussed above, the HHI is calculated by 
summing the square of the market shares of 
all companies in a given market. The precise 
calculation of the HHI requires information on 
the market size of all companies in the market. 
However, in the Euromonitor dataset, the 
market size of smaller ﬁ  rms is not recorded, but 
aggregated into the category “Others”. Generally, 
the threshold for inclusion in this category 
is very low (usually a market share of below 
0.1%). Hence, this should not have a big impact 
on the measure (especially as the market share 
is squared). Nonetheless, to ensure consistency 
across countries and sectors, where sometimes 
the thresholds may be higher, the following rule 
of thumb was employed for dealing with ﬁ  rms 
categorised as “Others”. It was assumed that they 
have, on average, a market share of half the lowest 
recorded market share (e.g. if the lowest recorded 
market share is 0.1%, they are assumed to have a 
market share of 0.05%). Thus, if the market share 
of companies in the category “Others” is Y% and 
the lowest recorded market share is Z%, then it is 
assumed for calculating the HHI that there are Y/
(Z/2) ﬁ  rms, each with a market share of Z/2.
The CRk indicator is calculated as the cumulated 
market share of the top k companies in a given 
market. Similar to the practical issues faced 
when calculating the HHI, the calculation of 
the CRk measure requires that information on 
at least k market players be available. In some 
instances, particularly in some sub-sectors of 
smaller countries, this is not the case. Therefore, 
to calculate the CRk measures when information 
is not available for k companies, but only y 
companies, the following rule was adopted – the 
market share of the k-y companies was set to 
the minimum of half of the market share of the 
smallest recorded ﬁ  rm (i.e. y/2) or the market 
share of the ﬁ   rms in the category “Others” 
divided by 11-y (as the largest CRk calculated is 
for ten companies).
Chart A4 ESCB indicator of the degree 
of regulation of shop opening hours 
with identical weights
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Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.
Chart A5 Comparison of OECD and 
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x-axis: ESCB indicator (2010)
y-axis: OECD indicator (2008)
Sources: OECD and Eurosystem staff calculations.
Note: The ESCB indicator of the degree of regulation of shop 
opening hours has been computed on the basis of information 
from NCBs.127
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STORE LOCATION DATA DESCRIPTION
The dataset consists of census-type data on 
non-specialised retailers  161 in ten euro area 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal). Data for Belgium were provided 
by the Nationale Bank van België/Banque 
Nationale de Belgique, drawing from different 
national sources, and refer to 2008. The 
remaining data were provided by Nielsen. The 
reference period for these data is 2010. The 
unit of observation is the store, for a total of 
128,292 observations (see Table A23). Detailed 
information at the store level is provided in the 
dataset: name, address, banner name, outlet type, 
sales area in square metres (sq. m.), number of 
counters, turnover share. Moreover, the dataset 
is endowed with information about each store’s 
membership of a parental company and/or 
buying group (if applicable).
To construct a dataset harmonised across 
countries, some data management was required.
The outlet type deﬁ  nition was not harmonised 
across countries, as the deﬁ  nition of hypermarkets 
and supermarkets may vary across countries.162 
Furthermore, the threshold (in terms of selling 
space in square metres) for inclusion in the 
dataset varied across countries.163-The 
harmonisation criterion chosen was based on the 
sales surface range applicable to most of the 
countries:
superettes (100-400 sq. m.), • 
supermarkets (400-2,500 sq. m.), • 
hypermarkets (2,500 and over). • 
Consequently, traditional shops with a sales 
area of less than 100 sq. m. were dropped from 
the sample, as they can represent a selected 
retail sector in many countries; furthermore, 
the large mixed retailers (shopping malls) 
were excluded from the ﬁ  nal dataset, owing to 
overlapping and for reasons of comparability. 
For discounts, a dummy variable is present 
in most Nielsen datasets. Where it was not 
speciﬁ   ed, NCB task force members were 
asked to construct the dummy, or a criterion 
based on the banner name was used (whenever 
possible).
As to the geographical dimension, many 
countries were provided with more aggregated 
details (NUTS2 in Table A23). The geographical 
detail is not an issue when considering the 
Nielsen dataset by itself, as the address 
NACE G5211 sub-sector, non-specialised store with food  161 
beverages or tobacco predominating.
See http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=deﬁ  nitions/ 162 
hypermarche.htm and http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.
asp?page=deﬁ  nitions/supermarche.htm as an example.
In Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and France, the smallest  163 
stores recorded have a selling space of 5 sq. m., 8 sq. m., 9 
sq. m. and 20 sq. m., respectively. However, in Greece and 
Portugal, stores smaller than 50 sq. m. were not recorded, while 
in Belgium, Spain and Italy, stores smaller than 100 sq. m. were 
not recorded.
Table A23 Description of the Nielsen structural dataset (2010)
AT BE DE ES  FI FR GR  IT NL PT 
NUTS3      X  X    X  X    
NUTS2  X X X      X    X X X 
Sales  area  X    X X X X X X X X 
Counters     X     X   X   X 
Turnover  share  X   X     X   X    
Buying  group X X X X X X X X X X 
Parental  group X X X X X X X X X X 
Store  X X X X X X X X X X 
Obs  4,999 3,725  32,216  16,269 2,827  17,682 3,033  29,482 4,375 3,932
Notes: Belgian data provided by the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique. Buying group for Greece imputed from 
external data source.128
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of the single store is available.164 The problem 
arises when the very detailed store-level 
information is merged with the regional 
(NUTS2) CPI data (see Section 2.3 for the 
regional analysis). In this sense, the former 
needed to be transposed to the latter (broader) 
aggregation, as in Spain and Finland, for 
example.  For other countries, like Italy, 
provided with both NUTS2 and NUTS3 
dimensions, the regional analysis was based on 
NUTS2, as the Eurostat additional explanatory 
variables used to asses the correlation between 
concentration and price changes were available 
at this level, despite a very detailed regional 
CPI at NUTS3. For some countries, like 
Belgium and Greece, the NUTS2 aggregation 
has been retrieved through postcodes.
In order to provide the ﬁ   nal dataset with a 
parental company and buying group for each 
country, some assumptions were made. Where 
not provided, it was assumed that the buying 
group for the hard discounters at the national 
level coincided with the global banner name. 
The parental company information was also 
used to provide an insight into the buying group 
if information on the latter was missing.
NUTS denotes Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics.  164 
There are three hierarchies, with 97 NUTS1 regions, 271 NUTS2 
regions and 1,303 NUTS3 regions in the European Union. In 
principle, NUTS2 regions should have a population in the range 
of 800,000 to 3 million, and NUTS3 regions 150,000 to 800,000. 
However, as countries often use existing administrative zones, 
this is only an indication rather than a precise guide.
Table A24 Overview of the precision of geo-coding results
Building/ 
address Street  Postcode  City  Total   
EA  75.6  14.2 9.1 0.8  100.0  128,292
BE  90.0 6.8 3.2  -  100.0  3,731 
DE  98.3 1.6 0.1 0.0  100.0  35,825 
GR  27.1 11.1 30.4 31.4  100.0  3,046 
ES  62.5 22.1 15.3  0.1  100.0  16,320 
FR  50.5 34.1 15.4  0.0  100.0  20,009 
IT  74.0  16.7 9.2 0.1  100.0  29,482 
NL  91.8 1.6 6.6 0.0  100.0  4,989 
AT  96.0 0.2 3.8 0.0  100.0  5,121 
PT  45.0 20.6 32.9  1.5  100.0  5,281 
SI  68.6  23.9 7.5 0.0  100.0  134 
SK  35.3 53.7  0.7 10.3  100.0  437 
FI  88.1 8.4 3.5 0.0  100.0  3,917 
Sources: www.bulkgeocoder.com and Eurosystem staff estimates.129
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Finally, very few countries were provided with 
a measure of the turnover share (only Austria, 
Germany, France and Italy).
Technical Box 1
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PRICE DISPERSION AND CONVERGENCE
This box considers three measures of dispersion and/or convergence: (i) the standard deviation, 
(ii) the coefﬁ  cient of variation and (iii) regression to the mean analysis. The ﬁ  rst two are referred 
to as sigma (σ) convergence measures, while the third is known as beta (β) convergence.
(i) The standard deviation is the classical and most commonly used measure of the degree of 
variation or dispersion around the average (mean). A low standard deviation indicates low price 
dispersion and the fall in the standard deviation over time is interpreted as convergence. However, 
while the advantages of this measure are that it is easy to calculate and understand, is in the same 
“dimension” as the underlying variable and is widely used, the disadvantages of it are that it is not 
“scale-independent” and is not directly calculable using published PPP data on relative price levels 
which are index to reference (e.g. EU15 = 100). To extract the standard deviation of prices using 
PPP data, it is necessary to have a measure of the actual price level for the reference “country” 
(Eurostat usually publishes PPP data with either EU15 = 100 or EU 27 = 100).
(ii) The coefﬁ  cient of variation is simply the standard deviation of a variable divided by 
its average or mean. It is used to correct for scale, but may provide a misleading picture of 
convergence depending on how prices are considered. As PPPs are presented as relative price 
levels (e.g. EU15 = 100), it is only possible to directly calculate the coefﬁ  cient of variation 
(as the relative price levels are effectively demeaned). Similar to the standard deviation, a low 
coefﬁ  cient of variation indicates low price dispersion and a fall over time is interpreted as 
convergence – although, as discussed below, this may not actually be the case.
(iii) The third measure, using regression to the mean analysis (so-called beta (β) regressions 
or beta (β) convergence), does not measure price dispersion per se, only the degree of 
convergence or divergence. Beta convergence is estimated using the following equation: 
PLcc,tt / PLcc,0 = αtt + βttPLcc,0, where PLcc,tt denotes the price level in a given country at the 
time tt, PLcc,0 denotes the price level in the same country in the base period, 0. If β < 0 and is 
statistically signiﬁ  cant, then beta-convergence is said to take place. It is often used and has intuitive 
appeal, but may be biased towards signiﬁ  cance. This bias has given rise to an extensive literature, 
referred to as the convergence (or Galton’s) fallacy literature – see, for example, Neary (1988), 
Boyle and McCarthy (1999), Quah (1993), etc.
Regarding which measure, if any, is best, it turns out that this may depend on the underlying 
nature of the data. More speciﬁ  cally, it boils down to whether one believes that dispersion and 
convergence should be measured in absolute or percentage terms.130
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Technical Box 2
COMBINING PPP AND HICP DATA
As noted in the main text, Eurostat’s PPP 
data are presented in the form of price level 
indices (PLIs), where a benchmark reference 
(normally EU-15 or EU-27) is equal to 100. 
Unfortunately, the PPP data are not designed 
to provide time series information on prices. 
This implies that one can only calculate the 
coefﬁ   cient of variation and not standard 
deviations, as the PLIs are “rebased” or “re-
meaned” to the benchmark each period, and 
data on the evolution of the average EU-15 
price level from which the standard deviation 
could be backed out are not available.
In order to retrieve this information and to 
assess the impact of the general trend in the 
price level on measures of dispersion, PPP 
data (to provide a cross-section dimension) 
have been combined with HICP data 
(to provide a time series dimension). Price 
level indices have been obtained from 
Eurostat’s PPP dataset for 146 consumption 
items. This level of disaggregation is more 
detailed than that available for the HICP (93 sub-components), particularly for food products. 
Of the 146 PPP data series, 58 directly match detailed HICP sub-component data on a one-to-one 
basis. 82 need to be aggregated somewhat to obtain 28 HICP series. There are a small number of 
series (mainly related to insurance) for which the HICP dataset is more detailed. Lastly, there are 
four PPP reference series (gambling, prostitution, narcotics and imputed rentals for housing) for 
which there is no HICP corollary. Thus, moving from PPP to HICP data, the number of available 
individual price series declines from 146 to 89 (see the Chart for an overview).
Matching detailed PPP and HICP data
































PPP 58 82 2 4
HICP 58 28 7 0
Source: Eurosystem staff calculations.131
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